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ARTICLE
A MATTER OF PROSTITUTION:
BECOMING RESPECTABLE
BEVERLY BALOS* & MARY LOUISE FELLOWS**
Feminists have achieved significant antiviolence legal reforms in the areas of do-
mestic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape over the past three decades. These re-
forms, however, have reinforced old borders between the traditional categories of
violence and prostitution and have constructed new borders by maintaining the dis-
tinction between worthy and unworthy women. Despite these flaws, the law reform
efforts have the capacity to transform the legal and social meaning of prostitution.
By adopting an approach that transcends consent or coercion and private or public,
Professors Fellows and Balos use the concept of respectability to introduce an ana-
lytically powerful framework for rethinking prostitution as a paradigm of degrada-
tion and as a practice of inequality.
First, the authors explain the role these dichotomies play in maintaining social hier-
archies through the discourse of respectability. Next, the authors situate the rela-
tionship among prostitution, racial and gendered cultural practices, and rights of
citizenship within the degradation/respectability framework. The authors use the
concept of respectability to critique previous reform efforts and to propose a possi-
ble civil rights remedy that is not dependent on the traditional concepts of consent
and coercion and individual liberty. In this way, they avoid polarizing the debate
and create a genuine opportunity for significant legal reform in the area of prostitu-
tion. Ultimately, the authors elaborate a theory of citizenship that undermines the
degeneracy/respectability dichotomy and that does not depend on an idea of
worthiness.
Representative Howard Orenstein: Mr. Chair, I listened to the tes-
timony and it was quite compelling, and it's undeniable that there is
massive coercion going on in society with terrible consequences. I
guess my question would be that, is it the position of the author, of
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A., 1972, SUNY-Binghamton;
J.D., 1977, University of Minnesota.
** Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.B.A., 1970, J.D., 1975,
University of Michigan.
Parts of this Article rely on ideas and concepts developed with Professor Sherene
Razack in an article previously published. See Mary Louise Fellows & Sherene Razack,
The Race to Innocence: Confronting Hierarchical Relations Among Women, 1 J. Gender,
Race & Just. 335 (1998). The authors wish to thank Margaret A. Baldwin, Martha E.
Chamallas, Sumi K. Cho, Nancy L. Cook, Adrienne D. Davis, and Evelina Giobbe for their
valuable comments on earlier drafts. The authors also wish to thank Andrew Holly and
Sarah Jepsen for their research assistance. Finally, the authors wish to thank the Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School for its support.
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A MATTER OF PROSTITUTION
the proponents [of this Bill] that a woman could never, under any
circumstances, actually give consent to engage in this act?1
Representative Andrew Dawkins: [I]n the House [Minnesota
House of Representatives] we wanted to make it absolutely clear
that we believe that a wom[a]n acting alone without any third party
involved, without any coercion involved as an adult, really does
have control over her own body and does have some [control over]
making decisions and we didn't want to make the statute a pre-
sumption that simple transaction of money between the john and
the prostitute by itself without more would constitute a[n] act of
coercion. So we carved out... what then [became] referred to-we
should find a better [name] for it-the "innocent john" provision
[of] our bill.
Senator David Knutson: Mr. Chairman, I don't think there are any
innocent johns ....
Representative Andrew Dawkins: Maybe I'm not quite getting it
and I could be, I'm trying to listen and learn here too, but the main
point that I want to convey is that I don't want to concede anywhere
in our law that an adult woman who's not being coerced by any
third party or any other circumstances, except for her own actions,
can make a decision about her own body and I'm trying to carve
that out and protect it.2
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the Minnesota legislature considered and ultimately en-
acted a statute that gives a person the right to sue for damages caused
by his or her being used in prostitution.3 This statute provides that
1 Act Involving Coercion into Prostitution: Hearing on H.F. 2519 Before the House
Judiciary Comm., 78th Sess. (Moin. 1994) (statement of Rep. Howard Orenstein) (tran-
script prepared by author, on file with the New York University Law Reviewt,).
2 Act Involving Coercion into Prostitution: Hearing on H.F. 2519 Before the Minne-
sota Legislative Conference Comm., 78th Sess. (Minn. 1994) (statements of Rep. Andrew
Dawkins and Sen. David Knutson) (transcript prepared by author, on file with the New
York University Law Review).
3 Minn. Stat Ann. §§ 611A.80-611A.88 (West Supp. 1999). Although the statute is
written in gender neutral language and its provisions apply to any person coerced into
prostitution, this Article focuses on women in prostitution. We limit the inquiry to women
for two reasons. First, women are overwhelmingly the persons most often used in prostitu-
tion by men, and, therefore, the meaning of prostitution is very much influenced by the
actions of men buying sex from women. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Miller et al., The United
States, in Prostitution: An International Handbook on Trends, Problems, and Policies 300,
313 (Nanette J. Davis ed., 1993) ("Most prostitutes in the United States are female; most
customers, male."). Second, within a society that treats heterosexuality as the norm, the
meaning and practice of prostitution is substantially different for women in prostitution
and for the men who are buying sex from them than it is for transsexual persons and men
who sell sex to men; therefore, the three types of prostitution require separate analysis.
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procurers (including owners of escort services, saunas, and other pros-
titution-related businesses) 4 and those who seek to buy sex5 are re-
sponsible for the injuries caused6 when they coerce adults into
prostitution or into remaining in prostitution.7 Modeled after a Flor-
ida statute,8 this new civil cause of action grew out of the efforts of a
coalition formed by the authors, their students, and a grassroots advo-
cacy organization. 9
See generally Sheila Jeffreys, The Idea of Prostitution 102-15 (1997) (reviewing literature
concerning transsexual and male prostitution).
Not atypically, under Minnesota law, prostitution means "engaging or offering or
agreeing to engage for hire in sexual penetration or sexual contact." Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 609.321(9) (West Supp. 1999). This legal definition emphasizes a woman's selling of sex
and obscures the act of purchasing sex. For purposes of this Article, we will use the term to
mean the market exchange of sex for money so that we remain analytically attentive to the
actions of both the seller and the buyer of sex. We also include reference to the market in
acknowledgment of the activity as organized, readily available, and distinguishable from
other activity in which the payment of money for sex is indirect or at least less explicit and
unambiguous. We use the term "money" for simplicity but intend it to encompass both
money and money's worth so as not to exclude bartering situations in which sex is ex-
changed for shelter, drugs, or other goods or services. For a discussion of the difficulties of
designing a working definition of prostitution, see Rita Nakashima Brock & Susan Brooks
Thistlethwaite, Casting Stones: Prostitution and Liberation in Asia and the United States
10-15 (1996); R. Barri Flowers, The Prostitution of Women and Girls 5-8 (1998); see also
Jane Mills, Womanwords: A Dictionary of Words About Women 53,54-55, 114-15, 119-20,
122-23, 129, 139-40 (1989) (describing semantic histories of prostitution-related words, such
as concubine, courtesan, harlot, hooker, hussy, Jezebel, and loose, as well as others); Car-
ole Pateman, The Sexual Contract 195-99 (1988) (discussing prostitution's meaning as
rooted in patriarchal capitalist context of nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
4 Throughout this Article we refer to procurers as pimps. The term "pimp" refers to
one who procures sexual services for others. It is of unknown origin but may be connected
with the Middle French word for a small eel, pimpreneu or pimperneau, which was also
used to refer to a knave, rascal, valet, and scoundrel; alternatively, it may be related to the
Middle French term pimper, meaning to dress up elegantly or adorn. See Barnhart Dic-
tionary of Etymology 795 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988); An Etymological Dictionary of
the English Language 452 (Rev. Walter W. Skeat ed., 1963).
5 Throughout this Article we refer to the purchaser of sex as a john. We use this term
because it was the invention of women in prostitution who wanted to convey the notion
that the men who buy sex are indistinguishable from one another. See Jeffreys, supra note
3, at 3; 2 Random House Historical Dictionary of American Slang 301 (J.E. Lighter ed.,
1997).
6 See infra note 24 (describing variety of harms experienced by women in
prostitution).
7 The statute permits those who were used in prostitution while minors to sue for
damages without having to demonstrate coercion. See § 611A.81(1)(b). For further dis-
cussion of juveniles in prostitution, see D. Kelly Weisberg, Children of the Night: A Study
of Adolescent Prostitution (1985).
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 796.09 (West 1992). Margaret Baldwin drafted and testified on be-
half of the Florida statute. See Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and
Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 Yale J.L. & Feminism 47, 97 (1992).
9 In 1992 and 1993, Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt
(WHISPER), a grassroots organization based in the Twin Cities, which advocates for
women used in prostitution, undertook a public policy initiative to develop legislative pro-
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On the one hand, the statute reflects conventional understandings
of tort law in that it allows an adult woman to recover damages for
injuries suffered in prostitution only if she can show that she was co-
erced into, or into remaining in, prostitutionlo It also relies on a con-
ventional understanding of prostitution because it presumes that a
woman who freely consents to the market exchange of sex for money
suffers no recoverable harm. On the other hand, the statute's expan-
sive definition of coercion narrows the meaning of "freely given con-
sent" in a significant way.1 While the statute defines "coercion" to
include traditional meanings, such as acts of physical or mental tor-
ture,12 it also expands the term to include less overt exercises of
power. For example, defining the terms of an individual's employ-
ment or working conditions in a manner that leads foreseeably to the
individual's use in prostitution is deemed to be coercive, as is a prom-
ise of financial rewards, a promise of marriage, isolating an individual
from others, and exploiting those who have been victims of previous
sexual abuse.' 3 This broad definition of coercion narrows the statu-
tory definition of consent, thereby enabling a woman used in prostitu-
tion to obtain recognition for harms that would otherwise remain
invisible to society and the law.14
In addition, the statute limits a defendant's recourse to proof of
consent to rebut evidence of coercion.15 For example, the statute pro-
vides that traditional objective criteria, such as the fact that the plain-
tiff consented to engage in prostitution, that the plaintiff was
compensated, that the plaintiff made no attempt to flee or otherwise
posals to reform the law of prostitution. The authors collaborated with WHISPER, offer-
ing a seminar in the fall of 1993 at the University of Minnesota Law Sdool titled
"Prostitution and Public Policy," which was co-taught by Mary Louise Fellows and Evelina
Giobbe, who was then director of public policy for WHISPER. The students in the semi-
nar developed several legislative proposals. In the semester beginning in January 1994,
Beverly Balos taught a legislative clinic to provide an opportunity for students who had
participated in the public policy seminar to continue their work and learn about the legisla-
tive process. The students and WHISPER presented their proposals to legislators and
policymakers in a public forum. Subsequently, WHISPER chose two of the proposed law
reforms as priorities for their legislative efforts: (1) the creation of a civil cause of action
for individuals coerced into prostitution and (2) the elimination of a "mistake of age" de-
fense to the charge of promoting or engaging in prostitution. The students in the legislative
clinic continued to collaborate with WHISPER in refining the proposals, participating in
the education of legislators, and monitoring the bills as they made their way through the
legislative process and were enacted into law in May 1994.
10 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.81(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999).
11 See id. § 611A.80(2).
12 See id. § 611A.80(2)(2).
13 See id. § 611A.80(2)(5), (11), (12), (14), (17).
14 See infra note 24 (describing variety of harms experienced by women in
prostitution).
15 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.82 (West Supp. 1999).
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terminate contact with the defendant, that as a condition of employ-
ment the defendant required the plaintiff to agree not to engage in
prostitution, or that the defendant's place of business was posted with
signs prohibiting prostitution or prostitution-related activities, do not
constitute a defense to an action claiming coercion. 16 This list of "acts
not defenses" constrains defendants from exploiting and manipulating
the conventional understanding of the doctrine of consent in a manner
that would undermine the statute's definition of coercion.
As the legislative history demonstrates, the proposed civil cause
of action, which embraced the typical coercion/consent framework but
reconfigured the meaning of coercion and consent,17 invoked strong
reactions from some legislators who expressed apprehension in al-
lowing anyone to recover damages resulting from consensual con-
duct.18 Their concerns focused on fairness for the defendant and
autonomy for the woman. In the context of prostitution, consent is
not morally transformative in that it does not convert illegal conduct
into legal conduct.' 9 Regardless of a woman's consent, the market
exchange of sex for money remains illegal. Notwithstanding the ille-
gality of the conduct, some legislators worried about the fairness of a
law that asserts that "yes" does not mean "yes."' 20 Other legislators
16 See id. § 611A.82(1), (2), (5), (7), (8).
17 The coercion/consent dichotomy is, of course, not a modem invention. See Barbara
Meil Hobson, Uneasy Virtue: The Politics of Prostitution and the American Reform Tradi-
tion 99 (1987) (reporting that "[t]hroughout the Victorian era, discussion of the causes of
prostitution centered on the voluntary-or-involuntary question").
18 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting statements of Rep. Andrew
Dawkins and Sen. David Knutson).
19 For discussion of the morally transformative nature of consent, see Alan
Wertheimer, Consent and Sexual Relations, 2 Legal Theory 89, 90 (1996).
20 See, for example, Representative David Bishop's statement made during delibera-
tions of the conference committee on the bill:
What is the purpose here? [If t]he purpose of this bill is really to get at the
johns and use an attack of prostitution by putting financial pressure and causes
of action against johns, then say so and make it quite simple. If the purpose of
the bill is all these methods of pressure, where you're pressuring here a minor
or an adult into prostitution, that's a different kind of case. Then you're after
the madam, procurer, pimp, the person who puts the person into prostitution.
And my perception of the bill is that was what the purpose was. That's why I
signed onto the bill; when it appeared that what [we were] really going to be
doing was arming people with lists of patrons, johns, customers, with an oppor-
tunity to go begin a series .. of law suits for the purpose [of suing those
persons] who were customers, johns, patrons, of the prostitute. When that ap-
peared to be the real opportunity of the bill, the cause of action of the bill, I
was concerned. That's [what] I was worried about. And I think that that is the
true purpose. I think the true purpose of [it] is to get at the johns and if that's
the case, it ought to be honestly reported.... I can see attorneys getting clients
to bring them their record books with names and addresses and dates and start
taking tape recordings and testimony and get lined up with complaints and
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adopted feminist arguments, criticizing the proposed civil cause of ac-
tion for treating as victims women who were exercising agency in
choosing to engage in prostitution.21 As one legislator explained to us
in a private meeting, he did not see how he could support a woman's
choice to have an abortion and, at the same time, support legislation
that did not recognize her choice to engage in prostitution.
Ultimately, the legislators amended the bill to provide that the
payment of money cannot by itself constitute coercion." For the re-
mainder of the legislative hearings, the amendment was referred to as
the "innocent john" exception.P Unquestionably, the exception sig-
nificantly undermines the proposal's initial challenge to the consent/
coercion framework.
The statute and its legislative history raise two disturbing ques-
tions: Why, in the face of extended testimony about the harms of
prostitution,2 4 did many legislators nevertheless ask whether a woman
start to process sequential collections. And I don't know if that's what we
want to do. [If this is going to be] a method of attacking prostitution, I think it
honestly has to be said so. [Bec]ause that's what's going to happen when we
sign the bill.
Act Involving Coercion into Prostitution: Hearing on H.F. 2519 Before the Minnesota
Legislative Conference Comm., supra note 2.
21 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (quoting statements of Reps. Howard
Orenstein and Andrew Dawkins).
22 Compare S.F. 2112, 78th Sess. (Minn. 1994) (on file with the New York University
Law Review), with Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.81(1) (West Supp. 1999).
23 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting statements of Rep. Andrew
Dawkins and Sen. David Knutson).
24 See Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 186-91, 259-63 (identifying harms to and abuse of
women in prostitution).
Understanding the harms caused by prostitution requires an appreciation of the fact
that most persons used in prostitution have a history of physical and sexual abuse in child-
hood. See Ine Vanwesenbeeck, Prostitutes Well-Being and Risk 21-24 (1994); Mimi H.
Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Early Sexual Exploitation as an Influence in Prostitution, 28 Soc.
Work 285, 285-88 (1983) [hereinafter Silbert & Pines, Early Sexual Exploitation]; Mimi H.
Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Victimization of Street Prostitutes, 7 Victimology 122, 125-27
(1982) [hereinafter Silbert & Pines, Victimization]; Ronald L Simons & Les B. Whitbeck,
Sexual Abuse as a Precursor to Prostitution and Victimization Among Adolescent and
Adult Homeless Women, 12 J. Fain. Issues 361, 363, 370-71 (1991). It is well documented
that persons in prostitution frequently experience sexual and physical violence. See
Kathleen Barry, The Prostitution of Sexuality 36 (1995); Vanwesenbeeck, supra, at 154-56;
Melissa Farley & Howard Barkan, Prostitution, Violence, and Posttraumatic Stress Disor-
der, 27(3) Women & Health 37,38 (1998); Silbert & Pines, Victimization, supra, at 127-30.
The type and severity of abuse experienced by persons used in prostitution are illus-
trated in a recent study in which 130 people who engaged in prostitution in San Francisco
were "interviewed regarding the extent of violence in their lives and symptoms of posttrau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD)." Farley & Barkan, supra, at 37. According to the study,
82% of the respondents reported having been assaulted since entering prostitution and
68% reported having been raped since entering prostitution. See id. at 40-41. The study
also indicates that 48% of the respondents had been raped more than five times. See id. at
41. In addition, it found that women and transgender persons who engaged in prostitution
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could consent to engage in prostitution? Why did some of the legisla-
tors embrace reasoning that led them to support the equality of all
women by recognizing the autonomy of a woman who consents to sex
were more likely than men who engaged in prostitution to experience physical assaults and
were more likely to be raped. See id.
The same study finds a 57% prevalence of a history of childhood sexual abuse-a rate
lower than that reported in other research. See id. at 40, 44. The authors of the study
provide two possible reasons for the lower figure. They suggest that it is likely that, for
respondents "in the midst of ongoing trauma," reviewing childhood abuse was probably
too painful. See id. at 44. "Several respondents commented that they did not want to
think about their past." Id. The authors also noted that many seemed profoundly uncer-
tain as to what abuse is. See id. For example, the authors report that "[a] number of
respondents reported having been recruited into prostitution at the age 12 or 13, but also
denied having been molested as children." Id.
The study indicates that 84% of the respondents reported current or past homeless-
ness. See id. It also indicates that drug abuse was reported by 75% of the respondents and
that 50% reported physical health problems. See id. According to the study, 68% of the
respondents met the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. See id. at 42. The authors describe
the severity of the PTSD by comparing the respondents with other population groups. See
id. For example, the respondents had a mean PCL score (an index of PTSD severity) of
54.9, compared with a mean of 50.6 for 123 PTSD treatment-seeking Vietnam veterans and
a mean of 34.8 for 1006 Persian Gulf war veterans. See id. The mean PCL for respondents
in the study is also high when compared to mean PCL scores derived from a random sam-
ple of women who sought healthcare through a health maintenance organization. See id.
In that survey, mean PCL scores were 30.6 for 25 women who reported a history of physi-
cal abuse in childhood, 36.8 for 27 women who reported a history of physical and sexual
abuse in childhood, and 24.4 for 26 controls in the same study. See id. Other studies also
suggest that women in prostitution generally fare less well than other women. See
Vanwesenbeeck, supra, at 108-10. While some women in prostitution have high well-being,
others have numerous health complaints, even compared to women not in prostitution but
who have experienced severe trauma. See id.
In another recent study of women engaged in street prostitution in Glasgow, Scotland,
which was conducted over a two year period, researchers found that 71.6% of the women
they studied in year one and 75.4% in year two were injecting drugs. See Neil McKeganey
& Marina Barnard, Sex Work on the Streets: Prostitutes and Their Clients 38 (1996). The
researchers also found an interdependent relationship between prostitution and drug use:
The women worked to finance their drug use and used drugs to enable them to work. As
one woman described the experience:
If I've no' had a hit, you jus' want it over an' done with. If you've had a hit,
you can stand and work nae bother, it doesnae bother you, you know what I
mean. But ye see if you're strait, ye start to think about it, then things start
flooding back intae your mind and you're sayin' 'I don't want to dae this', you
know what I mean.
Id. at 91. For the women interviewed for this study, "[v]iolence was such a frequent occur-
rence within the street prostitution scene that it was almost commonplace .... [V]iolence
was reported by nearly all of the woman interviewed .... ." Id. at 70.
Yet another type of harm experienced concerns sexually transmitted diseases, which
occur at high levels among women in prostitution. Data collected from 1963 women en-
gaged in prostitution in New York City who participated in a program that provides HIV
testing, condoms, bleach kits for cleaning needles, and HIV prevention information shows
that "35.2% tested positive for HIV, 26.5% reported a history of gonorrhea, and 18.1%
indicated that they had syphilis." Adele Weiner, Understanding the Social Needs of
Streetwalking Prostitutes, 41 Soc. Work 97, 99 (1996).
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for money?25 Underlying these questions is a more fundamental one:
Would prostitution exist in a world of equality?26
Our thesis is that prostitution, through the consent/coercion and
private/public dualities, enforces and reinforces social, economic, and
political hierarchical differences. As a way to understand prostitu-
tion's role in maintaining subordinated social categories, we focus on
the distinction between unworthy/degenerate and worthy/respectable
women and the two ways prostitution functions to maintain this dis-
tinction. First, prostitution functions as a paradigm for degeneracy
that supports social inequalities based on class, disability, gender, race,
and sexuality. Second, it functions as a practice of inequality.
Through an analysis that relies on the concepts of degeneracy and re-
spectability, we demonstrate prostitution's role in undermining efforts
to move toward greater social equality and explain how prostitution in
the United States supports social hierarchies wherever and however it
is practiced.27
25 A similar debate among feminists currently is taking place regarding the question of
whether prostitution should be understood as violating human rights or whether consen-
sual or "free" prostitution should be recognized as part of the human right of women to
self-determination. See Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 306-38 (describing debate in context of
international conventions against trafficking of women and prostitution); see also infra
notes 174-77, 184-222, 303-09 and accompanying text (discussing usefulness of consent and
choice analyses when considering legal reform strategies for prostitution); infra text accom-
panying note 331 (same).
26 Although others have considered the relationship of prostitution to equality, they
have typically employed gender or gender and class critiques to analyze the issues. See,
e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
Cal. L, Rev. 777, 828-30, 842-43 (1988) (discussing difficulty of envisioning prostitution in
model of "egalitarian sexual conduct" due to economic and social coercion inflicted upon
women); Christine Overall, What's Wrong with Prostitution? Evaluating Sex Work, 17
Signs 705, 717-22 (1992) (critiquing prostitution as classist industry). Our goal is to con-
sider equality by looking to the interrelationship among social hierarchies. The analysis
focuses on power relations and the interlocking nature of systems of oppression. See
Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics
of Empowerment 222-27 (1990) (investigating significance of analyzing race, class, and gen-
der as interlocking systems of oppression); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dom-
inance: On Sex Discrimination, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32,
40 (1987) (describing "dominance approach" in which "an equality question is a question
of the distribution of power").
27 Prostitution has engendered considerable debate among feminists. At the center of
the debate is the consent/coercion and private/public dualities. On one side are those who
view prostitution as work and an expression of a woman's sexual autonomy. See infra
notes 323-25 and accompanying text (discussing workers' rights approaches and goals). On
the other side are those who view prostitution as a form of violence against women. See
infra notes 326-30 and accompanying text (discussing antiviolence groups' approaches).
The opposing views of prostitution lead to further disagreements on legal reform ap-
proaches, including the question of whether prostitution should be totally decriminalized
or decriminalized only for those persons used in prostitution. See infra notes 323-24, 327
and accompanying text (discussing two groups' positions regarding decriminalization).
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We examine consent/coercion, private/public, and degeneracy/re-
spectability by analyzing the legal reforms that address traditional cat-
egories of violence against women, as well as the antiviolence
discourses that surround them. Through our analysis of the advances
in theories and reforms of the laws of domestic abuse, sexual harass-
ment, and rape, we expose the link between prostitution and inequal-
ity. Our purpose is to show that, while reform efforts in these areas
perpetuate social hierarchies because prostitution is excluded from
the discourse, at the same time these reforms have the potential to
disrupt social hierarchies by transforming the legal and social meaning
of prostitution.28
Part I describes how domestic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape
are interrelated, and how prostitution figures into these forms of sex-
ual violence and into the laws that address them. It reveals a correla-
tion between the pervasiveness of violence and the pervasiveness of
prostitution in women's lives by showing how prostitution functions as
a paradigm that underlies the law of violence against women. Part II
analyzes the legal reforms in the laws of domestic abuse, sexual har-
assment, and rape that legislatures have enacted over the past three
decades. It suggests that these reforms have either reinforced familiar
boundaries between traditional categories of violence against women
and prostitution or have constructed new distinctions. 29 At the same
time, however, this Part argues that efforts to reform the law can po-
tentially transform the legal and social meaning of prostitution.
In Part III, this Article explores how degeneracy and its opposite
counterpart, respectability, operate to perpetuate social inequalities,
with prostitution marking the boundary between those women whom
Our analytical framework is informed by this debate, but we rely on it primarily to demon-
strate that a transformation of prostitution is limited so long as it is understood either as a
matter of private choice or as a matter of coercion warranting state intervention. See infra
notes 325, 331 and accompanying text (discussing how agendas of both groups represent
claims for respectability and therefore reinforce rather than disrupt social inequalities).
28 The degeneracy/respectability dichotomy operates in society on two levels. Some-
times it operates unconsciously as a habit of mind. Other times people use it as an inten-
tional strategy for pursuing respectability and distinguishing their status and conduct from
the taint of degeneracy. The embeddedness of the dichotomy in contemporary thought
and practices makes it difficult to dismantle. We thank Martha Chamallas for this insight.
29 Throughout this Article we rely on the spatial metaphors of borders and boundaries
to signify that prostitution is practiced, as well as imagined, as a transgressive act. This
Article neither draws directly from spatial analysis literature nor addresses in any detail
the spatial implications of prostitution. Nevertheless, our ideas are informed importantly
by the study of social spaces and borders that challenge conventional understandings of the
role of law found in the legal literature. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1293
(1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1841 (1994).
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society labels unworthy and those women whom our society and cul-
ture construct as respectable. By locating the contemporary practice
of prostitaition within the historical context of nineteenth-century Eu-
rope and the United States, Part III shows how prostitution enforces
and reinforces hierarchical differences in modem society. Drawing on
the insights of critical race feminists, this Part also analyzes the inter-
relationships among prostitution, racial and gendered cultural prac-
flees, and rights of citizenship within the degeneracy/respectability
framework.
Having found in Part III that prostitution plays a significant role
in perpetuating inequality by reinforcing cultural norms of respecta-
bility, Part IV proposes political and legal strategies that can further
the goal of social equality by moving the discourse beyond the degen-
eracy/respectability dichotomy. The proposals include the creation of
a civil rights remedy to address the inequality perpetuated by prostitu-
tion, as well as the amendment of criminal statutes so that persons
used in prostitution are no longer penalized. The statutes would, how-
ever, still hold criminally liable those who purchase services from per-
sons used in prostitution, procure others for use in prostitution, or
knowingly benefit financially from a person used in prostitution.
These proposals, taken together, have the potential to disrupt the de-
generacy/respectability dichotomy and thereby move us closer to a
world of equality. The Conclusion summarizes the reasons why re-
form strategies that are based on notions of respectability reinforce
social hierarchies. It urges those of us who are interested in social
change to develop equality strategies by elaborating a theory of citi-
zenship that does not depend on a concept of worthiness. Otherwise,
prostitution will remain a paradigmatic model of degeneracy and a
practice that perpetuates inequality.
I
PROSTITUTION AND THE CONTINUUM OF VIOLENCE
This section argues that domestic abuse, sexual harassment, and
rape constitute a continuum of violence against women, and that as-
sumptions about prostitution underlie societal attitudes about these
acts of violence. Recognizing how prostitution relates to traditional
categories of violence against women and that it is a part of the con-
tinuum, we assert that reforming the laws of domestic abuse, sexual
harassment, and rape has the potential to transfigure prostitution. 30
30 We would include pornography and other aspects of the sex industry within the con-
tinuum of violence against women. The analysis necessary to support that position is dif-
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Traditionally, crimes of violence against women are disaggregated
into separate acts of violence, with specific, defining features. In con-
trast, the notion of a continuum of violence reflects women's lived
experiences: Violence is pervasive in all the places where they live
their lives-in their homes, their workplaces, and in public spaces.
The continuum also makes clear the relationship between the law's
assessment of women's rights to legal redress and societal and legal
attitudes about prostitution. Feminists frequently criticize the manner
in which the legal establishment and society scrutinize the conduct
and motivations of a woman who is subjected to domestic abuse, har-
assment, or rape more than they scrutinize the perpetrator when de-
termining whether the nature and severity of the harm the woman has
suffered warrants legal intervention.31 In situations of domestic
abuse, a woman is typically asked whether she provoked the violence
and why she remained in the relationship. 32 In cases of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace, the questions pertain to whether the woman
welcomed the conduct and why she remained in that employment.33
In rape, the critical inquiry is whether the woman consented. This
entails subsidiary questions about why she was where she was, wear-
ing what she was wearing, and behaving the way she was behaving.3 4
ferent from the analysis of prostitution presented here and therefore beyond the scope of
this Article.
31 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 174-75
(1989) (condemning law's focus on women's consent in rape cases); Carol Smart, Feminism
and the Power of Law 33 (1989) (noting that women's sexual history is relevant to courts in
rape cases); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale LJ. 1087, 1094-95 (1986) [hereinafter Estrich,
Rape] (noting that courts focus entirely on victim and only incidentally on defendant);
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 827 (1991) [hereinafter Estrich, Sex]
(criticizing scrutiny of victim's lifestyle in rape law); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's
Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 886, 895 (1989) (noting that legal definition of rape takes "male judicial
perspective" by focusing on victim's behavior); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Bat-
tered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1991) (describing
focus on women's volition in rape cases).
32 See Margaret A. Baldwin, Strategies of Connection: Prostitution and Feminist Poli-
tics, 1 Mich. J. Gender & L. 65, 71 (1993) (discussing "why did she stay" questions in
domestic abuse situations); Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in
Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1283, 1287 (1992) (compar-
ing society's focus on battered women's failure to exit abusive relationships to hearing's
focus on Anita Hill's failure to discontinue working for Clarence Thomas).
33 See Mahoney, supra note 32, at 1286-87 (discussing focus on Anita Hill's decision to
stay in her job).
34 See Smart, supra note 31, at 36-38 (discussing relevance of women's consent in rape
trials); Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 757, 766-67 (1992) (noting courts' tendency to focus on victims' behav-
ior); Baldwin, supra note 32, at 71 (criticizing litany of questions about their behavior that
rape victims face); Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 Law & Phil. 5, 10 (1992) (discuss-
ing questions asked of rape victims that focus on women's culpability); Estrich, Sex, supra
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When a woman engages in prostitution, however, no questions need
be asked. Both society and the law simply presume that the woman
provoked, welcomed, and consented to the conduct, given what she
was wearing, where she went, and the fact that she received money35
Where the circumstances involve prostitution, the failure to ask these
questions does not mean that the woman is not the focus of the in-
quiry. It just means that the inquiry is framed by assumptions made
about a woman in prostitution.
These assumptions, which result in women who are engaged in
prostitution having little or no protection under the law, 6 establish a
paradigm for a certain type of conduct. It is against this paradigm that
society and the law measure whether, when violence against women
occurs, it is appropriate for civil or criminal law to intervene. The real
purpose of questions like "Why didn't she leave her partner?"; "Why
didn't she leave that job?"; "Why was she with that man?", is to ascer-
tain whether the woman obtained a benefit, especially an economic
one. The unstated assumption is that if a woman enjoyed a benefit,
she "assumed the risk" and therefore bears responsibility for the vio-
lence, leaving the alleged perpetrator less accountable for his behav-
ior. Here, prostitution serves as the paradigm for what constitutes an
undeserving claim of harm. What we had comfortably assumed to be
an inquiry into the elements of domestic abuse, sexual harassment, or
rape turns out to be an inquiry into how closely a woman's behavior
resembles prostitution.37
note 31, at 827 (describing focus on women's behavior in rape cases); Morrison Torrey,
When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecu-
tions, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1013, 1014-15 (1991) (discussing popular perception that
women's behavior is responsible for their victimization).
35 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 828-29 (describing one image of woman used in
prostitution as "that of a sexually uninhibited woman who has made a rational decision to
sell sexual services, given her restricted options for other high paying work" and reasoning
that "[i]n the search for a refurbished concept of consent that takes into account the needs
and desires of women, it is risky to ignore the fact that it is the woman herself who pro-
posed the encounter"); Evelina Giobbe, Prostitution: Buying the Right to Rape, in Rape
and Sexual Assault I: A Research Handbook 143, 159 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1991)
(observing that "because an exchange of money occurs, irrespective of whether the woman
herself maintains control of or benefits from this exchange, the client is given permission to
use the woman in a manner that would not be tolerated in any other business or social
arrangement (including marriage in some states); and the woman's acceptance of the
money is construed as her willingness to engage in such commerce").
36 See, e.g., infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussing how women in prosti-
tution are placed beyond protections of sexual harassment laws).
37 Evelina Giobbe has said that "[p]rostitution isn't like anything else. Rather, every-
thing else is like prostitution because it is the model for women's condition." Evelina
Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution, in The Sexual Liberals and the
Attack on Feminism 67,76 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990) [herein-
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For example, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,38 the
landmark United States Supreme Court case that recognized "hostile
environment" sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under
Title VII, the Court held that testimony about the complainant's sexu-
ally provocative speech or dress was not per se inadmissible to estab-
lish the element of unwelcomeness to the sexual advances. 39 The
Court found that "such evidence is obviously relevant. ' 40 In so doing,
the Court constructed its inquiry into the element of unwelcomeness
as an inquiry into how closely the complainant's dress and behavior
resembled the stereotypical dress and behavior of a woman in prosti-
tution. The Court thus telegraphed an unavoidable outcome: If in-
deed you dress and behave like a woman engaged in prostitution, then
the sexual advances will be deemed welcome and the claim of sexual
harassment will fail.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Berry4' reversed the
murder conviction of the defendant who had strangled his wife. The
opinion dwells on the victim's behavior in what the court described as
"a tormenting two weeks in which Rachel alternately taunted defen-
dant .. and at the same time sexually excited defendant. '42 There
was uncontroverted evidence that prior to the defendant's murder of
his wife by strangulation, he had choked her twice, at least once to the
point of unconsciousness. 43 The facts set out by the court also indicate
that during this time the defendant's wife was in the process of leaving
the defendant and had informed the defendant that she wanted a di-
vorce.44 Nevertheless, the court found that the victim's "long course
after Sexual Liberals]. Margaret Baldwin, in thinking about and analyzing Giobbe's state-
ment, speaks of prostitutes and "other women":
In substance, the distinction provides a handy means of identifying appropriate
female objects of punishment and contempt. To be deemed a "prostitute,"
whether by the state, or by a john, or by any other man for that matter, imme-
diately targets a girl or woman for arrest, for sexual assault, for murder, or, at
the very least, dismissive scorn. Victims of rape, of incest, of domestic battery,
of sexual harassment, are quite familiar with this difficulty. Declared to be
"whores" and "sluts" by the men who abuse them, women then confront a
legal system which puts the same issue in the form of a question: was she in
fact a "slut" who deserved it, as the perpetrator claims, or not-a-slut, deserving
of some redress? (The outcome of this interrogation is commonly referred to
as "justice.")
Baldwin, supra note 8, at 48.
38 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
39 See id. at 69.
40 Id.
41 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
42 Id. at 779.
43 See id.
44 See id.
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of provocatory conduct" entitled the defendant to a jury instruction
on voluntary manslaughter. 45 Here the court focused on the victim's
behavior, not the defendant's. It emphasized her relationship with an-
other man and that she had, in the court's view, used that relationship
to "taunt" the defendant.46 This focus permitted the court to base the
degree of the husband's culpability on the moral/good or immoral/bad
behavior of the wife. By characterizing the wife's conduct as sexually
provocative, the court depicted her as immoral/bad and therefore less
worthy of protection.47 The stereotype behind this construction is that
of the prostitute who, by her very nature, engages in sexually provoca-
tive behavior. The court's reasoning is clear: A woman who engages
in sexually provocative conduct behaves like a prostitute and is less
worthy of the law's protection. Further, the actions that she provokes
by her behavior are, at least in part, deserved.
In addition to prostitution's influence on the legal and social tra-
dition of focusing on the behavior of women and its paradigmatic role
as the standard by which the seriousness of charges of domestic abuse,
sexual harassment, and rape is evaluated, it is bound to these other
forms of violence in yet a third way. Women report acts of violence
that are embedded in the images of prostitution, which are often rein-
forced through pornography. Survivors of domestic abuse report that
their batterers use the epithets of "whore" and "slut" when beating
their victims.48 They also report being forced to look at pornography
45 Id. at 780, 781.
46 See id. at 779, 780.
47 See id. at 779 (finding that wife's "cumulative series of provocations" caused defen-
dant's "uncontrollable rage").
48 For example, the use of such derogatory terms is found in many cases involving do-
mestic abuse. In People v. Babich, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 1993), the defendant in an
assault case testified that he called the victim, a woman he had been dating off and on for
several years and had lived with for part of that time, a "'lying little slut and whore.'" Id.
at 62. Similarly, in People v. District Court, 595 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1979) (en banc), the court
relied on testimony in which "the defendant shouted at the deceased, calling her a 'bitch,
whore and slut,"' id. at 1046, to uphold a finding of probable cause for the prosecution
under the state's second degree murder statute against a defendant accused of killing the
woman he had been living with for some time. See id. at 1048. Similar examples can be
found in cases involving protective orders. In Commonwealth v. Robicheau, 654 N.E.2d
1196 (Mass. 1995), for example, the court admitted evidence concerning a previous inci-
dent in which the defendant had assaulted his wife and told his son that his mother -vas
nothing but a 'f-ing slut and whore."' Id. at 1198 nA.
The use of derogatory terms and epithets is common in sexual, as well as domestic,
abuse. For example, in Fuget v. State, 522 A.2d 1371 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1937), a case
upholding the defendant's conviction for committing unnatural and perverted sexual prac-
tices, sodomy, and assault and battery, the court referred to evidence indicating that the
defendant and victim had previously engaged in consensual relations and that when, on the
particular evening in question, the victim refused to perform fellatio, the defendant struck
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and sometimes being forced to replicate the acts portrayed. 49 Survi-
vors also report that attackers use similar epithets during rapes and
sometimes throw money at them afterwards.50
State v. Norman,51 a 1989 North Carolina Supreme Court case,
demonstrates how sometimes domestic abuse can take the form of
prostitution. In an unsuccessful appeal of her conviction for voluntary
manslaughter of her husband, Judy Norman argued that she was enti-
tled to have the jury consider whether the killing was done in self-
defense.52 She presented evidence to show that she fit the proffle of a
her jaw with his fist and threatened to kill her, telling the victim that "'all women were
whores and sluts and that they all deserved what [she] was getting."' Id. at 1373.
49 See The Minneapolis Hearings, in In Harm's Way: The Pornography Civil Rights
Hearings 39, 145-47 (testimony of S.G.), 149-51 (testimony of Wanda Richardson), 152-55
(testimony of Sharon Rice Vaughn) (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds.,
1997) (discussing connection between pornography and violence against women); Robin
West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney Gen-
eral's Commission on Pornography Report, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 681, 687-89
(describing several situations in which men forced women to replicate acts portrayed in
pornography, sometimes after forcing them to look at it first).
50 Numerous cases contain examples of attackers throwing money at rape victims after
the attack, which the victims frequently refuse. In People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal.
1992), the court affirmed a conviction for two counts of rape by a defendant where the
victim testified that, after forcing her to have intercourse, "the defendant offered her $50,
but she said she was not a prostitute and did not want the money." Id. at 963. Similarly, in
Clark v. State, No. 02C01-9112-CR-00273, 1993 WL 188052 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2,
1993), a rape victim testified that "the defendant.., tore off her pants breaking the zipper
and raped her,... and [then] put four or eight dollars in her pocket," which she threw to
the ground before she fled. Id. at *1. Instances of attackers throwing money at sexual
abuse victims occur even with child victims. See, e.g., Collier v. State, 711 So. 2d 458, 460
(Miss. 1998) (noting that defendant gave dollar to nine-year-old victim after fondling her
vaginal area and buttocks).
In addition to throwing money, attackers also frequently use epithets during rapes. In
State v. Shipp, 712 So. 2d 230 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 724 So. 2d 775 (La. 1998), the
court found that the defendant kidnapped his estranged wife, "tore off her shorts and car-
ried her to a bedroom where he took off the rest of her clothes and raped her, telling her,
'Now you know how sluts and whores feel."' Id. at 233. Similarly, in State v. Morton, Nos.
18682-9-II, 19090-7-II, 1998 WL 109993 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1998), after the police
arrested the defendant for various felonies including rape, the defendant allegedly said,
"Don't worry about it. Believe me it's no big deal.... That fucking whore, she practically
invited us over to her plae.... No big deal, anyway, she's nothing but a fucking whore.
She [probably] deserved it anyway." Id. at *4. In another rape case, the defendant told the
victim that "she 'was going to be his whore,' and that she was going to 'make him some
money by selling [her] body."' Fuller v. State, No. 05-92-00093-CR, 1998 WL 548709, at *2
(Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1998). For a historical analysis of the interaction of money and
rape in slavery, see bell hooks, Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism 25-26
(1981). hooks describes how white male slaveowners and overseers provided material
goods to enslaved African American women they raped, ostensibly converting a rape into
an economic exchange, and how the antislavery movement masked the rape of enslaved
African American women by labeling the sexual assaults acts of prostitution. See id. at 25-
26, 33-34.
51 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
52 See id. at 9.
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battered spouse to support her self-defense claim, which included tes-
timony that the deceased frequently assaulted her, struck her with var-
ious objects, and put out cigarettes on her body.53 There was also
testimony that
her husband did not work and forced her to make money by prosti-
tution, and that he made humor of that fact to family and friends.
He would beat her if she resisted going out to prostitute herself or if
he was unsatisfied with the amounts of money she made. He rou-
tinely called the defendant "dog," "bitch," and "whore," and on a
few occasions made her eat pet food out of the pets' bowls and bark
like a dog.54
As in domestic violence and rape cases, sexual harassers fre-
quently equate their victims to women in prostitution. It is not un-
common to find that the conduct alleged to constitute workplace
sexual harassment involves references to prostitution through porno-
graphic images.5 5 In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,56 for exam-
ple, the male shipyard workers targeted Lois Robinson by choosing
pornographic images that included women who resembled her.S Like
the batterers, the harassers in the shipyard sent the message that
Robinson deserved no respect because she was the woman in the por-
nography-"a whore." 58
In recognizing that the neat, legal categories of domestic abuse,
sexual harassment, rape, and prostitution do not accurately reflect
53 See id. at 10.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Harris v. City of Harvey, 993 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (N.D. I11. 998); Mahan v.
Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 179 F.R.D. 49,51 (D. Mass. 1998); Blakey v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 731, 733 (D.NJ. 1998); Szarka v. Reynolds Metal Co., 17 F.
Supp. 2d 115, 119 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
56 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
57 The federal district court in Robinson found:
[1] a picture of a nude woman with long blonde hair wearing high heels and
holding a whip, [was] waved around by a coworker... in an enclosed area
where Robinson and approximately six men were working.... Robinson testi-
fied she felt particularly targeted by this action because she has long blonde
hair and works with a welding tool known as a whip ... [;]
[2] a picture of a nude woman with long blonde hair sitting in front of a mirror
brushing her hair in a storage area on a ship... [; and]
.3] pictures in the toolroom trailer aboard the U.S.S. Saratoga, in January 1985,
including one of a nude woman with long blonde hair lying down propped up
on her elbow.
Id. at 1496.
58 In fact, Robinson was specifically labeled with that epithet in the workplace by her
coworkers. See id. at 1499. The court found that the workplace contained abusive lan-
guage written on the walls in the plaintiff's work area. See id. Among the graffiti vas the
phrase "lick me you whore dog bitch," which the court found "appeared on the wall over a
spot where Robinson had left her jacket." Id.
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how women experience acts of violence, we do not intend to obscure
the fact that each category of violence presents issues particular to it.
Our purpose, instead, is to expose that the prostitution paradigm, its
images and its threats, plays a role that is common in all categories of
violence along the continuum. In turn, the continuum reveals both
the pervasiveness of violence and the pervasiveness of prostitution as
a paradigm in women's lives. Because different categories of violence
interrelate with and support each other, legal reforms and changing
societal views of one form of violence affect the law's treatment and
society's understanding of the other forms of violence. For this rea-
son, legal reforms that expand protection from violence in the areas of
domestic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape have the potential to
blur the boundaries between each of these forms of violence and pros-
titution. 59 In response, law reformers have developed strategies that
seek to reinforce traditional distinctions or to construct new ones.
Notwithstanding those strategies, however, law reform efforts also
have the capacity to transform our legal and societal understanding of
prostitution.
II
PROSTITUTION AND LAW REFORM
Concerns about the inadequacy and underenforcement of the
laws of domestic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape emerged in the
1970s.60 Over the past three decades, feminist movements, with their
antecedents in the civil rights, antiwar, and Black liberation move-
ments of the 1950s and 1960s, have operated within consciousness-
raising groups, grassroots organizations, and academic institutions to
gain political influence and to make violence against women a na-
tional issue.61 Major successes in state legislatures, the Congress, and
59 See infra notes 73-78, 88-100, 171-80 and accompanying text (suggesting relationship
between antiviolence legal reforms and prostitution).
60 See generally Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (1975)
(analyzing both historical and contemporary accounts of harmful effects of rape and sexual
assault); R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Women, Violence and Social Change
36-37 (1992) (discussing national and regional activist coalitions formed in late 1970s to
influence domestic violence legislation); Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Har-
assment of Women on the Job (1978) (tracing history of sexual harassment in workplace);
Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered
Women's Movement 29-30 (1982) (describing heightened political consciousness about do-
mestic abuse in early 1970s as providing impetus for battered women's movement);
William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980,5 Yale J.L. &
Human. 265 (1993) (examining "cyclical movements" in law of, among other issues, homo-
sexuality and gender-related violence from 1920 to 1980).
61 See Brownmiller, supra note 60, at 8-9 (describing author's view of rape as formed
through informal women's groups, speakouts, and conferences); Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
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in the courts have been achieved, resulting in a substantial overhaul of
the laws on domestic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape.62 During
this period of law reform, the issues raised, the legislative agendas es-
tablished, and the laws enacted all but ignored prostitution.63 That is
not to say, however, that the changing legal climate has not affected
prostitution and women used in prostitution.
In the sections that follow, we present the arguments used in the
law reform efforts to distance women who have experienced domestic
abuse, sexual harassment, and rape from women in prostitution. We
also show, however, how these very efforts reveal the unavoidable re-
lationship between prostitution and domestic abuse, sexual harass-
ment, and rape. Foregrounding the role prostitution has played in the
law reforms and the discourse surrounding them shows how the legal
changes during the last three decades have the potential to transform
the legal and social meaning of prostitution.
A. Domestic Abuse
There have been three major legal developments in domestic
abuse law: the creation of civil protective orders,64 reform of the
criminal justice system to make arrest and prosecution for domestic
assault more effective,65 and the admissibility of expert testimony
Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response 69-70 (1990) (describing ac-
tivists' role in encouraging law enforcement agencies' and officers' response to domestic
violence); MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 84-86 (describing informal "consciousness-raising
groups" through which women in 1960s and 1970s began to confront and organize around
issues of inequality); Scheehter, supra note 60, at 56-58, 69-73, 84-87 (describing how femi-
nists, community activists, and former battered women worked together to establish shel-
ters, support groups, and public education programs, and to advocate for legal reforms
during emergence of battered women's movement in 1970s).
62 See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 61, at 12 (discussing domestic abuse law reform);
Dobash & Dobash, supra note 60, at 165-70, 197-203 (same); Estrich, Rape, supra note 31,
at 1133-61 (discussing rape law reform); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 Stan. L Rev. 691, 702-04 (1997) (discussing sexual harassment law
reform).
63 See infra notes 87-94, 171-80 and accompanying text (discussing antiviolence law re-
forms and ways that reform agendas excluded issues involving prostitution). But see, e.g.,
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 796.09 (West 1992) (providing women in prostitution civil cause of action
against persons who coerced them into prostitution).
64 Since 1976, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes provid-
ing victims of domestic abuse with the opportunity to obtain civil restraining orders of
protection against their abusers. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1003(a) (1981); Elena Salzman,
Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal
Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L Rev. 329, 333 n.25 (1994).
65 Reforms that have occurred in the criminal justice system include: (1) expanding the
authority of the police to make arrests based on probable cause and in some jurisdictions
imposing a requirement of mandatory arrest in cases of domestic assault or for violations
of civil protection orders; (2) mandating police and court systems to provide greater assist-
ance and information to victims; and (3) mandating training of criminal justice personnel.
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about the battered woman syndrome in cases where women are tried
for killing their abusers.66 Advocates for change had to contend with
and challenge numerous obstacles that inhered in traditional legal
doctrines. For example, society and the law considered physical abuse
by a husband against his wife to be a private matter, and therefore
deemed it inappropriate for the state to intervene.67 This private/pub-
lic distinction contributed to a long history of court decisions that re-
fused to recognize harm or to provide a legal remedy out of respect
See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 60, at 169-70; see also Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note
61, at 12 (noting that reforms have focused primarily on "police response to domestic vio-
lence, the handling of cases by prosecutors and the judiciary, and to a lesser extent....
educating the public.., and providing state funding").
66 Expert testimony is sometimes admitted into evidence to explain the actions of bat-
tered women who are on trial for killing their abusers. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921
P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1996); State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985). But see State v.
Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12-13 (N.C. 1989) (finding that to take into account that defendant
was battered woman would require changing requirement for self-defense that danger
must be imminent). The testimony is usually characterized by a description of the "bat-
tered women's syndrome" as part of the defendant's claim of self-defense. See, e.g.,
Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 3-4. This approach is based on the work of psychologist Lenore
Walker. Walker identified a three stage battering cycle and applied the concept of learned
helplessness as a way of understanding the victim's responses and actions. See Lenore
E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics &
Pub. Pol'y 321, 330 (1992) [hereinafter Walker, Battered Women Syndrome]. The bat-
tering cycle consists of phase one, a period of tension building; phase two, an acute bat-
tering incident; and phase three, the period of loving contrition. See id. According to
Walker, battered women learn that they cannot control their abusers' violence and they
begin to believe they cannot influence or escape it. See Lenore E.A. Walker, The Battered
Woman 47 (1979) [hereinafter Walker, Battered Woman]. Once this belief is in place, "the
perception becomes reality and they become passive, submissive, 'helpless."' Id.
The "battered women's syndrome" testimony is introduced to assist in judging the
applicability of the defense of self-defense. Since its introduction, a number of commenta-
tors have criticized the development of the use of the "battered women's syndrome." See
Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-
Defense, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 121, 136 (1985) (noting inherent contradiction battered
women's syndrome raises by characterizing battered women as passive in self-defense
cases, yet still capable of killing their abusers, making them exceptions to group of which
they are part); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 23, 35-36 (suggesting that
battered women's syndrome reinforces stereotypes of women as alien, incomprehensible,
and unreasonable); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-De-
fense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep.
195, 198-99 (1986) (arguing that despite purpose for which this expert testimony was con-
ceived, old sex-biased stereotypes of incapacity and helplessness are replicated); Sharon
Angella Allard, Note, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspec-
tive, 1 UCLA Women's L.J. 191, 194 (1991) (arguing that battered women's syndrome
relies on prevailing gender characterizations of dominant white society).
67 See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 61, at 31; Dobash & Dobash, supra note 60, at
101-03; Laurie Wermuth, Domestic Violence Reforms: Policing the Private?, 27 Berkeley
J. Soc. 27, 43 (1982); see also Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and
History of Family Violence, Boston 1880-1960, at 271-79 (1988) (discussing community and
family reactions to domestic abuse).
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for the privacy of the home.68 In addition, advocates had to contend
with the presumption that a wife always had available to her the pri-
vate remedy of leaving her husband and would do so if the abuse were
serious. This notion, together with the assumption that the husband's
abuse was likely provoked by his wife's misbehavior, bolstered the
general reluctance to make domestic abuse a public matter.6 9 In argu-
ing that the failure of the state to intervene served to legitimate the
abuse, proponents of reform employed narratives that exploited tradi-
tional family values and stereotypes of white middle class women as
wives and mothers 70 For example, supporters highlighted the con-
trast of the criminal justice system's aggressive response to a barroom
brawl between strangers and its inaction when a husband assaults his
6s See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453,454 (Phil. Law 1868) (stating that courts have been
"Io[a]th to take cognizance of trivial complaints arising out of the domestic relations ...
because the evil of publicity would be greater than the evil involved in the trifles com-
plained of"); State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262,263 (Win. 1864) (holding that "law %vill not invade
the domestic forum, or go behind the 'curtain'").
69 See Gordon, supra note 67, at 259-60 (showing that woman-blaming responses to
wife beating became more pervasive after 1930s); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force
for Gender Fairness in the Courts, 15 Win. Mitchell L Rev. 825,875-77 (19S9) (identifying
many examples of gender-biased stereotypes involving victim blaming that have "a nega-
tive effect on the administration of justice in domestic abuse proceedings"); see also
Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 458 (suggesting that "slight words" may be sufficient to constitute prov-
ocation of husband); Black, 60 N.C. at 264 (holding that where "[t]he husband, in a passion
provoked by excessive abuse [by his wife], pulled her upon the floor by the hair... the jury
ought to have been charged in favor of the [husband]").
70 Kimberl6 Crenshaw analyzes how the "[s]trategies for increasing awareness of do-
mestic violence within the white community" have the effect of reinforcing racial stereo-
types and continuing the neglect of the problem of domestic violence in communities of
color. KimberI6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L Rev. 1241, 1258 (1991).
Countless first-person stories begin with a statement like, "I was not supposed
to be a battered wife." That battering occurs in families of all races and all
classes seems to be an ever-present theme of anti-abuse campaigns....
Efforts to politicize the issue of violence against women challenge beliefs that
violence occurs only in homes of "others." while it is unlikely that advocates
and others who adopt this rhetorical strategy intend to exclude or ignore the
needs of poor and colored women, the underlying premise of this seemingly
universalistic appeal is to keep the sensibilities of dominant social groups fo-
cused on the experiences of those groups....
... This strategy permits white women victims to come into focus, but does
little to disrupt the patterns of neglect that permitted the problem to continue
as long as it was imagined to be a minority problem. The experience of vio-
lence by minority women is ignored, except to the extent it gains white support
for domestic violence programs in the white community.
Id. at 1258-60 (footnotes omitted). Antiviolence arguments emphasizing the transgressive
nature of violence taking place in the home against wives and mothers depended on social
hierarchies for their persuasive powers. See also infra notes 259-73 and accompanying text
(relying on social history to show how home became site that was used to mask, as well as
justify, economic exploitation, racism, and sexism).
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wife in their home.71 This comparison made stark an unpleasant real-
ity that contradicted the ideal: The dangerous barroom was made
safer than the home; the dangerous stranger was made less of a threat
than the husband. Advocates employed the comparison of the home
and the barroom to silently establish a wife's worthiness. Even
though the home was the symbol of the private domain, advocates
could justify state intervention because the wife was in the home, not
in the barroom, and therefore was worthy of protection. The compar-
ison also implied that a woman who failed to fulfill her appropriate
domestic role was not worthy of the state's protection. The woman
least able to conform to the domestic ideal and therefore least worthy
of protection was, of course, the woman in prostitution.72
Reformers also relied on an idealized view of a woman's domes-
tic role to explain why women stay in abusive relationships or why
they kill their abusers. These explanations frequently relied upon so-
ciety's notion of respectable motivations, such as emotional commit-
ment to the relationship and maternal responsibility, and emphasized
the complexity of a long-term intimate relationship. 73 Proponents of
legal change emphasized loyalty, motherhood, and intimacy in chal-
71 See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 61, at 69 (noting that advocates for battered
women realized that "police appeared to arrest everyone but domestic violence assailants"
(citation omitted)).
72 As K. Sue Jewell explains, relying on the work of Shelby Steele, social hierarchies
are reinforced when only those who can proclaim their innocence are permitted to assert
that they were harmed or victimized. The distinction between worthiness and unworthi-
ness is analogous to the innocence/guilt dyad that Jewell identifies when she writes about
the institutional treatment of African American women.
It is always in the interest of those who mediate society's resources, as well as
the ideas of its members, to maintain their image of innocence. In controlling
resources and institutions in society the idea of image implies that the privi-
leged and individuals positioned high on the social hierarchy of discrimination
are entitled to the societal rewards that they possess and mediate. And that
those with relatively meager resources can only blame themselves for occupy-
ing an economically depressed position, because it is reasoned that they lack
the qualities that are necessary for greater access to societal institutions and
resources. Any efforts to bring about significant social change that will have
permanence in improving the status and life chances of African American
women and their communities must include efforts to dispel traditional images
of innocence and guilt.
K. Sue Jewell, From Mammy to Miss America and Beyond: Cultural Images and the Shap-
ing of US Social Policy 13 (1993). For a further elaboration of how notions of worthiness
and unworthiness perpetuate social differentiations, see infra Part III.
73 See Littleton, supra note 66, at 46-47 (reasoning that battered women stay to rescue
the relationship, something beyond themselves); Mahoney, supra note 31, at 15-17,23 (sug-
gesting battered women stay because of commitment to ideal of "marriage" and sense of
responsibility to children); Schneider, supra note 66, at 211 (suggesting that expert testi-
mony in defense of battered women who kill their abusers emphasizes woman's unique
insight and ability to know and anticipate degree of violence she faces); Walker, Battered
Women Syndrome, supra note 66, at 330, 332 (describing third phase of cycle of violence as
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lenging the law to recognize the right of women to be free from vio-
lence. They de-emphasized economic dependency and the systemic
forces that privilege male power within and without the family struc-
ture and, therefore, avoided destabilizing stereotypical gender roles.74
Margaret Baldwin makes a similar observation when she writes of
how the representations of women who are battered reinforce the
legal and social boundaries that separate worthy women from women
in prostitution.
The ties and insights of persistent affection are not commonly pres-
ent between a prostitute and a john.... [T]he prostitute [does not]
enjoy the tidy legal status of an otherwise socially conforming "vic-
tim." The "good woman" sex role of loyalty to intimate monoga-
mous fidelity, while perhaps of tactical assistance in garnering
sympathy for women battered by husbands, is but a tool of punish-
ment of women in prostitution....
In the legal representation of women .... structural insights
have largely been compressed to one line mention of women's com-
mon economic dependency on husbands in marriage .... At most,
[feminist legal critics] "maternalize" the economic dimension, at-
tending to the "special" economic pressures on battered women
with children to support to remain in abusive marriages. Further,
the economic interest of men in the women they control by vio-
lence, in the time-honored tradition of pimping, remains wholly
uninterrogated. Of course, avoidance of the economic question also
serves to maintain the "good woman" distance from the inference
of prostitution.....5
Baldwin correctly concludes that reformers achieved success in
the area of domestic abuse by reinforcing the distinctions between re-
spectable and disreputable women. We draw an additional conclusion
from the fact that reformers policed the boundaries between "good"
and "bad" women. The very need for reformers to police the bounda-
ries of meaning between "good" and "bad" women suggests that
transforming society's view of domestic abuse potentially implicates
the meaning of prostitution.
Thus, reformers succeeded in gaining the state's recognition of
and intervention in domestic abuse, which effectively challenges the
distinction between private and public and acknowledges that a man's
loving contrition in which battered woman gets glimpse of what love and marriage could be
and is thus persuaded to remain in relationship).
74 See Gordon, supra note 67, at 3-4 (arguing that "family-violence policy is mainly
discussed today without an historical dimension, and with its political implications
hidden").
75 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 73-76.
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conduct in his home is a matter of public policy. But their efforts re-
ified the distinction between "good" women who deserve the state's
assistance and "bad" women who, by implication, do not. Neverthe-
less, by bringing the issue of domestic abuse into the public arena,
these legal reforms make the relationship between domestic violence
and prostitution harder to ignore. Once the state acknowledges that
male privilege exists and acts to curb it in the home, it is hard for the
state to deny that male privilege exists in the marketplace. Further-
more, it is difficult for the state to refuse to address it when it results
in harms to women in the market exchange of sex for money.
Although law reformers used strategies to distance the dynamics
of domestic abuse from prostitution, they nevertheless established an
approach to domestic violence that could be applied to prostitution.
For example, it is no longer appropriate for police, prosecutors, or
judges to ask: "Why did she stay?" Instead, as feminists have argued
successfully, the right questions are: What benefits does the abuser
obtain through violence and how do we stop it?76 As we argued ear-
lier, "Why did she stay?" is a question that relies on the paradigm of
prostitution. 77 Because reformers established a legal discourse of do-
mestic abuse that reduced society's reliance on the paradigm, they cre-
ated the possibility of changing the paradigm itself. Thus the right
questions to ask in cases of prostitution are: What is the john buying
and how do we stop it?
The prostitution paradigm operates differently for sexual harass-
ment and rape than it does for domestic abuse because the law and
society generally view domestic abuse as a physical but not a sexual
harm. Therefore, reformers'have not had to focus as acutely on distin-
guishing the conduct of survivors of domestic abuse from that of
women used in prostitution.78 In contrast, for rape and sexual harass-
ment, which turn upon the issue of a woman's consent, reformers have
had to disassociate carefully prostitution from rape and sexual harass-
ment. As the law of sexual violence has changed to expand the cate-
gories of prohibited conduct, the discourses surrounding those
76 Cf. Schechter, supra note 60, at 314, 317-18 (discussing role of feminists and battered
women's movement in helping society to see domestic abuse as political, social problem,
not private issue); R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate'
Victims of Marital Violence, 2 Victimology 426, 434 (1977) (noting that "[w]e prefer to see
violence used by men against women in the family as attempts to establish or maintain a
patriarchal social order"); Mahoney, supra note 31, at 56-57 (noting that focus in domestic
violence should not be woman's acceptance of violence, but man's attempt to regain con-
trol and dominance).
77 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
78 See infra Part II.B (discussing relationship between sexual harassment and prostitu-
tion); infra Part II.C (discussing relationship between rape and prostitution).
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changes have reinforced the boundary between prostitution, on the
one hand, and sexual harassment and rape, on the other, at the same
time that they have weakened it.
B. Sexual Harassment
Like women who are battered in the home, women who are sexu-
ally harassed at work struggle with limited choices in trying to mini-
mize the risk of further physical and emotional harm while preserving
their work life and economic security. Arguing that sexual harass-
ment was "neither incidental nor tangential to women's inequality,
but a crucial expression of it,"79 C atharine MacKinnon set forth in
1979 a legal theory for why sexual harassment is a form of sex discrim-
ination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.80 In 1980 the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated
regulations to Title VII defining sexual harassment and determining
employer liability.81 In 1986, the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Winson82 upheld the regulations, establishing that the
creation of a hostile environment through sexual harassment is a form
of sex discrimination.83
Sexual harassment is not a new phenomenon. What is new is that
since the late 1970s, some types of sexual harassment have been made
illegal, workers and students have been provided limited remedies
against their employers and schools for failure to establish rules, and
employers and schools have developed procedures designed to pre-
vent harassment and to respond to it when it occurs.
The private/public distinction that frames the discourse of domes-
tic abuse also operates in the sexual harassment arena. A woman who
did not remain at home, under the control of a husband or father,
risked being perceived as sexually available.84 Thus, a woman who
79 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination xi (1979).
8o Id. at 208-13 (theorizing that sexual harassment is form of employment discrimina-
tion because "[s]exual harassment threatens women in their jobs.... When it has an im-
pact upon fundamental employment decisions and upon the workplace atmosphere, sexual
harassment is discrimination in employment" (footnote omitted)).
81 Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45
Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998)).
82 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
83 See id. at 66.
84 See Andrea Dworkin, Women in the Public Domain: Sexual Harassment and Date
Rape, in Sexual Harassment: Women Speak Out 1, 4 (Amber Coverdale Sumrall & Dena
Taylor eds., 1992) (noting that "[t]he wife was the private woman in the private (domestic)
sphere, protected inside," but "outside, the woman is public in male territory, a hands-on
zone; her presence there is taken to be a declaration of availability-for sex and sexual
insult"); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoiza-
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worked in the public marketplace to earn money was vulnerable to
the charge of promiscuity because her economic activities draw her
closer to the prostitution paradigm.85 Proponents of sexual harass-
ment law reform employed the stereotypical notion that a working
woman was sexually available to show how the expectation that
women would provide sex as a condition of employment or education
amounted to sex discrimination. 86
Although law reform proponents do not feel the need to articu-
late why the law of sexual harassment should distinguish commercial
sexual exploitation, including prostitution, from other types of waged
work, the distinction clearly benefits respectable society. By exclud-
ing prostitution from the reach of sexual harassment law, the legal
system can more easily reconcile sexual harassment with the tradi-
tional civil and criminal law principles of consent and coercion. The
law has constructed prostitution as an act in which a woman initiates
sex for money. Therefore, if it treats prostitution, which represents a
woman's unambiguous consent, as sexual harassment, it would expose
the tension between equality claims based on group harms and liberty
claims based on individual rights. If the law were to view sexual har-
assment as an equality claim, it would not be able to use consent to
determine whether discrimination occurred. Sexual harassment
claims, however, are based, at least in part, on the right of individuals
to be free from unwelcome, sexually based, harmful conduct in the
workplace, which makes the issue of consent critical.87
tion of Women, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 526 (1993) (arguing that street harassment of
women carries implicit and sometimes explicit message that women do not belong in pub-
lic, where they draw attention by their mere appearance, but rather in private sphere at
home).
85 See Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on
Race and Sex in America 47-49 (1984) (describing "cult of the lady" in which true woman's
exclusive role was in home, resulting in women in public workplace being viewed as appro-
priate targets of harassment); MacKinnon, supra note 79, at 159 (suggesting that "[a] great
many instances of sexual harassment in essence amount to solicitation for prostitution");
Baldwin, supra note 8, at 64-65 (demonstrating that many sexual harassment cases reveal
connection between sexual harassment and prostitution by presuming sexual availability of
working women to their coworkers).
86 See MacKinnon, supra note 79, at 174-92; Franke, supra note 62, at 714-16; see also
Estrich, Sex, supra note 31, at 829; B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual
Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 31-32 (1993).
87 For discussions of sexual harassment focusing, in part, on the individual's right to be
free of harmful conduct, see MacKinnon, supra note 79, at 179 (arguing that "a sex stereo-
type is present[,j .. expressed through sexual harassment, that women are sexual beings
whose privacy and integrity can be invaded at will"); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual
Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 450, 455 (1997) (arguing that sexual har-
assment can be understood as "a type of incivility or... disrespect" constituting "dignitary
injury").
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By excluding women in prostitution, law reformers can more eas-
ily advocate for a broader definition of coercion. Martha Chamallas
explains:
Proponents of bans on sexual harassment argued that women
had never genuinely consented to the myriad forms of sexual har-
assment they experienced at work. Rather than indicating genuine
consent, their lack of protest reflected the considerable economic
power of employers and supervisors. Women tended to tolerate or
acquiesce to the milder forms of sexual harassment. What passed
for consent could better be described as a grudging accommodation
to the fact of women's powerlessness to change the tone of the
working environment or the social conventions of the workplace.P
Within the employment and educational context, the EEOC and the
courts accepted this explanation and embraced a standard of un-
wanted or unwelcome sexual conduct that did not rely on a narrow
meaning of coercion.89 The EEOC and courts did not adopt a stan-
dard that would have required a complainant to demonstrate resist-
ance. 90 The explanation for why women complied succeeded precisely
because it excluded the conduct of women engaged in prostitution.
Proponents used the rhetoric of "acquiescence" and "grudging accom-
modation" in order to attribute a woman's compliance to her
powerlessness in the workplace rather than to her promiscuity.91 The
law of sexual harassment thus challenges the stereotype that all
women in the waged labor force are sexually available by giving a
legal remedy to some women under some circumstances.92
Margaret Baldwin's critique of current law and feminist reform
efforts focuses on the segregation of women in "legitimate" work from
women in prostitution.
[O]ur advocacy stresses the distinction between a woman's villing-
ness to work and her willingness to have sex as part of the bargain,
or to be sexualized in her status as worker:. "real women" do not
88 Chamallas, supra note 26, at 802 (footnote omitted).
89 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 6S (1986) (distinguishing
unwelcomeness from involuntary sex and affirming unwelcomeness as appropriate stan-
dard); Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998) (defin-
ing sexual harassment as unwelcome sexual advances).
90 See Vnson, 477 U.S. 57; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
91 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 802.
92 Cf. Pamela S. Haag, In Search of "The Real Thing": Ideologies of Love, Modem
Romance, and Women's Sexual Subjectivity in the United States, 1920-40, in American
Sexual Politics: Sex, Gender, and Race Since the Civil War 161, 164 (John C. Fout &
Maura Shaw Tantillo eds., 1993) (arguing that "the aggregate identity of the sexually mod-
em-and presumably liberated-middle-class girl initially was negotiated in the crucible of
class and finally secured... through the demarcation of prostitution .. from premarital
sensual expression legitimized by an idealized, all-consuming love").
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combine sex with money. At the outset, this may seem a quite per-
verse distinction to draw in the context, as sexual harassment is de-
fined in those conditions where that combination is women's lived
employment experience. 93
Baldwin is disheartened by advocates' unwillingness to take the "small
[conceptual] step .. to hold all prostitution to be per se actionable as
sexual harassment, as the demand for money in the transaction shows
that a woman's sexual compliance in the acts were otherwise un-
wanted." 94 Nevertheless the fact that she considers that it should take
only a "small step" to view prostitution as a form of sexual harassment
reveals that sexual harassment reforms have the potential to influence
our understanding of prostitution.
The border between sexual exploitation in "legitimate" work-
places and prostitution has proven to be permeable and difficult to
maintain.95 Even as the Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
93 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 76; see also Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 267-68 (noting that
"sex industry markets precisely the violence, the practices of subordination, that feminists
seek to eliminate from the streets, workplaces and bedrooms," presenting "a formidable
and increasingly significant obstacle to feminist efforts to eliminate sexual violence").
94 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 76-77.
95 One aspect of the permeability of the distinction between "legitimate" workplaces
and prostitution is the role that prostitution plays within conduct that serves as a basis for
sexual harassment claims. For example, many cases of sexual harassment include allega-
tions that the defendants called plaintiffs derogatory, sexual names, including "slut,"
"bitch," "whore," and "cunt." See, e.g., Ierardi v. Sisco, 119 F.3d 183, 185, 189 (2d Cir.
1997) (affirming lower court's denial of motion for summary judgment of suit alleging that
defendant subjected plaintiff to recurrent sexual harassment, including addressing her as
"slut" or "bitch"); Wmsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that defendant harassed plaintiff and called her various names, including "floor
whore" and "curb whore"); Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d
1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting derogatory statements defendant directed at plaintiff
including, "I won't work with any cunt," "whore," and "split tail"); Huddleston v. Roger
Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1988) (ruling that plaintiff estab-
lished prima facie case based on allegations that coworkers called female employee in car
dealership "bitch" and "whore"); Maldonado v. Esmor Correctional Serv., Inc., No. 97-
Civ.-7087, 1998 WL 516118, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1998) (noting plaintiff's allegations
that defendant's employees repeatedly made "degrading and sexist comments" to her, in-
cluding "whore" and "slut"); Mahan v. Boston Water and Sewer Comm'n, 179 F.R.D. 49,
53-56, 57 (D. Mass. 1998) (denying motion for summary judgment of suit alleging that male
coworkers made loud sucking and kissing sounds when plaintiff walked past them and that
they wrote "Fucking Pig" or "Fucking Whore" in dust on her car); Morris v. American
Nat'l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1491 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (finding that defendants' em-
ployees wrote "bitch" or "slut" on plaintiff's desk and wrote "whore" on welding screen),
aff'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 941 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1991). Many cases
involve allegations of defendants sending plaintiffs inappropriate and offensive sexual
drawings or pornographic pictures and magazines. See, e.g., Winsor, 79 F.3d at 999 (find-
ing that defendant sent plaintiff "notes and pictures, including pictures of gorillas and pigs
with words 'bitch,' 'whore,' and 'floor whore' written on them, and a cartoon of a woman
pulling up her skirt and spreading her legs"); Mahan, 179 F.R.D. at 53-56 (noting plaintiff's
allegations that she frequently found pornographic magazines on her windshield and urine
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Vinson reconstructed the meaning of consent by allowing recovery for
a sexually compliant victim, 96 it was unable to abandon the conven-
tional suspicions about the sexual availability of a woman in the
waged work force. It reasoned that
[w]hile "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to
such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually pro-
vocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determin-
ing whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome.
To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. 97
As we stated earlier, behind the reasoning that would find provocative
speech and dress "obviously relevant" is the prostitution paradigm. 93
What the Court seems to be saying is that a woman in public is likely
to welcome the sexual advances of any and all men if her speech and
dress closely resemble the stereotypical conduct of women in prostitu-
tion. The relevance of her provocative conduct and the relevance of
the prostitution model are presumably underscored by the fact that
the sexual encounters occur within an employment context where eco-
nomic benefit and detriment to the complainant are at stake. With
prostitution and the sexually available woman underlying and under-
mining inquiries into the issue of welcomeness in sexual harassment
law, efforts to distinguish sexual exploitation in the "legitimate" work-
place from prostitution become counterproductive for those persons
committed to sexual harassment reform.99 The reformers' explana-
on roof of her car); Morris, 730 F. Supp. at 1491 (noting plaintiff found "a picture of a nude
woman sitting on the edge of a bathtub and touching her breasts, with a note saying some-
thing like 'You should be doing this instead of a man's job'"). Similarly, sexual harassment
victims frequently claim defendants discuss inappropriate and sexually graphic topics at
work. See, e.g., Maldonado, 1998 WL 516118, at *1 (noting plaintiff's allegations that "em-
ployees frequented 'strip clubs' during lunch and would discuss such outings in an explicit
manner in the office upon their return").
96 See 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986); Chamallas, supra note 26, at 804-06.
97 Vnson, 477 U.S. at 69.
98 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
Wnson).
99 Vinson's holding that "sexually provocative speech [and] dress" are relevant to the
issue of welcomeness, see 477 U.S. at 69, is cited approvingly by the lower courts. See, e.g.,
Carr, 32 F.3d at 1011; Burns v. McGregor Elem. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir.
1992); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987); Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 13 F.
Supp. 2d 1296,1300-01 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.1RD. 48,
53 (D.D.C. 1997); Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.RD. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996); Weiss v.
Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311,315 (S.D. Iowa 1992). But see, e.g., Gallagher v. Delaney,
139 F3d 338, 346 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to rely on Vinson and finding that plaintiff's
sexual affair with coemployee and use of cocaine did not permit "a court to determine, as a
matter of law, that a person was receptive to sexual suggestions"); Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting employer's assertion that
plaintiff "welcomed" employer's harassment "because she herself talked like a 'drunken
sailor"). The courts also have held that a plaintiff's past sexual conduct or sexual or sexu-
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tion for why sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination ulti-
mately dissolves the distinction between sexual exploitation in the
"legitimate" workplace and prostitution. Instead, their explanation
reveals "the bond between material survival and sexual exploitation"
that keeps gender oppression in place in both situations. 100
Further evidence of how sexual harassment jurisprudence chal-
lenges the meaning of prostitution is found in the work of Martha
Chamallas, to whom we referred earlier, and Stephen Schulhofer.101
Both are legal theoreticians committed to the development of a legal
concept of consent that protects women from sexual objectification
ally provocative activity outside the workplace is irrelevant to a claim of sexual harass-
ment. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993);
Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 136; Stang v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., No. 89-C-1443, 1990 WL 37680,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 1990) (mem.); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Utah
1987); see also Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 346.
Since 1994, plaintiffs may be able to use Rule 412(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which provides that evidence offered to prove the plaintiff's other sexual behavior
or the plaintiff's sexual predisposition is not admissible unless the evidence is otherwise
admissible and its "probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm... and of
unfair prejudice to any party." Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, § 40141(b), 108 Stat. 1919 (found at Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2)).
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 412 expressly states that it was designed to exclude
evidence "relating to the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech, or life-style." Fed. R.
Evid. 412(b)(2) advisory committee's note. Although Rule 412 might be read as diverging
from Vinson, see Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment
Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621, 637 (1997), the
recent case of Howard, 177 F.R.D. at 53, indicates that the courts may try to reconcile the
two. Howard held, upon a motion to compel discovery, that plaintiffs would not be com-
pelled to "tell the defendants whether they engaged in sexual behavior with other employ-
ees." Id. at 51. With regard to Vinson the court wrote:
Nothing in this opinion is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
[Vinson] .... That case hardly stands for the proposition that so long as evi-
dence has some theoretical relationship to plaintiff's welcoming the sexual ad-
vances complained of it must be admitted. Instead, [Vinson] requires behavior
claimed to be welcoming to be admitted only if its probative force exceeds its
potential for prejudice. Thanks to Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2).... the balancing
must now be performed in accordance with the more stringent requirements of
the new rule.
Id. at 53; see also Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 501-03 (D.N.M. 1996) (limiting discov-
ery by relying on Fed. R. Evid. 412 and its relationship to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), which
permits "a broad range of discovery"); Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp.
105, 109 (E.D. Va. 1995) (limiting admissibility of evidence based on defendant's failure to
comply with procedural safeguards of Rule 412).
Rule 412, which is a "rape-shield" type evidentiary rule, does not resolve the distinction
between the "legitimate" workplace and prostitution. Rather, it can be understood as rein-
forcing that distinction. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (analyzing rape
shield laws).
100 MacKinnon, supra note 79, at 7.
101 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (quoting Chamallas for purpose of explain-
ing role of consent in sexual harassment).
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and sexual encounters that they experience as alienating.102 As part
of a study of consent and its function in the legal control of sexual
conduct, Chamallas considers the role of economic pressure as an in-
ducement to sex.10 3 After establishing that "[t]he normative theory
underlying sexual harassment suits is that neither job benefits nor job
detriments should be conditioned on sex," she demonstrates that "[i]n
the employment context, technical consent by a woman who is put to
such an unfair choice is not regarded as effective consent," even
though "her submission also produced a corresponding benefit."' 4
The law finds sexual harassment "from the existence of the improper
inducement alone" because the employer or those acting on behalf of
the employer (e.g., supervisor or personnel director) "abused his posi-
tion to secure sex."'10 5
Chamallas then analyzes the law outside of the employment con-
text where she finds the state unwilling to use the criminal law of rape
to protect women against economic coercion' 06 and compares that un-
willingness with "the prevailing legal stance on prostitution" that
holds both parties criminally liable for a market exchange of sex for
money.10 7 She concludes that "it is impossible to arrange the rules
governing sexual harassment, rape, and prostitution into a coherent
position on the legal status of economically coerced sex."1 s She also
concludes that
the law of sexual harassment has highlighted the issue of economic
coercion and much effort has been directed toward identifying those
sexual encounters in which the use of economic pressure is most
objectionable. Equally important, there seems to be little current
sentiment in active support of the practice of trading sex for eco-
nomic gain.10 9
Chamallas is reluctant to take the "small step" urged by Baldwin.110
In addition, later in the article Chamallas indicates that she does not
view prostitution as a practice of inequality because she can imagine it
being an exercise of sexual freedom "when resource equality between
men and women is achieved." ' Nevertheless, her exploration of the
102 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 814, 836; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Au-
tonomy Seriously- Rape Law and Beyond, 11 L & Phil. 35, 6S, 70-71 (1992).
103 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 820-30.
104 Id. at 820.
105 Id. at 820-21.
106 See id. at 825-26.
107 Id. at 826.
108 Id. at 830.
109 Id.
110 See supra note 95-100 and accompanying text (critiquing feminist distinction be-
tween women in "legitimate" work and women in prostitution).
111 Chamallas, supra note 26, at 842.
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complex nexus between sex and economic power inspired by reforms
in sexual harassment law can assist us in thinking about prostitution in
a new way.
Similarly, Schulhofer's study of the right to sexual autonomy
shifts our perceptions of prostitution as he investigates the connection
between sex and economic power and the relationship between sexual
harassment, rape, and prostitution.11 2 When Schulhofer examines the
law of rape, he explains that it was designed not only to protect
against forcible coercion but also to protect autonomous choice.113 By
uncovering the dual purposes of existing law, he hopes to shift the
debate from "how aberrant, egregious, or potentially lethal the behav-
ior of a man may be" to "whether the preconditions for meaningful
choice are present and whether behavior that may interfere with
meaningful choice has adequate social justification.' 14 He ultimately
proposes two groups of offenses: rape, which includes sexual contact
by actual or threatened violence, and sexual abuse or sexual miscon-
duct, which reaches nonviolent interference with freedom of choice in
matters of sexual intimacy." 5 Although he shows how the "right to
sexual autonomy has clear contours that are pervasively accepted and
no longer contestible in our culture," 116 he also acknowledges that the
conventional focus on issues of force and consent requires him to ex-
plain the concept of sexual autonomy, which, he asserts, underlies the
law of rape." 7
Searching for "the core constituents of personal freedom and se-
curity that traditionally have warranted criminal law safeguards," he
finds two distinct elements in the concept of sexual autonomy: (1)
"the capacity to choose, unconstrained by impermissible pressures and
limitations" (intellectual autonomy) and (2) "a physical boundary, the
bodily integrity of the individual" (physical autonomy). 1 8 As part of
his efforts to make this conception of autonomy concrete, Schulhofer
considers prostitution as one of several situations in which a man's
exercise of economic inducements taints a woman's consent.1 9 By
comparing his analysis of four different scenarios depicting sex for
112 See Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 79-88.
113 See id. at 67-68.
114 Id. at 68.
115 See id. at 67, 71-93.
116 Id. at 71.
117 See id.
118 Id. at 70-71; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimida-
tion and the Failure of Law 110-13 (1998) (describing dimensions of sexual autonomy as he
conceives of it).
119 See Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 84-88.
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economic benefit, we can detect how the law of sexual harassment
informs his analysis of prostitution.120
The first scenario involves a "well-compensated fashion model
who accedes to sexual pressure in order to land a career-enhancing
film role."' 21 Schulhofer, relying on the law of sexual harassment,
concludes that "sexual services are never an appropriate condition of
ordinary employment" and that "[o]n this basis the fashion model's
freedom of choice would be improperly constrained and her accept-
ance of sexual intimacy would not be validly consensual."' 2
Although she can freely choose to refuse the demand, under
Schulhofer's meaning of freedom of choice, she should have the op-
tion to choose "the acting role without sexual submission." 123
In the second scenario, the model agrees to marry a billionaire
entrepreneur for purely economic reasons.1 4 In the absence of an
employment relationship, Schulhofer concludes that the model's pref-
erence for the billionaire's "wealth and comfort without having to
submit to his sexual attentions" is not protected because the billion-
aire's interest in seeking sexual relations within the confines of an inti-
mate social relationship is appropriate?- s The billionaire's exercise of
his autonomy is not an "improper interference" with the model's free-
dom of choice.126
Schulhofer varies the model scenario by substituting a "needy
mother of four" for the fashion model, and switching the chance of an
acting role for the offer of loan forgiveness or a generic job.127 In
another variation involving the needy mother he substitutes a generic
"suitor" for the billionaire and has him offering economic support in
return for continuing "an ongoing sexual relationship," or threatening
"to terminate a current but deteriorating relationship unless the
mother complies with his sexual demands." - Despite these factual
differences, Schulhofer's analysis stays the same: Absent an employ-
ment context, the constraints on the needy mother's freedom of
choice are troubling, but nevertheless do not constitute an impermissi-
ble limitation on her autonomy. 29
120 With slight variations, Schulhofer adopts a similar analysis of the scenarios in his
recent book. See Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 162-65.
121 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 84.
1 Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
123 Id.
124 See id. at 85-86.
125 Id. at 86.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 84.
128 Id. at 88.
129 See id. at 86, 88.
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At the point that he hypothesizes "a small businessman" offering
the needy mother a job conditioned on sexual compliance, he recog-
nizes how close his scenarios come to a sex-for-money exchange when
he states, "Prostitution, of course, is typically illegal, but even if it is
not, her desperate situation renders the voluntariness of her consent
problematic.' 1 30 After concluding that the employment context is suf-
ficient to treat the conduct of the employer as illegal, he then returns
to prostitution. 13' Initially he asks the question whether, "in an auton-
omy analysis," prostitution should be treated differently than employ-
ment conditioned on sex-that is, should the conduct be treated as
illegal? 32 Outside of a conventional employment context, Schulhofer
recognizes that "both parties understand that the essence of the trans-
action is the exchange of money for sex."1 33 This distinction suggests
to him that treating prostitution as legal protects a woman's autono-
mous choice, but only if society "first attempt[s] to assure women the
availability of ordinary employment not conditioned on sexual com-
pliance, and an adequate safety net of welfare and child support for
women unable to find work. 1 34 His reasoning up to this point ex-
plains why he does not raise questions about prostitution when he dis-
cusses the fashion model scenarios in which the woman is described as
economically secure. His analysis resembles Chamallas's concerns
about the inequality of material resources between men and
women.
35
Schulhofer, however, does not end his discussion of prostitution
here. Because he is interested in showing that his proposals regarding
sexual autonomy are supported by existing legal principles, he ad-
dresses laws that view "the explicit purchase of sex as outside the le-
gitimate prerogatives of freedom to exploit private property," and he
considers prostitution within the broader context of a legal regime
that prohibits the "purchase [of] organs for transplant, babies for
adoption, or... the gestational assistance of a surrogate mother." 136
130 Id. at 86.
131 See id. at 87.
132 See id. Schulhofer did not address the question of whether prostitution should be
treated as a criminal offense for a woman selling sex as well as for a man who conditions
the payment of money on sex. His conclusion that prostitution is an offense against a
woman's autonomy suggests that he might favor decriminalizing prostitution for the
woman used in prostitution but not for the john. See id. at 87-88.
133 Id. at 87.
134 Id; see also Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 165 (making similar point).
135 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (suggesting prostitution could be exercise
of sexual freedom if men and women had economic equality).
136 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 87. For a related analysis, see Margaret Jane Radin,
Contested Commodities 132-36 (1996). Radin starts from the premise that, ideally, sexual
interactions should not be commodified, meaning that sexuality should not be treated as
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Schulhofer explains society's prohibitions of these transactions as re-
flecting two "salient" concerns: (1) "that for sellers in financial dis-
tress, monetary incentives will involve excessive pressure or wil
prompt short-sighted decisions that the seller will later regret"; and
(2) "that certain core features of human dignity and freedom should
not be the subject of market exchange."13 7 Rather than dismissing
these concerns as paternalistic and arguing that the law of prostitution
cannot be reconciled with his definition of autonomy, Schulhofer sug-
gests how the concerns relate to his two-prong definition of autonomy:
In effect, society constrains intellectual autonomy (freedom of
choice) in order to protect physical autonomy (the integrity and cor-
poral boundaries of the physical person).... [Tihe male who solicits
her commits an offense against her autonomy by trying to purchase
a constituent of her person and her humanity that society has de-
cided should not be "for sale."'138
Schulhofer's analysis of prostitution is at best incomplete, espe-
cially when it is considered within the context of the fashion model/
needy mother scenarios.' 39 Schulhofer constructs a scenario in which
a billionaire seeks sexual fulfillment in an "ongoing, intimate social
relationship[ ]" in return for providing a fashion model "wealth and
comfort" and stipulates that the fashion model agrees to marriage or
cohabitation "for purely economic reasons."1 40 He constructs a simi-
property that is the subject of market transactions. See id. at 132. She then argues that the
current legal regime that makes the market exchange of sex for money illegal causes "harm
to ideals of personhood instead of maintaining and fostering them, primarily because it
exacerbates the double bind." Id. The double bind that Radin refers to is the practical
problem of transition in which current policies may reinforce the status quo and hinder
progress, but new policies in the name of progress may substantially worsen the situation.
See id. at 123-24. She believes that the fact that "[p]oor women who believe that they must
sell their sexual services in order to survive are subject to moral opprobrium, disease,
arrest, and violence" causes the exacerbation. Id. at 132. Radin worries, however, about
the effect of market rhetoric on the "discourse about sex, and in particular about women's
sexuality." Id. at 133. For her, "the best policy solution, for now, is a regime of regulation
expressing incomplete commodification," id. at 134, which would entail decriminalization
of the sale of sexual services, the banning of pimping and recruitment, the unenforceability
of prostitution contracts, and might go so far as to include the banning of advertising. See
id. at 134-36.
Unlike Chamallas and Schulhofer, Radin does not raise the question of whether pros-
titution is incoherent with other feminist legal reforms or is itself a practice of inequality.
Radin treats prostitution as containable within our discursive arrangements and finds it
acceptable. She believes prostitution reflects a woman making the best decisions she can
in difficult circumstances and exercising her autonomy. Her analysis, therefore, does not
move us beyond conventional understandings of consent and coercion.
137 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 87.
m3 Id. at 87-88.
139 See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text (describing Schulhofer's analysis of
fashion model/needy mother scenarios).
140 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 86.
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lar scenario in which a suitor of undisclosed wealth is substituted for
the billionaire and a needy mother of four is substituted for the fash-
ion model.141 He justifies the legality of both types of sexual en-
counters based on the men's entitlement to seek sexual fulfillment in
intimate relationships. 42
The obvious question is: What distinguishes the billionaire and
the suitor from a john under Schulhofer's approach? One answer
might be that Schulhofer is not obliged to distinguish his conclusions
regarding his scenarios from his analysis of prostitution because he
indicates that "the appropriate treatment of prostitution is debata-
ble.' 43 Perhaps Schulhofer is using his autonomy framework within
the prostitution context to show how his theory could be used to sup-
port the current state of the law. 44 Even this explanation is problem-
atic, however, because his analysis of prostitution explains why a man
buying sex for money should be held criminally liable but fails to ex-
plain why a woman selling sex for money should be.145
Another answer might be that the billionaire and the suitor are
seeking "ongoing, intimate social relationships" while the john pre-
sumably is only seeking a brief sexual encounter. 46 This explanation
is inadequate because Schulhofer does not address the motivations of
johns when indicating that their conduct could constitute sexual abuse
under his legal scheme. 47 It is also problematic because it leaves
open an argument that brief sexual encounters that the parties enter
into for the purpose of mutual sexual pleasure might be the subject of
state intervention if the parties have unequal economic power.148
Schulhofer's analysis remains inadequate when we shift the focus
of the inquiry to what distinguishes the fashion model and needy
mother from the woman in prostitution. No distinction can be made
based on the facts of the economic distress likely to be experienced by
women entering or continuing in prostitution, because Schulhofer hy-
pothesized that the suitor made "sexual demands" to a "mother
fac[ing] dire economic pressure.' 49 Neither can a distinction be made
between the motivations of women in prostitution and those of a fash-
ion model or needy mother, because in the scenarios Schulhofer de-
141 See id. at 84, 88.
142 See id. at 86, 88.
143 Id. at 87.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 86-88.
146 Id. at 86.
147 See id. at 87-88.
148 See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text (describing Chamallas's development
of ideal regulation of sexual conduct).
149 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 88.
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scribes both women as engaging in sex for the exclusive purpose of
obtaining economic benefit. 150
Schulhofer's deference to the sexual autonomy of the billionaire
and the suitor, but not to a purchaser of sex for money, his failure to
apply his two-prong concept of sexual autonomy to the fashion model
and the needy mother in the same way he applied it to a woman in
prostitution, and his failure to reconcile his justification for the current
law of prostitution with his analysis of his scenarios undermine his
analysis of the market exchange of sex for money. These shortcom-
ings may account for Schulhofer abandoning his analysis in his recent
book.'51 On reconsideration he concludes that a "man who proposi-
tions a prostitute is not necessarily coercing her" because even though
the proposal is illegal, it "does not interfere with her options, limited
though they may be.' 15 2 Despite the analytical problems in
Schulhofer's earlier analysis and his implicit rejection of it later, his
serious engagement with the issue of prostitution demonstrates how
the law of sexual harassment highlights the link between a woman's
economic survival and sexual exploitation, and creates the possibility
of transforming the prostitution paradigm so that it can no longer be
used as it was in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.1'
Both Chamallas and Schulhofer find that they must consider
prostitution in their respective investigations of the role of consent
and economic pressure when evaluating the legality of sexual en-
counters. They understand that the legal recognition that sexual har-
assment is a form of sex discrimination means that a woman receiving
an economic benefit does not, by itself, negate the harm and, in fact, is
evidence of her lack of meaningful choice. Their work is persuasive
evidence that the law of sexual harassment has the potential to change
the meaning of prostitution.
C. Rape
There have been two major legal developments in the law of rape
during the last three decades: (1) the modification of the legal defini-
lions of consent and force and (2) the introduction of rape shield
laws.' 54 Rape reform advocates have developed strategies to chal-
lenge a number of myths surrounding the crime of rape, which include
150 See id. at 86, 88.
151 See Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 165-66.
152 Id.
53 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See supra notes 38-40, 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing
Vimson's holding that complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is not irrelevant
as matter of law in determining whether he or she found sexual advances unwelcome).
154 See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text (explaining rape reform measures).
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the belief that rape is perpetrated by abnormal and deviant men,15 5
that charges of rape are untrustworthy because the women making
them are likely to be seeking revenge or concealing their own promis-
cuity,156 and that women say no when they really mean yes.1 57 Under-
standing that the social myths and legal definitions of rape served to
maximize men's sexual access to women at the cost of women's bodily
integrity, 58 proponents criticized the entire criminal process from the
legal definition of rape, to police investigations and arrest and
prosecutorial policies, to defense tactics at trial.1 59 Reform efforts re-
sulted in the elimination of the statutory requirements that the state
prove that a complainant physically resisted her attacker and present
corroboration of her testimony. 60 These requirements were blatant
examples of how the law reflected the myth of the "lying woman," and
how it concentrated on the complainant's conduct, deflecting atten-
tion from the behavior of the perpetrator.
At the core of the feminist critique of the law of rape is the legal
meaning of consent and its relationship to force. 61 By eliminating the
legal requirement that women can only prove their lack of consent by
presenting evidence that they resisted the perpetrator, the law and so-
ciety have had to reconsider the distinction between consensual and
nonconsensual sex and to reexamine the relationship between force
and consent. 162 The law continues to grapple with the roles of consent
155 See Torrey, supra note 34, at 1022-23.
156 Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 181; Torrey, supra note 34, at 1014-15.
157 See MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 175; Torrey, supra note 34, at 1014-15.
158 See Brownmiller, supra note 60, at 311-12; MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 172-76;
Torrey, supra note 34, at 1013-19, 102540.
159 See Smart, supra note 31, at 34-43, 48-49; Estrich, Rape, supra note 31, at 1094-1132,
1169-78; Torrey, supra note 34, at 1040-61. But see Crenshaw, supra note 70, at 1298-99
(critiquing both feminist and antiracist challenges to rape as based on male-centered ap-
proach to racism and white-centered approach to sexism so that each fails adequately to
address rape of Black women); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 Harv.
Women's L.J. 103, 133-40 (1983) (arguing that feminist analysis of rape law is only partially
applicable to Black women).
160 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 799 & n.101. But see Torrey, supra note 34, at 1041-
45 (demonstrating how doctrine of prompt complaint embodies rape myths and how it
continues to play role in investigation and prosecution of rape charges).
161 See MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 172-83; Smart, supra note 31, at 36-38; Estrich,
Rape, supra note 31, at 1121-32, 1154-56; Robin West, A Comment on Consent, Sex, and
Rape, 2 Legal Theory 233, 233-34, 236-40 (1996).
162 See MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 173, 177 (indicating that "[r]ape cases finding in-
sufficient evidence of force reveal that acceptable sex, in the legal perspective, can entail a
lot of force" and that "[e]ven when nonconsent is not a legal element of the offense, juries
tend to infer rape from evidence of force or resistance"); Estrich, Rape, supra note 31, at
1131 (positing that "[t]he consent standard, like the force standard.... emerges as another
means to protect men against unfair convictions by giving them full and fair warning that
their (forceful) advances constitute an unwelcome rape rather than a welcome, or at least
accepted, seduction"); West, supra note 161, at 240-43 (analyzing two reform movements
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and force because there is no societal consensus about whether rape
should be defined so that any degree of force, regardless of its sever-
ity, is permissible if consent exists, or whether it should be defined so
that, even in the absence of force, anything less than affirmative,
freely given consent, is ineffective. 163 The law reform debates center
on the sexual autonomy of both women and men, whether it is appro-
priate for the state to intervene in private sexual conduct, and the
state's responsibility to protect women's bodily integrity within a soci-
ety based on inequality.' 4
Although the law of rape is still in transition, the debates about
what constitutes consent and force are taking place in an environment
in which it is less acceptable to demand that a complainant explain
why she was where she was, wearing what she was wearing, and be-
having the way she was behaving. The rape shield laws certainly have
contributed to the changing legal landscape. These laws, which have
been widely enacted, generally limit the admissibility of a rape com-
plainant's prior sexual conduct with any person other than the defen-
dant.165 The statutes vary in the degree to which they restrict the
admissibility of such evidence. 166 They were designed to combat the
inspired by feminist critiques of rape, one advocating removal of consent requirement and
other advocating removal of force requirement).
163 See MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 174-78; Estrich, Rape, supra note 31, at 1121-32;
West, supra note 161, at 240-43.
164 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 169 (arguing that "laws of rape, abortion,
obscenity, and sex discrimination ... are integral to sexual politics because the state,
through law, institutionalizes male power over women through institutionalizing the male
point of view in law"); Chamallas, supra note 26, at 841-43 (arguing for egalitarian perspec-
tive that expands choices actually available to women while "impos[ing] legal burdens only
on those encounters" that are "exploitive and nonmutual"); Estrich, Rape, supra note 31,
at 1182 (arguing "that consent should be defined so that 'no means no.' And the 'force' or
'coercion' that negates consent ought to be defined to include extortionate threats and
deceptions of material fact."); Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 67-68 (suggesting that rape
law's emphasis on violent compulsion has obscured importance of autonomy and "con-
strained thinking about the proper reach of criminal prohibition to protect it").
165 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.45.045 (Michie 1998) (prohibiting evidence of com-
plaining witness's previous sexual conduct unless relevant and probative value outweighs
danger of "undue prejudice," "confusion," or "unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
complaining witness"); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1994) (prohibiting evidence of
prior sexual conduct of victim unless it meets certain tests); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-407
(1998) (presuming as irrelevant "specific instances of the victim's or a witness' prior or
subsequent sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's or a witness' sexual conduct,
and reputation evidence of the victim's or a witness' sexual conduct" with certain excep-
tions); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting introduction of evidence
of "victim's previous sexual conduct" except in certain limited circumstances).
166 Rape shield laws do not always protect the complainant from the introduction of
evidence regarding her past sexual activity. Many of the statutes have exceptions that al-
low the introduction of such evidence. For example, the Minnesota statute allows evidence
tending to show "a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct ... [if] the judge ...
find[s] that the victim made prior allegations of sexual assault which were fabricated."
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assumption that a complainant is untrustworthy, as well as the as-
sumption that a woman who consented to sex in the past is likely to
have consented to sex again. 167 The laws also reflect advocates'
continuing efforts to shift the focus of the rape inquiry away from the
question of whether the complainant was worthy of protection, to-
ward questions regarding the defendant's behavior.16 The growing
willingness of prosecutors to pursue nonstranger rape charges, 169 and
the increase in criticism of the law's unwillingness to treat sex ob-
tained through economic pressure or deception as criminal,1 70 demon-
strate that, as the legal concepts of consent and force continue to
evolve, feminist challenges to the law of rape and the myths underly-
ing it will have a significant effect on the terms of the debate.
At the same time that the rape reform initiatives extend the law's
protection to a larger group of women, they reinforce the boundary
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.347(3) (West Supp. 1999). It also allows evidence to be admitted of
the "victim's previous sexual conduct with the accused." Id. Finally, "[w]hen the prosecu-
tion's case includes evidence of semen, pregnancy, or disease .... evidence of specific
instances of the victim's previous sexual conduct is admissible solely to show the source of
the semen, pregnancy, or disease." Id. The Colorado statute has similar exceptions. See
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-47(1) (1998). The Alabama statute also allows evidence of the vic-
tim's past sexual behavior with the accused. See Ala. Code § 12-21-203 (1995).
Susan Estrich has concluded:
[T]he guarantees of state rape shield laws are not ironclad.... [T]he statutes
present a very mixed picture. Some are just plain poorly drafted and provide
only illusory protections. And even some of the better ones contain loopholes
which defense attorneys, in today's environment, may be able to use to swal-
low the rule.
Estrich, supra note 34, at 21 (footnotes omitted). For cases considering the application of
rape shield laws to defendants' efforts to introduce evidence of a victim's prior prostitution
activities, see infra note 180.
167 See Estrich, supra note 34, at 22 (noting that "[w]hen the bulk of the rape shield
statutes were passed, the focus of attention for law reformers... was the almost indiscrimi-
nate use of a woman's sexual history and sexual reputation both to discredit her testimony
and to prove that she had consented"); Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the
State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763,764-65
(1986) (describing "impetus behind nationwide reform of evidentiary law applicable to
rape prosecutions that swept through state legislatures and Congress in mid-1970's" (foot-
note omitted)).
168 See Galvin, supra note 167, at 793-95 (describing police's, doctors', and courts' re-
sponses to rape victims).
169 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 800 (noting that, as part of rape law reform effort,
"pressure [was] also ... put on law enforcement personnel and district attorneys to investi-
gate and prosecute 'date' and 'acquaintance' rapes"); Estrich, supra note 34, at 5 (noting
"powerful signs of the change in our understanding of rape" as demonstrated by prosecu-
tions of rape cases).
170 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 810-11 (describing "feminist critique of consent in
laws governing sexual conduct" to include defining nonconsensual sex as induced by "supe-
rior economic strength" and "sex induced by deception"); Schulhofer, supra note 102, at
84-93 (analyzing appropriateness of criminal sanctions for economically induced sexual re-
lationships and relationships characterized by deception).
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between worthy women and women in prostitution.171 By excluding
evidence of their prior sexual history, the rape shield laws legally con-
struct rape complainants as worthy women, thereby preserving the
category of unworthy women. In addition, it is widely accepted that
testimony about a complainant's prior sexual history with the defen-
dant is exempted from rape shield laws, a factor that further rein-
forces the worthy woman/unworthy woman distinction.172 The
exception implies that a woman is less at risk of being charged with
promiscuity and unworthiness if evidence about her sexual activity is
limited to only one man. She can be viewed as sexually discriminating
and therefore worthy.173
Within the consent/force debates, some reformers have tried to
secure protections for a woman's bodily integrity through a "no means
no" standard 74 while others have gone further and embraced a "yes
means yes" standard.115 Both standards place prostitution beyond the
171 Although Susan Brownmiller recognized that prostitution "institutionalizes the con-
cept that it is man's monetary right, if not his divine right, to gain access to the female
body," and that "the false perception of sexual access as an adjunct of male power and
privilege... fuel[s] the rapist mentality," Brownmiller, supra note 60, at 392, she did not
see that advocating for a legal reform that would bar evidence of a rape survivor's sexual
history except for "[p]rior consensual intercourse between the complainant and lhe defen-
dant," id. at 386, contributed to the making of, in her words, "a cooperative class of
women, set aside" to perform sexual services, id. at 392.
172 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
173 Baldwin explains the lack of feminist critique of the exception in rape shield laws
that allow the admission of evidence pertaining to past sexual conduct with the defendant
by connecting the rape reform strategies to reforms in domestic violence laws. See
Baldwin, supra note 8, at 70-71. She observes that a critique of the rape shield exception
would be contrary to the strategy feminists have used on behalf of battered women. The
representation of battered women via the battered women's syndrome seeks an expansion
of the representation frame to include emotional history;, psychological consequences of
serial battery, and the lack of social recognition, support, and material alternatives bat-
tered women confront. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing battered
women syndrome). As Baldwin argues, this representation is in sharp contrast to the
"freeze-frame, miniaturist portrait of the rape victim generally constructed under the
shield rules." Id. at 71. The exception for past sexual conduct with the defendant serves
the function of reducing the tension between the two conflicting antiviolence strategies.
See id. at 70-71.
174 See Estrich, Rape, supra note 31, at 1127-32 (arguing that, for nonconsent require-
ment to contribute to women's autonomy, victim's verbal assertion of "no" must be taken
seriously); see also MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 174-75 (questioning role of consent in
rape law and arguing that "[i]f rape laws existed to enforce women's control over access to
their sexuality, as the consent defense implies, no would mean no, marital rape would not
be a widespread exception, and it would not be effectively legal to rape a prostitute" (foot-
note omitted)); Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 41-45 (explaining limitations to "no means
no" reform strategy).
175 See Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 Berkeley Women's LU.
193, 216-18 (1987-1988) (reviewing Susan Estrich, Real Rape (1987)) (criticizing Estrich's
focus on verbal "no" as reliable objective indicator of nonconsent); see also Schulhofer,
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reach of the law's protection of bodily integrity. In the name of sexual
autonomy, a strategy focused on consent means that the law need
look no further than a woman's "yes" and should respect a woman's
"no." The problem with relying exclusively on a consent analysis to
protect bodily integrity is that it prevents serious inquiry about
women in prostitution who are deemed to say yes all the time.176
Baldwin argues that reformers' emphasis on consent is the means by
which some women can maintain their distance from women in prosti-
tution. She writes, "Prostitutes, of course, say 'yes' a great deal. Our
threshold commitment to the dismissal of a woman's 'no' as the talis-
manic violation of rape both renders prostitution beyond the pale of
our rape reforms and, praise be, prostitutes as the women we are
not."177
Although the proponents of rape reforms can be portrayed accu-
rately as attempting to expand the protections of the bodily integrity
of worthy women at the expense of women in prostitution, the rape
discourse that has evolved over the last three decades regarding
women's bodily integrity nevertheless has the potential to transform
our understanding of the market exchange of sex for money. One
justification for the rape shield laws is that a woman's bodily integrity
is not protected if prior consent to sex is used as a proxy for consent to
the sexual conduct at issue. 178 A similar concern presumably under-
lies the prosecution of nonstranger rape cases. 179 The state begins to
meet its obligation to protect a woman's bodily integrity when it re-
fuses to treat the fact that a woman found herself in a sexually vulner-
supra note 102, at 42 (raising difficulty of determining "when the circumstances are suffi-
ciently constraining to invalidate ostensible consent").
176 See Baldwin, supra note 8, at 69; see also MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 175 (arguing
that concept of consent in rape law does nothing to enhance sexual autonomy of women
used in prostitution).
177 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 69; see also Sherene Razack, From Consent to Responsibil-
ity, from Pity to Respect: Subtexts in Cases of Sexual Violence Involving Girls and
Women with Developmental Disabilities, 19 L. & Soc. Inquiry 891, 922 (1994). Through
studies of sexual assault cases involving girls and women with developmental disabilities,
Razack shows how the consent framework reinforces categories of subordination and how
each of us has an investment in maintaining sexual violence as it is currently understood.
Razack urges antiviolence reformers to abandon "disengagement tactics" emphasizing vul-
nerability of women with disabilities and to instead work toward having their stories told
"as stories of injustice." Id.
178 See Galvin, supra note 167, at 798-99 (describing evolution of laws as based on both
"instrumentalist arguments" that restrictions on use of prior sexual history would aid com-
plainants in enforcing rape laws, as well as modem social acceptance of premarital sex); see
also Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Mass. 1981) (noting that "[r]eformers
have argued that inquiries into the sexual history of the rape complainant chills her willing-
ness to testify" and that "reputation evidence is only marginally, if at all, probative of
consent").
179 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 800.
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able position as a proxy for consent. In the wake of these legal
changes, evidence of promiscuity no longer serves a probative func-
tion with regard to a woman's consent or her credibility.
When legal inquiry focuses on the harm of a woman's bodily in-
tegrity and rejects reputational evidence of her promiscuity, the shift
in the discourse modifies the social status of "prostitute." If a person's
status is based on her sexual conduct, but such conduct no longer has
probative power in a legal setting, her designation as a "prostitute"
can no longer short-circuit an inquiry into the question of harm to her
bodily integrity. The meaning of "prostitute" is altered. This is illus-
trated in a series of recent court decisions that refused to allow a de-
fendant to show consent or to attack the complainant's credibility
through the introduction of evidence of a complainant's prostitution
activities with others.'80 Not only do the legal changes make possible
the prosecution of a man for the rape of a woman who has engaged in
sex for money, but it also creates a discourse within which it is possi-
180 See, e.g., United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating "it is
intolerable to suggest that because the victim is a prostitute, she automatically is assumed
to have consented with anyone at any time"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 (1992); Williams
v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195,200 (End. 1997) (holding that evidence offered that victim on prior
occasions "had committed acts of prostitution" was properly excluded because evidence
was offered simply to show that victim had consented in past "in the hope the inference
will be drawn that she consented here"); State v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 869, 879 (NA1. 1997)
(holding that "when a defendant characterizes an alleged rape or other criminal sexual
conduct as an act of prostitution, evidence of prior acts of prostitution is not necessarily
material and probative"). But see, e.g., People v. Sloviniski, 420 N.W.2d 145, 153 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "evidence of alleged prostitution is probative on the issue of
consent if the fact that a complainant has engaged in intercourse for money has any ten-
dency to make it more probable that the complainant consented to the sex act in issue");
State v. Williams, 487 N.E.2d 560,563-64 (Ohio 1986) (holding that evidence of complain-
ant's reputation as prostitute was admissible because proffered evidence was more than
mere impeachment of witness's credibility but went to negate implied establishment of
element (consent) of crime charged).
Defendants may still be able to introduce evidence of a complainant's prostitution
activities if they can demonstrate some special relevancy, such as motive to fabricate or
pattern of conduct by the victim. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152, 160 (Md. 1993)
(holding that evidence that complainant had exchanged sex for drugs in past was admissi-
ble in order for defendant to establish that he was falsely accused because victim did not
get cocaine she was promised); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 184-S5 (Mass.
1981) (holding, in ruling on whether defendant could introduce evidence at trial that com-
plainant had been charged previously with prostitution to show that allegation of rape may
have been motivated by complainant's desire to avoid further prosecution, that rape shield
statute did not prohibit admission of "evidence of specific instances of a complainant's
sexual conduct in situations when that evidence is relevant to show complainant's bias");
Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15, 20 (Va. 1983) (explaining that defendant may
show that victim engaged in "a distinctive pattern of past sexual conduct, involving the
extortion of money by threat after acts of prostitution, of which her alleged conduct in [a
particular] case [is] but an example").
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ble for society to reconsider the implications of a woman's bodily in-
tegrity when she engages in sex for money.
When Lynne Henderson writes about the phenomenological dif-
ferences between violent and nonviolent sexual abuse, she describes
how the act of rape erases the self. "Rape denies that you are a per-
son, that you exist. In contrast, lovemaking affirms your existence,
and undesired sex at least does not completely deny your per-
sonhood.... [W]omen experience total helplessness and obliteration
during rape. When a woman's existence does not matter, intercourse
becomes rape."'181 In her articulation of the harm of rape, she shows
how disregard for bodily integrity results in the denial of a woman's
personhood. As she focuses on the terror of a single life-threatening
sex act, she leaves no room to engage in a debate about whether a
woman's reputation or prior sexual conduct is relevant.
Henderson's description of the harm of rape as a denial of per-
sonhood provides a model for examining the harms of prostitution.
Her language of "obliteration" can be helpful in describing the harm
of multiple and repetitive sexual encounters with johns.1 8 2
Henderson's description of a sexual act where "a woman's existence
just does not matter"'183 facilitates an understanding of how money
buys away a woman's existence and how the status of "prostitute" sys-
tematically makes a woman's existence not matter.
In this light, redefining consent to mean that "no means no" or
that "yes means yes" effectively precludes the possibility of treating
prostitution as sexual violence.184 Nevertheless, the debate over the
meaning and significance of consent in rape can illuminate our under-
standing of prostitution. Chamallas, for example, proposes that legal
rules aimed at protecting bodily integrity and autonomy should not
interfere with the parties' abilities to make mutual choices to engage
in sexual conduct for the purpose of "sexual pleasure or emotional
intimacy," but that laws should regulate sexual conduct that is not mu-
tual in terms of choice or purpose. 85 Chamallas's ideal merges liberty
and equality concerns.18 6 By including notions of individual choice,
sexual desire, and intimacy in her proposal, she builds on liberalism
and its commitment to limited state control and individual auton-
181 Henderson, supra note 175, at 226.
182 See id. For a discussion of the harms of prostitution that is similar to Henderson's
observations, see Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 268-73.
183 Henderson, supra note 175, at 226 (emphasis omitted).
184 See supra notes 161-64, 174-77 and accompanying text (discussing role of consent in
law of rape).
185 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 784, 836-39.
186 See id. at 836-39.
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omy.187 She narrows the legitimate purposes of sexual conduct to
"sexual pleasure or emotional intimacy" 1  and introduces the concept
of mutuality, in response to the reality that heterosexual sex has his-
torically been a site of patriarchal domination where women's sexual
needs and desires were subordinated to men's.18 9 Chamallas persua-
sively argues that "sexual encounters engaged in for emotional and
physical gratification may be characterized as the most egalitarian
kind of sexual encounters" because (1) "men and women are regarded
as possessing an equal capacity to experience sexual pleasure and
emotional intimacy" and (2) sex with one or the other of these goals
"seems more capable of avoiding the dangers of sexual objectification
which feminists have identified as a chief mechanism by which male
supremacy is established and maintained." 190 Mutuality promotes
equality in sexual encounters because unless it is present "the encoun-
ter is not dependent on the reciprocal response of the parties ... [and]
increases the chance that the sex will be an alienating experience for
both parties and will perpetuate the sexual objectification of
women." 191
Acknowledging that the feminist contention that "liberalism's
primary conern ... with limiting governmental coercion" makes it
"incapable of producing equality for women," 192 Chamallas puts for-
ward a "tentative hypothesis... that moral sex is... sexual conduct in
which both parties have as their objective only sexual pleasure or
emotional intimacy, whether or not [the sex is] tied to procreation." 193
Chamallas's definition of moral sex thus seems to exclude prostitu-
tion. The john may be seeking sexual pleasure, but for the woman
engaged in prostitution, even if we assume-contrary to a substantial
body of empirical evidence-that she obtains sexual pleasure from the
encounter, her primary objective is to obtain money.194 Of course,
187 See id. at 793-94.
188 Id. at 784.
189 See id. at 839-40.
190 Id. at 839.
191 Id. at 841.
192 Id. at 783.
193 Id. at 784.
194 See, e.g., Barry, supra note 24, at 31-32 (reporting on study documenting how women
disassociate from sex engaged in for money); Brock & Thistlethwaite, supra note 3, at 183,
186-87 (reporting how women in prostitution separate sexual intimacy in their personal
lives from having sex for money); Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 219-21 (reporting on studies
indicating that women do not engage in prostitution for sex). But see Ven Bullough &
Bonnie Bullough, Women and Prostitution: A Social History 309 (1987) (summarizing
data from study conducted by group of researchers organized by Kinsey group indicating
that, of women in prostitution interviewed, "approximately 80 percent reported having
orgasms at least occasionally" with clients and that they reported that they engaged in
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this definition of moral sex is problematic because it suggests that the
john is pursuing moral sex but the woman engaged in prostitution is
not. Chamallas's notion of mutuality can address this concern. 195 The
market exchange of sex for money is not moral sex on the part of the
john either because it is "not premised on mutuality," given the differ-
ent character of each participant's aims. 196
When elaborating on the egalitarian ideal of sexual conduct and
distinguishing it from the traditional view, which is based on the mari-
tal status of the parties, and from the liberal view that equates individ-
ual choice with sexual freedom, Chamallas explicitly addresses
prostitution.197 She concludes that the difference between the liberal
and egalitarian perspective on prostitution is that liberals fail to con-
sider the limited choices available to women in prostitution whereas
egalitarians would only accept that prostitution is an expression of a
woman's sexual freedom in a world of resource equality between men
and women.
[N]o convincing liberal argument can be made against prostitution
because it is possible to view prostitution as expressing the sexual
autonomy of the individual prostitute and the data are unpersuasive
that prostitution causes harm to third parties.
The egalitarian perspective, in contrast, is most reluctant to
equate individual choice with sexual freedom and is consciously di-
rected toward expanding the choices actually available to women.
For example, the egalitarian view does not conclude that because
prostitutes initiate sexual encounters, prostitution necessarily fur-
thers the sexual freedom of women. Because prostitution may be a
choice of last economic resort for many women, the egalitarian is as
likely to see it as the degrading artifact of sexual inequality as the
expression of women's liberty. Insofar as genuine sexual freedom
depends on sexual equality, full legal approval for prostitution may
be appropriate only when resource equality between men and
women is achieved. 198
Rather than critiquing the liberal view through her analysis to
argue that sexual autonomy exercised for purposes other than "sexual
prostitution "because it offered a good income, an opportunity to meet interesting people,
was comparatively easy, was fun, and gave sexual pleasure").
195 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 784:
My tentative hypothesis is that moral sex is coming to be identified with sexual
conduct in which both parties have as their objective only sexual pleasure ....
Sex used for more external purposes, such as financial gain .. is regarded as
exploitative and immoral, regardless of whether the parties have engaged
voluntarily ....
196 See id. at 841.
197 See id.
198 Id. at 841-42.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[V/ol. 74:1220
A MATER OF PROSTITUTION
pleasure or emotional intimacy"'199 is likely to perpetuate inequality,
Chamallas embraces the conventional meaning of sexual autonomy.
It matters to Chamallas that a woman initiates a sexual encounter, and
she seems reluctant to challenge the import of a woman saying "yes"
to sex. She thus privileges a conventional liberal understanding of
sexual autonomy in a way that seems inconsistent with her own ideal
of "moral sex." As this contradiction demonstrates, it is difficult for
any conventional consent framework to change people's understand-
ing of prostitution. Chamallas's reluctance to challenge the liberal un-
derstanding of sexual autonomy as it applies to prostitution, however,
does not detract from the ability of her definition of "moral sex" as
mutual sexual conduct to expose the way in which prostitution is a
practice of inequality.
Feminist critiques of the role of "consent" in rape law are also
helpful in developing a new understanding of prostitution.
Schulhofer, in addressing the problem of how the law of rape should
treat a woman's silence, observes that traditional rape law equates si-
lence with consent because the law is "centered on protect[ing
women] from forcible coercion. '20 0 Schulhofer explains that the legal
meaning of nonconsent as resistance to forcible coercion is, in the con-
text of rape, readily perceived by the legal system as revulsion, which
is unlikely to be expressed through silence. 20' Schulhofer appreciates,
however, that silence is ambiguous: It might express "emphatically
negative, enthusiastically positive, indifferent, uncertain, or ambiva-
lent" feelings toward sexual conduct.2 0 2 In this light, he argues, the
ambiguity of silence leads to the conclusion that intercourse "in the
face of verbal objections, ambivalence, or silence is intercourse with-
out consent, and it represents a clear offense against the physical au-
tonomy of the person. °20 3 He concludes that, "[e]ven in the complete
absence of force, such behavior is 'nonviolent sexual misconduct' and
should be punished as such.''04
Once Schulhofer shows how the law, in order to protect an indi-
vidual's bodily integrity, must do more than protect a woman from
abhorrent sexual conduct, prostitution no longer clearly represents an
instance of consensual sex. Although he initially assumes that ambi-
199 Id. at 784.
200 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 67, 73. For a similar discussion of silence, see
Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 267-73.
201 See Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 73 ("The very conception of rape implied coercing
someone to do something repugnant.").
202 Id.
203 Id. at 77.
204 Id.
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guity exists as to a woman's feelings where the "response to a sexual
initiative is neither clearly affirmative nor clearly negative,"20 more
recently, he discusses a woman's initiation of sex as potentially coer-
cive under some circumstances. 206 He does not go so far as to say that
the meaning of a woman's agreement to, and even initiation of sex,
becomes ambiguous when the consent is conditioned on an exchange
of money.20 7 By extension, the analysis in his article and book, how-
ever, suggests that the meaning of the initiation of sex by a woman in
prostitution is ambiguous both because the practice of prostitution oc-
curs within an oppressive and exploitative social and economic re-
gime, but also because the commercial nature of the exchange raises
the possibility that the woman may be "emphatically negative, ...
indifferent, uncertain, or ambivalent" about the sex but "enthusiasti-
cally positive" about the money.208 Accordingly, Schulhofer's ap-
proach to the meaning of silence can be applied more broadly to
encompass the harm to bodily integrity that occurs in prostitution,
even when the woman consents to or initiates sexual contact.
Robin West also questions the practice of legitimating consensual
sex by examining the contexts within which women say "yes" to sex. 20 9
She observes that "[i]t is a non sequitur, but a disturbingly common
one, to argue from the premise that some act is bad because it is non-
consensual, to the conclusion that the same act, if consensual, is there-
fore good. '210 As she goes on to explain, just because theft is bad,
does not mean that all bargains are good.211 Just because rape is bad
because it is nonconsensual does not mean that "consensual sex-all
of it-must be good because it is consensual. '2 12 She expands on her
observation when she writes that "in a cultural climate that valorizes
individualism, decries paternalism, and worries obsessively about the
totalitarian implications of any form of collective action" it is difficult
not to believe that there is value created by a consensual exchange.213
Within the context of sex she notes that it is extremely difficult to see
the harms caused by the "habit" of legitimation because both the con-
205 Id. at 73.
206 See Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 150-51 (arguing that woman is coerced even when
she initiates sex in situations in which employer provides benefits, knowing that victim is
afraid of not receiving them if she does not participate in corrupt system).
207 See id. at 165 ("[Pjroposals to exchange sex for money are obviously illegitimate.
But the man who propositions a prostitute is not necessarily coercing her.").
208 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 73.
209 West, supra note 161, at 247.
210 Id.
211 See id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 248.
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duct and the harm from it are "private and privatized.'" 1 4 West does
not suggest that consensual sex should be the subject of the criminal
law, nor does she reconsider the specific role that consent plays in
prostitution. Nevertheless, her observation introduces a different per-
spective for evaluating prostitution by looking to alternative markers
of value.215
West's response to the contemporary analysis of the law of rape
that analogizes rape to property crimes also potentially recasts the
meaning of a market exchange of sex for money.216 She challenges
the analogy because it blurs the distinction between property and sex
and between market transactions and sexual intimacy 2 17 As she
states, "[it may be that we should criminalize some forms of fraudu-
lently or coercively obtained sex. But the reason we should do so is
surely not that only by so doing can we better protect our autonomous
right to sell it at the highest price and to the highest bidder."218 She
resists the property crime analogy because she does not believe that
the harm of rape consists in taking from women something that "we
should be free to keep to ourselves, to trade, or to give away, and
[that], as is the case with anything else we own, it is equally violative
of our autonomy when we are forced to part with it against our
will."'219 She explains that "[t]he commodification of some aspect of
our world or being in large part means that we are willing to separate
our selves from that which is commodified."' ' 0 The experience of
holding back the self to benefit from "[t]hat which is traded, given, or
disposed of, or sold" is consciously different from the experience of
"'hav[ing] sex,' or 'mak[ing] love,' [where] at least ideally, we do not
hold our 'self' back in this way."2 1 Although West refrains from ana-
lyzing prostitution, other than to indicate it reflects the commodifica-
214 Id. at 248-49.
215 For a discussion of choice and prostitution, see Barry, supra note 24, at 33; Jeffreys,
supra note 3, at 128-60; Pateman, supra note 3, at 190-93, 200-18; Janice G. Raymond,
Sexual and Reproductive Liberalism, in Sexual Liberals, supra note 37, at 103, 105-11.
216 See Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93
Colum. L. Rev. 1442 (1993) (commenting on Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay
on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent 92 Colum.
L. Rev. 1780 (1992)).
217 See West, supra note 161, at 247 ("ITnhere is something amiss with the argument that
we should criminalize nonconsensual sex for the same reasons that we criminalize all non-
consensual takings."); West, supra note 216, at 1447-51 ("[R]ape in which the only demon-
strable violence is the violence of penetration. ... [and rape] aggravated by the use of
violene ... are experienced, and typically described, as more like spiritual murder than
either robbery or larceny.").
218 West, supra note 161, at 247.
219 Id.
220 West, supra note 216, at 1451.
221 IdC
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tion of sex and to urge us not to accept it as representing "normal"
sexual experiences,222 she insists that we look beyond the model of
property and property crimes to find the harm in rape. West's view of
rape provides the framework for analyzing, likewise, the harm of pros-
titution by looking beyond the models of the marketplace and theo-
ries about the unjust allocation of material resources.
Thus far, Part II has examined legal reforms that address violence
against women and has proposed that these changes in the law, as well
as the discourse surrounding them, have the potential to transform the
legal and social meaning of prostitution. What remains to be an-
swered is why the transformation has not occurred and, indeed, why
the potential for change is largely unrecognized. In the Part that fol-
lows, we examine why prostitution is perceived to be an intractable
problem and remains virtually untouched by the legal reform move-
ments and conclude that women who have not been prostituted, as
well as society as a whole, have a stake in perpetuating the taint of
degeneracy that is attached to women in prostitution.
Our conclusion relies on the work of critical race feminists, who
show that the law reforms addressing violence are limited in their ef-
fectiveness because they focus almost exclusively on sex oppression
and ignore other forms or sites of oppression.223 They also show how
the choice/coercion and private/public dichotomies mask social hierar-
chical arrangements and practices. The relationship between prostitu-
tion, racial and gendered cultural practices, and rights of citizenship
that is revealed through critical race feminist literature can be theo-
rized in a new way by viewing it through the lens of degeneracy and
respectability. From the perspective of the degeneracy/respectability
dichotomy, prostitution reveals itself to be paradigmatic of all forms
of inequality and not merely a marketplace transaction between une-
qual parties in which money is exchanged for sex. Part III explores
how degeneracy and its counterpart, respectability, operate in our so-
ciety to maintain inequality, and how prostitution delineates the dis-
tinction between those persons who are labeled as unworthy and
those who are constructed as respectable. Invoking the analytical
methods of critical race feminists, we contend that the exclusion of
prostitution from antiviolence reform efforts is not an oversight, but
rather an effective strategy for pursuing respectability, thereby en-
trenching structures of dominance in society.
222 See West, supra note 161, at 247; West, supra note 216, at 1449 & n.36.
223 See infra notes 225-50 and accompanying text (describing work of critical race femi-
nists who show how antiviolence efforts fail to address adequately implications of race in
violence against women).
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PROSTITUTION AND THE DEGENERACY/
RESPECTABILiTY DICHOTOMY
Critical race feminists have criticized reforms of the laws concern-
ing violence against women because they fail to address the underly-
ing cultural practices that devalue women of color and make them
unworthy of protection.0 4 Their assessment that the laws neglect the
synergistic impact that degrading racial and gendered stereotypes
have on women of color is pertinent to the reasons why prostitution
has been excluded from reform efforts.
KimberlM Crenshaw explores "the race and gender dimensions of
violence against women" for the purpose of showing how "feminist
and antiracist discourses have failed to consider intersectional identi-
ties such as women of color."25 In her evaluation of rape reforms,
especially the rape shield laws, she describes the "sexualized images of
African Americans" that shape cultural beliefs and how those sexual-
ized images operate in a gendered way to equate African American
women with "bad" women.22 As Crenshaw states:
Blacks have long been portrayed as more sexual, more earthy, more
gratification-oriented. These sexualized images of race intersect
with norms of women's sexuality, norms that are used to distinguish
good women from bad, the madonnas from the whores. Thus Black
women are essentially prepackaged as bad women within cultural
narratives about good women who can be raped and bad women
who cannot. 2 7
She concludes that "[r]ape law reform measures that do not in some
way engage and challenge the narratives that are read onto Black
women's bodies are unlikely to affect the way cultural beliefs oppress
Black women in rape trials."'' 8 Crenshaw's critique makes evident
how the "sexualized images" of African American women depend on
the prostitution paradigm.229
224 See infra notes 225-41 and accompanying text (discussing writings of two critical race
feminists, Kimberl6 Crenshaw and Sumi Cho, as well as contributions of other
commentators).
225 Crenshaw, supra note 70, at 1242-43.
226 Id. at 1271.
227 Id.
228 Id. For a further discussion of images symbolizing African American womanhood,
see Jewell, supra note 72, at 35-47, 55-56 (analyzing varying and contradictory images of
African American women and how images were used to support institution of slavery in
United States).
229 See Crenshaw, supra note 70, at 1271; see also Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race &
Class 182-83 (1981) (giving example of how sexual outrages perpetrated against enslaved
women were used to justify viewing African American women in post-Civil War era as
"'promiscuous and loose" (footnote omitted)); hooks, supra note 50, at 24-26 (describing
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Sumi Cho reveals the "racialized (hetero)sexual harassment" ex-
perienced by Asian Pacific and Asian Pacific American women in the
workplace, similarly basing her thesis on historical and contemporary
sexualized images and stereotypes.230 Cho looks to the "[m]ilitary in-
volvement in Asia, colonial and neocolonial history, and the deriva-
tive Asian Pacific sex tourism industry" to account for the stereotypes
of Asian Pacific women that have, in turn, been "internationally trans-
ferred" to "apply to women both in and outside of Asia" through the
"mass media and popular culture."2 31 As she explains, the racialized
ascriptions to Asian Pacific women as "exotic, hyper-eroticized, maso-
chistic, [and] desirous of sexual domination" 32 serve a "'model mi-
nority' function" within a patriarchal culture that resists the
implications of gender equality.233 "Asian Pacific women are particu-
larly valued in a sexist society because they provide the antidote to
visions of liberated career women who challenge the objectification of
women. s23 4 Cho directly addresses the prostitution paradigm when
she critiques an article published in Gentleman's Quarterly by Tony
Rivers, which refers to the "'Hong Kong hooker with a heart of gold"'
of the 1960 film, The World of Suzie Wong.235 She concludes that the
"cultural backdrop of converging racial and gender stereotypes in
which the model minority meets Suzie Wong, so to speak" results in
Asian Pacific and Asian Pacific American women being "especially
susceptible to racialized sexual harassment. '2 36
Cho's critique of current law parallels Crenshaw's2 37 in that
"new... frameworks that integrate race and gender should be devel-
rapes of enslaved women and how white slaveowners and overseers placed women in "role
of prostitute[s]" by giving them items of clothing and such).
230 Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the
Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. Gender Race & Just. 177, 181 (1997).
231 Id. at 193; accord Brock & Thistlethwaite, supra note 3, at 5-6 (discussing growth of
sex tourism in Asia that is "directly tied to the Vietnam War"); see also Katharine H.S.
Moon, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations 2 (1997) (explain-
ing how "Korean women working as prostitutes in military camptowns have been in-
separably tied to the activities and welfare of the U.S. military installations [in Korea] since
the early 1950s" and focusing "on the role of the women as instruments in the promotion
of two governments' bilateral security interests"); Saundra Pollock Sturdevant & Brenda
Stoltzfus, Disparate Threads of the Whole: An Interpretive Essay, in Let the Good Times
Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia 300,321-27 (Saundra Pollock Sturdevant &
Brenda Stoltzfus eds., 1992) (describing pervasiveness of prostitution near and around
United States military installations throughout Asia and how military masculinity is ex-
pressed through racial misogyny reflected in buying of sex).
232 Cho, supra note 230, at 191.
233 Id. at 192.
234 Id. (footnote omitted).
235 Id. at 193-94 (citation omitted).
236 Id. at 194.
237 See supra notes 70, 225-29 and accompanying text (discussing Crenshaw's work).
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oped to account for the multi-dimensional character of harassment
that occurs and is challenged across races, social classes, and bor-
ders." 81 She insists that "[t]o understand the uniqueness" of injuries
resulting from the "synergy of race and gender," the law must adopt
"more nuanced conceptions of the victims' and the harassers' sub-
jecthoods." 239 She also advocates that the law "incorporate a fuller
conception of workplace power relations, so that the synergistic ef-
fects of race and gender are given the consideration they warrant."2 40
The law's inadequacy, as Cho understands it, is that it fails to take into
account the fact that Asian Pacific American women "and women of
different racial backgrounds possess subjectivities that are not coter-
minous with an essentialized Western female subjectivity." 41
In light of their analyses that current law reforms do not address
the lived experiences of women of different racial backgrounds, Cho
and Crenshaw call for further law reform that will disrupt racialized
and sexualized stereotypes. Theirs is part of a broader challenge to a
jurisprudence that affords protection only to those women identified
as worthy and denies it to those who are not. Patricia Hill Collins's
work is instrumental in revealing that the stereotypes are not exoge-
nous to the developing law of violence against women but inseparable
from established legal and cultural practices. In her analysis of prosti-
tution, she observes that "[t]he prostitution of Black women [in the
American antebellum South] allowed white women to be the oppo-
site; Black 'whores' make white 'virgins' possible."2 42 According to
Collins, the making of the worthy woman happens by imagining what
the worthy woman is not, which means that the worthy/unworthy dis-
tinction itself is a practice of dominance. 243 As she states, "[t]he crea-
tion of Jezebel, the image of the sexually denigrated Black woman,
has been vital in sustaining a system of interlocking race, gender, and
class oppression."244
Collins recognizes that sexual denigration operates within each
form of oppression.245 By embracing an analytical framework that
238 Cho, supra note 230, at 209 (footnote omitted).
239 Id. at 210.
240 Id. at 211.
241 Id. at 210.
242 Collins, supra note 26, at 175-76.
243 See id. at 174-76 (identifying role of domination in characterizing Black women as
"victims" or pets").
244 Id. at 174.
245 See id. at 165-67 (considering restrictive and repressive link between sexuality and
power hierarchies by race, gender, and class). We can see this in her analysis of the "con-
nection between race, gender, and sexuality." Id. at 175. Relying on Sander Gilman's
analysis of the exploitation of Sarah Bartmann, the so-called "Hottentot Venus," she links
"the icon of the Black woman with the icon of the white prostitute" that developed in
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emphasizes the interlocking systems of race, gender, and class oppres-
sion, Collins uncovers the vital role played by the discourse of degen-
eracy. Prostitution marks the boundary between worthy and
unworthy women within the discourse of degeneracy that holds in
place oppressive systems.
The work of critical race feminists, such as Cho, Collins, and
Crenshaw, reveals how the antiviolence movement's efforts are com-
plicit in, rather than disruptive of, social hierarchies,21 6 because they
have been based on constructing the harmed woman as an innocent
and worthy victim, which is to say she is constructed as "not an unwor-
thy agent"-not a woman in prostitution.2 47 In order for society and
the law to recognize a worthy (respectable) category, they must first
recognize its opposite; that is to say, the unworthy (degenerate)
woman must be defined and identified.2 48 The worthy/unworthy di-
vide, as critical race feminists understand, implicates and supports all
forms of inequality. Within the worthy victim/unworthy agent dichot-
omy, women in prostitution, as well as women linked to prostitution
through the discourse of degeneracy, have to be excluded from the
reach of traditional antiviolence law reform efforts, as their inclusion
may serve to undermine those efforts.249
nineteenth-century Europe. Id. (citing and discussing Sander L. Gilman, Black Bodies,
White Bodies: Toward an Iconography of Female Sexuality in Late Nineteenth-Century
Art, Medicine, and Literature, 12 Critical Inquiry 204, 237 (1985)). While alive, Bartmann,
an African woman, was exhibited with little clothing. See Collins, supra note 26, at 168. To
her European audiences she "represented deviant sexuality." Id. After her death, the
French placed on display in Paris "her genitalia and buttocks." Id. (citing Gilman, supra, at
213). Collins, quoting Gilman, concludes that
the white prostitute symbolized the sexualized woman. The [white] prostitute
represented the embodiment of sexuality and all that European society associ-
ated with it: disease as well as passion .... "[I]t is this uncleanliness, this dis-
ease, which forms the final link between two images of women, the black and
the prostitute. Just as the genitalia of the Hottentot were perceived as parallel
to the diseased genitalia of the prostitute, so to the power of the idea of cor-
ruption links both images .... "
Id. at 175 (altered from original) (quoting Gilman, supra, at 237); see also Lynda Hart,
Fatal Women: Lesbian Sexuality and the Mark of Aggression 119-20 (1994) (discussing
Gilman and extending his analysis that "black woman and the prostitute merged by the
late nineteenth century" by suggesting "that the lesbian was also subsumed within this
merger" and arguing that "[if] not quite made entirely synonymous, the prostitute, the
black woman, and the lesbian were nonetheless drawn together to form a triad onto which
the white male patriarch's terror of sexuality was projected").
246 See supra notes 70, 237-41 and accompanying text (discussing implications of racial
stereotyping on effectiveness of antiviolence law reforms).
247 See supra notes 72, 75, 166, 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing how worthi-
ness/unworthiness distinction has affected antiviolence reforms).
248 See Collins, supra note 26, at 176 ("Black 'whores' make white 'virgins' possible.").
249 But see Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 611A.80-611A.88 (West Supp. 1999), in which the state
legislature enacted a civil cause of action on behalf of juveniles and persons coerced into
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The possibility of transfiguring the way in which prostitution is
perceived by society and by the law depends, therefore, on recogniz-
ing how it functions to maintain the degeneracy/respectability dichot-
omy3 o50 Prostitution operates in two related ways to enforce and
reinforce the dichotomy. One way is as a paradigm of degeneracy that
supports social inequalities based on class, disability, gender, race, and
sexuality. The analysis of stereotyping that is found in the work of
critical race feminists demonstrates the pervasive nature of the para-
digm and how it functions to maintain dominant social arrange-
ments.251 The second way prostitution operates to sustain the
dichotomy is as a practice of inequality.
In order to comprehend prostitution as a paradigm of degeneracy
and a practice of inequality, it must be examined within the historical
context of nineteenth-century Europe and the United States.z2 This
period represents an important historical moment for the formulation
of hierarchical structures that have persisted in contemporary
times.253 It is the period in which the European middle class first le-
gitimated its power and began to consolidate it within liberal demo-
prostitution. See supra notes 3, 7-23 and accompanying text (discussing statutory scheme
and some of its legislative history). The fact that the statute precluded recovery for con-
senting adult women, however, supports the view that harms to an unworthy woman re-
main beyond the scope of antiviolence law reforms. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.81(1)
(West Supp. 1999).
250 The language of respect and respectability recently has emerged in the legal litera-
ture. Anita Bernstein advocates our rethinking the harm of sexual harassment by replac-
ing the doctrine of reasonableness with one of respect. See Anita Bernstein, An Old
Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 Cornell L Rev. 1231, 1239 (1998) (defending
proposed "respectful person standard" as able to "bring[ ] common sense to the doc-
trine,... educate judges-and everyone else in the workplace-incrementally and without
bombast"); Bernstein, supra note 87, at 450-51, 482-506 (describing respect standard and
explaining benefits as compared to reasonableness standard). Randall Kennedy relies on a
"politics of respectability" as a strategy for achieving race neutrality in the criminal law.
See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 17-21 (1997) (discussing merits and po-
tential excesses bf "politics of respectability"). The related legal scholarship on shaming is
also relevant to notions of degeneracy and respectability. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey,
Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Chi. L Rev. 733,743-62 (1998) (taking critical
look at shaming model of punishment); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591,594-605 (1996) (identifying expression of social condemna-
tion as purpose of punishment). It is neither useful for our purposes, nor within the scope
of this Article, to discuss this emerging scholarship. It is possible, however, that the mean-
ing of respect, degeneracy, respectability, and shame as used and understood in contempo-
rary legal discourse may well prove to be a source of contention in the future.
251 See supra notes 225-50 and accompanying text (describing operation of gender and
racial stereotyping).
252 The authors are indebted to Sherene Razack for her insights regarding the concept
of respectability in the nineteenth century.
253 See 1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. An Introduction 17-35 (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1978); David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy
and the Politics of Meaning 43-46 (1993); Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather. Race, Gen-
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cratic states.25 4 Sustained by colonial capitalism, the making of the
middle class as a class distinct from the aristocracy, the working class,
and colonized populations necessitated the social constructions of
class, gender, and race, which currently define contemporary Ameri-
can society.255
Social historians agree that early in the nineteenth century, within
the context of an emerging urban capitalism and the growing influ-
ence of Evangelical Christian religion in both England and the United
States, respectability became closely associated with work ethic, good
character, independence from patronage, sobriety, chastity, and dedi-
cation to family.z56 The middle class distinguished itself from the aris-
tocracy, the working class, and others by striving to achieve the
attributes of respectability, thereby relegating those who lacked these
attributes to the degenerate category. Respectability itself had no
independent social meaning; it was defined by way of contrast to bad
der and Sexuality in the Colonial Context 21-61 (1995); Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes:
Travel Writing and Transculturation 9-10 (1992).
For a description of the practices of prostitution in the United States during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, see Ruth Rosen, The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in
America, 1900-1918, at 1-4 (1982) (suggesting that prostitution was not viewed as either
occupation or status until industrialization and urbanization of nineteenth century).
254 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism 80-111 (1983); Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire:
Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things 96-97 (1995).
255 We recognize the dangers inherent in transposing to North American soil the making
of the European elite in the nineteenth century. Although the histories of European and
North American nations differ, a powerful argument can be made for their interconnected-
ness both in the nineteenth century and today. With European empires expanding to link
vast sections of the globe, nineteenth-century imperialism laid the groundwork for today's
global political economy. See Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism 6-8 (1993) (dis-
cussing role of empires in laying "the groundwork for what is in effect now a fully global
world" and noting that, by 1914, Europe laid claim to roughly 85% of globe). As Edward
Said observes, "in Europe itself at the end of the nineteenth century, scarcely a corner of
life was untouched by the facts of empire." Id. at 8. "'The American experience," he con-
tinues, "was from the beginning founded upon" imperialism; as the century progressed, the
extermination of native peoples, the enslavement of Africans, and the displacement of
populations the world over through American interventions, both direct and indirect, con-
tinued apace. Id. Although legitimating ideologies vary from one period to the next, and
from one locale to another, they all bear the hallmarks of these arrangements, which are
rooted in imperialism.
256 See Leonore Davidoff & Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the
English Middle Class, 1780-1850, at 108-13, 180-92 (1987) (discussing evangelical concep-
tions of gender roles, work ethic, and family relations); E. Anthony Rotundo, American
Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modem Era 20
(1993) (identifying perceived need to control male aggression in individualistic age); Gail
Bederman, "Civilization," the Decline of Middle-Class Manliness, and Ida B. Wells's Anti-
lynching Campaign (1892-94), in 52 Radical Hist. Rev. 5, 6 (1992) ("Middle-class construc-
tions of both manliness and womanliness centered around willful control of sin." (footnote
omitted)).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 74:1220
A MATTER OF PROSTITUTION
character, patronage, drunkenness, promiscuity, and profligacy. To
become respectable meant to reject these degenerate forms of
behavior.
George Mosse elaborates on how the intellectual construct of
middle class respectability, the term that described the ordered, self-
regulating state of middle class homes and persons, came to distin-
guish middle class life.
Through respectability, they [the middle class] sought to maintain
their status and self-respect against both the lower classes and the
aristocracy. They perceived their way of life, based as it was upon
frugality, devotion to duty, and restraint of the passions, as superior
to that of the "lazy" lower classes and the profligate aristocracy.z-7
Mosse asserts that degeneracy emerged as the antithesis to respecta-
bility in the late nineteenth century once national survival began to be
defined in terms of physical and moral health and manliness became
the term that described those able to possess these qualities.258
In the second half of the nineteenth century the distinctions be-
tween women and men, private and public, and home and workplace
intensified within intellectual thought and through material prac-
tices.Z59 The marketplace became characterized as harsh, crude, and
257 George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality- Respectability and Abnormal Sexual-
ity in Modem Europe 5 (1985).
258 See id. at 34. Degeneracy, for Benedict Augustin Morel, who first formulated the
concept in medical terms in 1857, is a process of destruction that is brought on by "moral
and physical poison." See id. at 34-35. Mosse writes:
This deviance from the norm, as Morel called it, could be brought about by
such poisons as alcoholism and the use of opium, by debilitating diseases like
malaria, but also by the social environment, a nervous temperament, diseased
moral faculties, or inherited bodily and mental weakness. Several of these poi-
sons usually combined in order to begin the relentless process of degeneration.
Id. at 35 (footnote omitted). For further discussion of the different views of degeneracy
within the development of sexology in the late nineteenth century, see generally Larence
Birken, Consuming Desire: Sexual Science and the Emergence of a Culture of Abun-
dance, 1871-1914, at 65-67 (1988). Birken situates sexology within "the larger history of
Western thought," id. at 15, showing how the concept of degeneration reflected class, gen-
der, and race differentiations at the turn of the century, see id. at 72-91, as part of his larger
argument that "sexology simultaneously furthered and resisted the extensions of the con-
cept of citizenship." Id. at 76 (footnote omitted).
259 Thomas Laqueur, in his historical study of the changing meaning of sex, demon-
strates how, in the nineteenth century, prostitution became "the social evil, a particularly
disruptive, singularly threatening vice" with a social context in which the boundaries be-
tween "home and economy, private and public, self and society" were "sharply drawn."
Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud 230-32 (1990).
As Laqueur shows, prostitution historically had "been regarded as wicked and detrimental
to the commonweal." Id. at 230. He also details the various explanations over the centu-
ries for the belief that women in prostitution were barren. See id. at 230-32. In the nine-
teenth century, however, when "[s]ociety seemed to be in unprecedented danger from the
market place," he argues that society and the sexual body became intertwined within the
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brutish, while the home became characterized as clean, orderly, and a
haven for social and moral graces.260 The separate spheres made it
possible for a man to earn respect through self-control and good char-
acter by looking to his home, wife, and children, leaving him free to
lust for power and wealth in the marketplace. 261 Not coincidentally,
the barbaric marketplace became a justification for virtuous women to
remain in the home and not compete with men by entering into the
public arenas of the workplace, education, or politics. 262 This era is
frequently referred to as either the "cult of the lady" or the "cult of
domesticity. 263
The middle class home-the emblem of respectability-required
a gender hierarchy and a colonial economic order to finance it. A
"claim that sex for money ... bears no fruit." Id. at 232. Laqueur summarizes his thesis
that the nineteenth-century cultural meaning of the "trope of the barren prostitute," id. at
232, reflected marketplace anxieties when he writes:
The paradoxes of commercial society that had already plagued Adam Smith
and his colleagues, the nagging doubts that a free economy might not sustain
the social body, haunt the sexual body. Or, the other way around, the per-
verted sexual body haunts society and reminds it of its fragility, as it had done
in other ways for millennia.
Id. at 233.
260 See, e.g., Giddings, supra note 85, at 47-49 (describing nineteenth-century perception
of women who worked outside home); Rotundo, supra note 256, at 254 (portraying male
attempts to dominate marketplace by "stressing gender contrasts" and "the harsh world of
economic and political struggle").
261 Elaine Showalter examines how the practice of drawing rigid boundaries was a re-
sponse to a range of fin de sidcle cultural insecurities.
In periods of cultural insecurity, when there are fears of regression and degen-
eration, the longing for strict border controls around the definition of gender,
as well as race, class, and nationality, becomes especially intense. If the differ-
ent races can be kept in their places, if the various classes can be held in their
proper districts of the city, and if men and women can be fixed in their sepa-
rate spheres, many hope, apocalypse can be prevented and we can preserve a
comforting sense of identity and permanence in the face of that relentless spec-
ter of millennial change.
Elaine Showalter, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Si~cle 4 (1990).
262 See Rotundo, supra note 256, at 254 ("As women tried to enter the rough arena of
money and power, men defended their turf by stressing gender contrasts .... "); see also
Mary Romero, Maid in the U.S.A. 52-53 (1992) (emphasizing how ideology of separate
spheres in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in United States accentuated dependence
of wife's social position on husband's and how social position, in turn, determined differ-
ences in structure of women's homemaking activity).
263 See, e.g., Giddings, supra note 85, at 47-49; Romero, supra note 262, at 53-58; see
also Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, in 18 Am. Q. 151, 151
(1966); cf. Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in
the Age of Jackson, 1800-1840, in A Heritage of Her Own: Toward a New Social History
of American Women 182 (Nancy F. Cott & Elizabeth H. Pleck eds., 1979). As Diane
Roberts forcefully demonstrates with regard to the distinctions between the meaning of
cult of the lady in the North and in the South, it is a mistake to use the concept of the cult
of the lady as if it were monolithic in either its practices or effect. See Diane Roberts, The
Myth of Aunt Jemima: Representations of Race and Region 107-09 (1994).
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number of discursive arrangements sustained these interconnections.
As Ann Laura Stoler argues in her examination of Michel Foucault's
work, "nineteenth century bourgeois sexuality... was situated on an
imperial landscape where the cultural accoutrements of bourgeois dis-
tinction were partially shaped through contrasts forged in the politics
and language of race." 64 Thus, colonizers defined a "healthy bour-
geois person" only in contrast to that person's racial opposite. This
practice, honed in colonial territories, was eventually brought home
and was projected onto the working class.265 Victorian society explic-
itly racialized the cult of the lady when it "stigmatized as specimens of
racial regression" women who transgressed the boundaries of
respectability. 66
As Collins's work makes clear,267 prostitution within Victorian
boundary making was an emblem of contamination. 2m To say it was
264 Stoler, supra note 254, at 5.
265 See id. at 5-7. Anne McClintock shows the crucial relation between middle class
domesticity and empire. See McClintock, supra note 253, at 42. In contrast to bourgeois
males, Victorian iconography featured women as primitive and archaic; the female body
itself was thought to inhabit anachronistic space, space inherently out of time with moder-
nity. See id.
266 Id. McClintock elaborates further on racialized stigmatization:
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the analogy between race and
gender degeneration came to serve a specifically modem form of social domi-
nation, as an intricate dialectic emerged-between the domestication of the
colonies and the racializing of the metropolis. In the metropolis, the idea of
racial deviance was evoked to police the "degenerate" classes-the militant
working class, the Irish, Jews, feminists, gays and lesbians, prostitutes,
criminals, alcoholics and the insane-who were collectively figured as racial
deviants, atavistic throwbacks to a primitive moment in human prehistory, sur-
viving ominously in the heart of the modem, imperial metropolis.
Id. at 43.
267 See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text (discussing Collins's writings regard-
ing prostitution).
268 See Hobson, supra note 17, at 110-11 (quoting writers on prostitution reasoning that
"'[a] women [sic] is of more delicate organization than a man, finer strung, of more refined
essence, so she can be lower, more degraded and viler, when she sinks'" and describing
woman in prostitution as "'a social pest carrying contamination and foulness of every quar-
ter'" (citing William Acton, Prostitution 119 (MacGibbon and Kee Ltd. 1968) (1857);
Sydney Southworth, 9 Friend of Virtue 146 (1846))); see also Marilynn Wood Hill, Their
Sisters' Keepers: Prostitution in New York City, 1830-1870, at 16-25 (1993) (describing
how prostitution "became the symbol of what was perceived as the social and moral disin-
tegration of society," and describing how at mid-century it was treated as "the social eil,"
by moral reformers and by "a new breed of researcher-writers [including William Acton
and William Sanger] who broached... [prostitution] in the manner of scientific investiga-
tors" (footnote omitted)).
Rosen attributes "the polarized images" of prostitution in history--"the innocent vic-
tim or the sinister polluter"-to "racial, ethnic, and class prejudices" in which "the inno-
cent victim" was embodied in the white, native-born young rural woman, while "the
sinister polluter" evoked the image of "a lower-class nonwhite or immigrant woman." See
Rosen, supra note 253, at 47, 49; see also Hobson, supra note 17, at 35-36 (describing how
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antithetical to the lady and the home is to understate its role in mark-
ing degeneracy. 269 Prostitution represented not just the streets but the
metropolis's "sewers. ' 270 As Leonore Davidoff indicates, the home in
records for arrests for prostitution during the mid-1800s in various cities in United States
indicate bias based on interaction of race and ethnicity and class); infra note 269 (discuss-
ing images of prostitution).
269 During the mid-eighteenth century, "prostitute" came to be conceived as a social
status and no longer a reference to conduct alone. See Amanda Anderson, Tainted Souls
and Painted Faces: The Rhetoric of Fallenness in Victorian Culture 48-49 (1993).
The distinction between the woman in prostitution and the lady was complex because
it embraced the dual images of "the fallen angel" and the "evil temptress or siren of vice."
Hobson, supra note 17, at 72. From the 1830s until the twentieth century, popular novels
depicted the fallen woman as an innocent victim, which might have influenced both social
and political perceptions of prostitution. See id. at 70-72. As Hobson reports, however,
the literary themes "did not negate the deep-seated prejudice and condemnation of society
toward sexually deviant women" and in fact "[t]he sentimentalized accounts of fallen
women in popular literature led to greater censure of women who did not fit the passive-
victim model." See id. at 72.
A further complication is that while the boundary between the status of women in
prostitution and "ladies" was substantial, it was not impenetrable. As Rosen reports, fe-
male reformers operating in the 1840s and 1850s within voluntary organizations to "res-
cue" women in prostitution "came to recognize the precariousness of their own social and
economic position as women, and thus to articulate feelings of identification between
themselves and prostitutes." Rosen, supra note 253, at 8. She gives examples of leaders
emphasizing "the similarities of all women, each within 'a hair's breadth' of being the
other" and notes that the reformers' publications "repeatedly challenged the socially up-
held distinctions between madonnas and magdalens and declared their solidarity with all
women." Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted); see also Hobson, supra note 17, at 49-50 (describ-
ing how female moral reformers "constructed a sexual politics around prostitution" in
which they understood that "women were bound together not only by their shared exper-
iences but also by common grievances against men's sexual aggression, both outside and
inside marriage" with effect of transforming in 1830s and 1840s "the social and political
meanings of prostitution").
270 See Leonore Davidoff, Worlds Between: Historical Perspectives on Gender and
Class 105 (1995).
This analysis is further supported by the work of Thomas Laqueur who explains pros-
titution's status as "the social evil" by looking to the relation between sex and capitalism.
See Thomas W. Laqueur, Sexual Desire and the Market Economy During the Industrial
Revolution, in Discourses of Sexuality: From Aristotle to AIDS 185 (Domna C. Stanton
ed., 1992). He argues that within the industrial revolution,
there was ... a deep and pervasive understanding that economic rationality
alone could not motivate capitalism and market behavior. There was more to
industrialism than science in the service of progress. Passion and desire were
integral to the new order, and there was no clear conceptual boundary be-
tween its sexual and economic manifestations.
Id. at 186. Desire was at the core of the perceived problems of sex and social mobility
according to Laqueur.
A market economy, and especially an industrial economy, is predicated on so-
cial openness, on the notion that the satisfaction of desire-for goods, services,
prestige-through labor is beneficial to both the individual and society. It
stands in stark opposition to a society of ranks and orders in which convention
and sumptuary legislation are meant to keep desire in check. But once the
genie of desire is let out, how is it to be restrained when its attention turns to
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the nineteenth century came to mean much more than a place where a
family resided. 271 What it represented was determined in part by its
relationship to prostitution, which Victorians "visualized" as inhab-
iting "the 'Nether Regions' of society."272
Prostitutes, who were seen as the potential source of both physical
and moral contagion for middle-class men, were also cast into this
region [the imagined Nether Region]. Defenders of prostitution
saw it as a necessary institution which acted as a giant sewer, draw-
ing away the distasteful but inevitable waste products of male lust-
fulness, leaving the middle-class household and middle-class ladies
pure and unsullied. None of the inhabitants of this twilight zone
could ever aspire to be included in the 'body politic' but had to be
hidden and controlled wherever possible.273
sex? A free labor and free exchange were to be sought after, one of free love
was clearly not.
Id. at 205. Laqueur expands on this point when he provides examples of discourses in
which "working-class sexuality represents the exhilarating yet also terrifying liability, flux,
and movement of a capitalist economy and rapid industrialization" and concludes that
"[t]he problem is not the democratization of access to sex but of access to respectable
social position and authority. It is as if unbounded upward mobility pollutes the social and
specifically the sexual body." Id. at 209. It is within this context, that prostitution was
called upon to guard the "sharply drawn" boundaries "between home and economy, be-
tween public and private, self and society." Id. at 213. When "[s]ociety seemed to be in
unprecedented danger from the marketplace," it called upon old tropes of "the barren
prostitute" and "other biological defects and dangers... [that] are in this context not
warnings against undue sexual pleasure or inadequate sublimation but rather representa-
tions of the dangers of withdrawal from family and other supposed shelters from money."
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Laqueur, supra note 259, at 230-33 (analyzing prostitution
in similar manner).
271 See Davidoff, supra note 270, at 9 ("[D]omesticity as a concept as well as the home
as an actual space were coined and elaborated beyond recognition on a much wider scale
and further down the social hierarchy than ever before, in the countryside as well as in
towns. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century it became a central part of the new
morality propagated by the Evangelical movements within both the Established and Non-
conformist churches ...
272 Id. at 105.
273 Id.; see also Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex 102 (H.M. Parshley trans. & ed.,
1989) (referring to St. Augustine and St. Thomas who compared relationship of prostitutes
to city with relationship of sewers to palace). Alain Corbin expresses similar views about
the necessity of prostitution in his discussion of the regulation of prostitution in France in
the mid-nineteenth century and the influence of the views of Alexandre Parent-
Duchfatelet, a physician and social investigator. See Alain Corbin, Women for Hire: Pros-
titution and Sexuality in France After 1850, at 4 (1990). Parent-Duchitelet regarded pros-
titution as an "indispensable excremental phenomenon that protects the social body from
disease" and believed that the real risk from prostitution was its "temporary character"
that could lead to a woman who had been in prostitution "gain[ing] access to our homes."
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in the early 1800s, William Collier, an urban mission-
ary, referred to an area of Boston that society recognized as a place where public prostitu-
tion occurred as an "'insidious serpent' in a household surrounded by opulence, literature,
and 'every external accomplishment."' See Hobson, supra note 17, at 14 (footnote
omitted).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1999] 127/9
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Social histories of the nineteenth century further reveal prostitu-
tion's prominent role in maintaining order in the community by ex-
ploring the complex interactions among the medical, legal, and
military establishments in perpetuating and regulating prostitution in
the name of a healthy military.2 74 The Contagious Diseases Acts
(C.D. Acts), promulgated in England in the mid-nineteenth century
"to control the spread of venereal disease among enlisted men in gar-
rison towns and ports,"2 75 authorized police who suspected a woman
of being a "common prostitute" to subject her to an internal examina-
tion and, if they found she had a venereal disease, to "intern[ ] her in a
certified lock hospital... for a period not to exceed nine months. '2 76
She could only avoid the sanitary and penal requirements by refusing
to comply and subjecting herself to a trial in which she had the burden
of proving that she was "virtuous. 2 77 As Judith Walkowitz explains,
the C.D. Acts reflected "a new enthusiasm for state intervention into
the fives of the unrespectable poor. Both prostitutes and enlisted men
were members of the social 'residuum,' the casual laboring poor who
inhabited the 'nether regions' of society."2 78
274 See generally Judith R. Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women,
Class, and the State (1980). The Contagious Diseases Acts (C.D. Acts), promulgated in
1864, 1866, and 1869, and repealed in 1886, were the product of a public debate about
prostitution begun over a decade earlier by the publication in 1857 of William John
Acton's book on prostitution. See Acton, supra note 268. Acton was a medical doctor
who made proposals in his text for the regulation of prostitution and prevention of vene-
real diseases. See Peter Fryer, Introduction, in Acton, supra note 268, at 7-13. For a re-
lated study of the dramatic change in the policing of prostitution that occurred in the
nineteenth century in Paris, see generally Jill Harsin, Policing Prostitution in Nineteenth-
Century Paris (1985).
The link between the military and prostitution is longstanding and unabated. See
Brock & Thistlethwaite, supra note 3, at 70-80, 91-99, 111-14. For further analysis of the
British military and its role in prostitution as England expanded and maintained its empire,
see id. at 137 ("The expanded military required by England for its wars of expansion and
maintenance of its empire employed this population of dislocated women as sex work-
ers."). For a contemporary view of the military's approach to sexually transmitted dis-
eases, specifically AIDS, see Sturdevant & Stoltzfus, supra note 231, at 310-13.
275 Walkowitz, supra note 274, at 1 (footnote omitted); cf. Hobson, supra note 17, at 165-
83 (describing intense anxiety about venereal disease in United States during World War I
and serious threat prostitution represented to war effort); Rosen, supra note 253, at 51-53
(reporting on antiprostitution movement in United States during Progressive Era and dem-
onstrating that fear of venereal disease from prostitution was real even if basis for it was
suspect).
276 Walkowitz, supra note 274, at 1-2.
277 Id. at 2.
278 Id. at 3 (footnote omitted); see also Rosen, supra note 253, at 9-11 (describing failure
of campaigns beginning in 1870s to regulate prostitution in larger cities of United States
and indicating how opponents used examples of regulation in Europe and British C.D.
Acts to "appeal to nativistic prejudice by asserting that regulation of prostitution was tan-
tamount to an acceptance of 'polluted' European values" and also to show that they were
"practically unworkable").
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From a military standpoint, prostitution served two purposes re-
lated to the ideology of the home. Military reforms at the time em-
braced a "policy to create a professional bachelor army and navy
without family ties or local identities." 279 As members of the degener-
ate working class, enlisted men presumably were viewed as undeserv-
ing of a life that could include home and family. Given its policy,
military authorities saw prostitution as necessary to meet the sexual
needs of the enlisted men.280 They also thought prostitution ad-
dressed military preparedness by "curb[ing] homosexuality in the
ranks."28' 1 Concern about homosexuality presumably had as much to
do with middle class Victorians' "deep-seated social fears and insecu-
rities" as it did with military unit cohesion.282
Although prostitution served military disciplinary goals, it was
also perceived as a serious social problem involving disease and disor-
derliness.8 Both the military and local civilian officials embraced the
C.D. Acts as a means of protecting the healthy vigor of the enlisted
men, while at the same time controlling "the unrespectable civilian
poor" in the community.284 The fact that the enlisted men were not
subject to medical examination undermined the attempt of the C.D.
Acts to address the public health problems related to prostitution.
Walkowitz reports that "an earlier attempt to institute periodic exami-
nation among soldiers had failed because enlisted men violently ob-
jected and officers feared that compulsory examination would lead to
the demoralization of their men."' ' 3-
The double standard of "[s]pecial controls [being]... placed on
the female body" but not the male's led to the women engaged in
prostitution being "identified as the primary source of disease and
pollution.' ' 286 It also resulted in a class of "'sexually deviant'[,] ...
'fallen women,"' which justified male sexual access. s  Walkowitz's
study forcefully demonstrates that, within the late nineteenth-century
garrison towns of England, women in prostitution were exploited to
279 Walkowitz, supra note 274, at 4.
280 See id.
281 Id. at 4. The view of prostitution as a preventative for homosexuality continued
through the twentieth century. See Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 37-41 (presenting views of
Harry Benjamin and R-E.L. Masters, who argued that prostitution prevented homosexual-
ity because it allowed young men to gain confidence in heterosexual relations).
282 Walkowitz, supra note 274, at 4.
283 See id. at 3-4.
284 Id. at 4.
285 Id. at 3.
286 Id. at 4-5; see also Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victo-
rian England, 1850-1895, at 85-86 (1989) (describing feminists' critique of sexual double
standard reflected in C.D. Acts).
287 Walkowitz, supra note 274, at 5.
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reinforce military orderliness, community standards, heterosexuality,
and class and gender distinctions. Nineteenth-century society viewed
the women as a "primary source of disease and pollution, ' 288 and their
treatment was emblematic of a larger pattern of class, gender, and
sexual oppression that was encompassed by the degeneracy/respecta-
bility ideology z8 9
While prostitution in the nineteenth century can be viewed as
paradigmatic of degeneracy, it also functioned as a practice of inequal-
ity. This is exemplified by the prostitution of Chinese women in Cali-
fornia in the last half of the nineteenth century. An examination of
this history reveals how economic exploitation, racism, and sexism
played their part in preserving the ideology of "the home," family, and
respectability. The discovery of gold in 1848 brought a migrant labor
force of Chinese men to work in the California mines.290 While patri-
archal Chinese customs contributed to the creation of this labor force,
Lucie Cheng finds that an "[e]qually, if not more important, [reason]
was the racist hostility of white society. ''2 91 She reports that "Ameri-
can capitalists paid low wages to Chinese men to deter their women
from crossing the Pacific," and she found evidence that some whites
"advocated the importation of more Chinese laborers and not their
288 Id.
289 Walkowitz further notes:
Pollution became the governing metaphor for the perils of social intercourse
between the "TWo Nations"; it assumed heightened scatological significance in
a society where the poor seemed to be living in their own excrement, and
where the first programmatic attempt to deal with urban social problems was
in the realm of sanitary engineering. Literally and figuratively, the prostitute
was the conduit of infection to respectable society. She was nonetheless an
object of class guilt as well as fear, a powerful symbol of sexual and economic
exploitation under industrial capitalism.
Id. at 4; see also Hobson, supra note 17, at 139-64 (discussing Progressive Era in United
States and its "[w]ar on [p]rostitution"); David J. Pivar, Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality
and Social Control, 1868-1900, at 255-77 (1973) (discussing purity reform movement in
United States with goal of abolishing prostitution); Rosen, supra note 253, at 38, 40
(describing public response to prostitution during Progressive Era as "an unprecedented
hysteria and panic" attributable to anxiety created by "the rapid commercialization, urban-
ization, and industrialization" that was marked "by the influx of immigrant populations,
the migrations of blacks to the North, the changes in family and class structure, the new
roles for women, tha challenges to Victorian morality, the glorification of market values,
and the breakdown of community life"); Carolyn Strange, Toronto's Girl Problem: The
Perils and Pleasures of the City, 1880-1930, at 89-115 (1995) (describing construction of
and approaches to prostitution in Toronto of social purity advocates and Progressives dur-
ing late 1800s and early 1900s).
290 See Lucie Cheng Hirata, Free, Indentured, Enslaved: Chinese Prostitutes in Nine-
teenth-Century America, 5 Signs 3, 5-6 (1979) (examining prostitution of Chinese women
in nineteenth-century American West).
291 Id. at 7.
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women so they would not establish a permanent population here."292
Denying Chinese laborers the ability to make homes not only maxi-
mized the profits of the mine operators but also reinforced racial dif-
ferences. Other white Californians, relying on racial and gender
biases, sought to preserve their own middle class homes by advocating
"the importation of more Chinese prostitutes who could meet the sex-
ual demands of Chinese men and thus lessen the threat they perceived
to white womanhood." 293
In nineteenth-century California, prostitution was an essential
component of industrialization. As Jacqueline Baker Barnhart con-
cluded after completing her study of prostitution between 1849-1900
in San Francisco:
What is clear in looking at the many economic sectors of a nine-
teenth-century city like San Francisco is that prostitution was not a
separate economic subculture.... It was a large-scale and widely
ramified business based, like all businesses, upon financial gain, and
the profits from prostitution were woven intricately throughout so-
ciety's business and social community.294
Indeed, in the nineteenth century, prostitution made a contribution to
economic development because of its class, gender, and racial implica-
tions, and not despite them.295 Furthermore, the sexual and economic
292 Id.
293 Id. For a discussion of the effect of stereotyping in the late nineteenth century that
led to the assumption that all Chinese women on the Pacific Coast were prostitutes, see
Sucheng Chan, The Exclusion of Chinese Women, 1870-1943, in Entry Denied: Exclusion
and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943, at 94, 95, 97 (Sucheng Chan ed.,
1991).
For a description of the nature and extent of trafficking in women for purposes of
prostitution in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
see Rosen, supra note 253, at 112-35. For a history of the enactment and enforcement of
the White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2421-2423 (West Supp. 1999); 18 U.S.C. § 2424 (Supp. m 1997), the federal
statute first enacted in 1910 to address the trafficking of women, see David J. Langum,
Crossing over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act (1994). See generally
Sietske Altink, Stolen Lives: Trading Women into Sex and Slavery (1995) (providing his-
torical and contemporary investigation of global traffic in women for prostitution).
294 Jacqueline Baker Bamhart, The Fair but Frail: Prostitution in San Francisco 1849-
1900, at 81 (1986). For a discussion of the economic interests and the commercialization of
prostitution in many United States cities at the turn of the century, see Rosen, supra note
253, at 69-85. For a discussion of how the sex industry is currently used in economic devel-
opment in Asia, see Brock & Thistlethwaite, supra note 3, at 114-20.
295 See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text (discussing Cheng's study of prostitu-
tion of Chinese women in nineteenth century on West Coast of United States). Rosen
assists us further in seeing the "important place" and "vital social functions" served by
women in prostitution who were typically "characterized as outcasts with no place in soci-
ety" during the early twentieth century. Rosen, supra note 253, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
Economically, prostitution was a source of income to the police, to procurers,
madams, doctors, politicians, and liquor interests. Politicaly, it upheld gender
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exploitation of Chinese women in the nineteenth century has continu-
ing vitality in today's social arrangements.2 96
Prostitution functions as a paradigm of degeneracy and as a prac-
tice of inequality in the late twentieth century because the degeneracy/
respectability dichotomy that thrived in nineteenth-century society
has continuing vitality.2 97 Respectability in the twentieth century
marks the boundaries between those who are included in the body
politic and those who are not, just as it did in the nineteenth cen-
tury.298 As long as it continues to determine who has a rightful claim
to protection by the laws and thus to full citizenship, respectability
remains important in uncovering practices of domination.299
and class divisions. The singling out of a caste of degraded women served as an
object lesson and a threat to other women. The specter of the whore was al-
ways before them as a reminder of what they might become or how they might
be treated if they failed to live up to the angel image or lived outside of male
protection. For men, prostitution upheld the double standard, the polarized
images of women as angelic or monstrous, but in neither case fully human, and
the ideology that women existed to serve men. The association of prostitution
with lower-class, immigrant, and nonwhite populations served to divide women
from one another. It also justified the low ranking of these populations in the
social hierarchy. The visible association of brothels with lower-class neighbor-
hoods and customers, which made it seem as if lower-class men had recourse to
prostitutes whereas upper-class men did not, and the association of sexual in-
dulgence with weakened health and ambition, provided one rationalization for
poverty, unemployment, and disease among the poor.
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
296 See supra notes 230-41 and accompanying text (discussing Cho's work regarding
stereotyping of Asian Pacific and Asian Pacific American women in late twentieth
century).
297 See Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 7-34 (summarizing efforts of feminist activists working
against prostitution in late nineteenth century through World War II and describing how
they found themselves relying on concepts of consent and respectability); see also Regina
G. Kunzel, Fallen Women, Problem Girls: Unmarried Mothers and the Professionalization
of Social Work 1890-1945, at 10-25 (1993) (describing maternity home movement in which
organizations during World War I shifted their "rescue work" with prostitutes to care of
unmarried mothers). Kunzel further shows that prostitution remained the focus of social
work. See id. at 18-19 (noting how organizations constructed unmarried mothers as "'at
the foot of the precipice"' of "'abyss"' of prostitution (footnote omitted)). The threat of
prostitution "underlined the precariousness of female respectability and the stakes in-
volved in its maintenance" and remained essential "to the construction of a new boundary
that divided good women from bad." Id. at 19. Evangelical workers relied on stories "of
male sexual irresponsibility and aggressiveness and female vulnerability and victimization"
to describe the plight of unmarried mothers. See id. at 20 (footnote omitted). For a fur-
ther discussion of the institutionalization of women in prostitution in the nineteenth cen-
tury, see Hobson, supra note 17, at 118-30.
298 See Mosse, supra note 257, at 133-52, 181-91. In his study, Mosse traces the impor-
tance of respectability in his study of National Socialism from its origins up to World War
II, and concludes, "What began as bourgeois morality in the eighteenth century, in the end
became everyone's morality." Id. at 191.
299 Cf. Rosen, supra note 253, at 49 (concluding that Progressive Era reformers under-
stood prostitution within crisis world view that compelled them to impose order "by rein-
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forcing older moral boundaries and defining who should remain within and without the
body politic"). In using the construct of respectability to chart domination, however, we
must be wary of positing a straightforward correspondence between the hierarchical ar-
rangements of the nineteenth century and those of the twentieth. As Anita Levy writes,
the contemporary task is to trace the nineteenth century middle class power that has in the
twentieth century "vanished into commonsense norms of self and identity." Anita Levy,
Other Women: The Writing of Class, Race, and Gender, 1832-1898, at 5 (1991). In other
words, the practices of domination that established the middle class in the nineteenth cen-
tury have become everyone's morality today. Although the goal of identifying hierarchies
remains constant across time and location, the arrangements that mark the distinction be-
tween respectability and degeneracy-thus maintaining the dominant group--change from
one period to the next and from one locality to another.
One example of particular "arrangements" making the distinction is found in the pe-
nal practices in the early part of the twentieth century. During the Progressive Era, a
scientific approach to social engineering, combined with the establishment of female
reformatories for the purpose of "rehabilitating" women in prostitution led to "prostitutes
[becoming] one of the first mass populations to be tested for hereditary and genetic de-
fects." Rosen, supra note 253, at 21. Rosen reports that "[b]y 1913, twelve states had laws
that permitted the sterilization of criminals, idiots, the feeble-minded, imbeciles, syphilitics,
moral and sexual perverts, epileptics, and rapists." Id. The "reforms" of this period lead
Rosen to conclude that "[s]uch legislation, like the reformatories and prisons in which
prostitutes were housed, reflected a society that increasingly associated degeneracy with
poverty and gradually sought means to control the sexual behavior of the poor." Id. at 21-
22. She also suggests that the term "feeble-minded" did not indicate mental deficiency so
much as it indicated the woman's "refusal or failure to conform to middle-class values and
behavioral patterns." Id. at 23; see also Hobson, supra note 17, at 190-93 (describing use of
diagnostic label of "feeble-mindedness" in nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its im-
plications for women in prostitution).
Dorothy Roberts's use of the concepts of private choice and deviancy to explain the
nexus between citizenship and domination provides persuasive evidence of the continuing
relevance of the degradation/respectability divide. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority
Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of Equality, 57 U. Pitt. L Rev. 363 (1996). In
her critical analysis of liberty and equality jurisprudence from the 1896 Supreme Court
case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), to the Court's contemporary approach, she
demonstrates how the discourse of privacy and autonomy maintains racial hierarchies and
delimits citizenship rights for some while enhancing them for others. See Roberts, supra,
at 368-75. Although she does not use the terms of degeneracy or respectability, her argu-
ment that in the 1990s, "liberalism's professed commitment to personal liberty turns out to
safeguard massive institutional inequality" demonstrates the persistent correlation be-
tween respectability and domination. Id. at 375.
Roberts observes that, "[a]fter a civil war and the Reconstruction... white Americans
relied on the Constitution's protection of their liberty to safeguard their position of
power." Id. at 369. She demonstrates this not on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding
or majority opinion in Plessy, which affirmed a state's power to make legal distinctions
based on race, but by quoting Justice Harlan's dissent:
"The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage, and holds fast to tie principles of constitutional liberty."
Id. at 369-70 (emphasis added in original) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). Roberts then demonstrates how contemporary jurisprudence continues in the
tradition of "hold[ing] fast to liberty at the expense of racial equality." Id. at 370. The
liberal tradition of limited government intervention to "protect[] citizens against imposi-
tion of state orthodoxy,... means that the definition of liberty must set aside certain
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The persistence of nineteenth-century distinctions between deg-
radation and respectability and their relationship to the family as a
politicized institution can be seen in the neglect by mainstream society
and politics of the economic and social problems found in urban Afri-
can American communities. Dorothy Roberts finds the source for the
distancing of African Americans by white Americans in the "family's
political role. ' 300 By designating "the private family as the exclusive
setting for caring relations between people," and embracing "the pri-
vate family as ... [the] model for social accountability," historical ra-
cial separation continues to influence social policies because it
remains "difficult-if not impossible-for most white Americans to
imagine blacks as part of their family."'301 For Roberts, the private
sphere, which is symbolized by the family, accounts for why, in the
late 1990s "[w]hites find it difficult to see the fate of the cities as a
shared interest because improving the lives of thousands of black ur-
ban poor does not seem to be in their private interest. ' '302
claims to substantive equality." Id. The accepted consequence of this liberal philosophy is
that "[i]nequality is the price we may have to pay for freedom." Id. at 371 (footnote
omitted).
300 Id. at 397.
301 Id. (footnote omitted). Roberts analyzes how the privileging of liberty over equality
is accomplished in part by a conceptual segregation of "private choices" from the "unjust
social structures" that determine and form those choices. See id. at 395-96. With regard to
the economic and social problems found in urban African American communities, she ar-
gues that "[s]eparating private choices from social power thus facilitates the view of blacks
as an expendable population." Id. at 398 (footnote omitted).
302 Id. at 397-98 (footnote omitted). Roberts shows how personal choice is the basis for
the "belief in black responsibility for the effects of racism" and "the long-standing ideology
that blames the poor, because of their dependence mentality, deviant family structure, and
other cultural depravities, for their poverty." Id. at 386 (footnote omitted). Commenting
on Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), Roberts argues
that "[c]ourts have frequently disregarded the racially disproportionate effect of employ-
ment practices if the disadvantaged employees could have chosen to abide by the rules."
Roberts, supra note 299, at 386 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In Rogers, the court
rejected a Black woman's claim against her employer who prohibited her from wearing
"an all-braided hairstyle" while working. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231. Roberts, quoting
Paulette Caldwell, shows how the rhetoric of "private choices" keeps subordination in
place.
The Rogers decision illustrates how courts require black employees to assimi-
late their choices to whites' cultural expectations in order to keep their jobs.
Paulette Caldwell's reaction to reading about the decision emphasizes this den-
igration of black people's private choices and culture:
"Whether motivated by politics, ethnic pride, health, or vanity, I was outraged
by the idea that an employer could regulate or force me to explain something
as personal and private as the way that I groom my hair. I resented the impli-
cation that I could not be trusted to choose standards appropriate for the
workplace and that my right to work could be conditioned on my disassocia-
tion with my race, gender, and culture. Mostly I marveled with sadness that
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Roberts's critique of political and jurisprudential approaches that
privilege individual autonomy, choices, and privacy over social justice
claims corroborates our view that the distinctions of consent/coercion,
private/public, and degeneracy/respectability mask inequality and, in
particular, mask prostitution as a practice of inequality.30 3
These sets of dualities, which gained particular intensity in the
nineteenth century and have been redefined in the late twentieth cen-
tury by evolving social, political, and cultural practices, underlie many
antiviolence reforms.30 As we have shown in our discussion of antivi-
olence law reforms, the home continues to represent respectability,
while prostitution continues as a paradigm of degeneracy.305 Advo-
cates for reforms of the domestic abuse laws established a wife's wor-
thiness by placing her in the home and by emphasizing her loyalty,
motherhood, and intimacy.306 Their challenge that the law recognize
the right of women to be free from violence was framed as a story
about respectable women, which left in place the underlying structure
of inequality.30 7 Thus for a woman to claim that she was a worthy
victim, she had to prove her respectability, which required her to dis-
tance herself and her situation from prostitution.
Reform proponents needed a slightly different strategy to argue
for sexual harassment laws in the workplace where they were unable
to rely on the image of the good woman in her haven, the home. Ac-
cordingly, reformers adopted a discourse that divided women into
those who were engaged in legitimate work, as opposed to those who
were engaged in prostitution.303 Heightened attention to the meaning
of consent led to the development of notions of "acquiescence" and
"grudging accommodation" to allow for legal attribution of a woman's
compliance to her powerlessness in the workplace and not to her pro-
something as simple as a black woman's hair continues to threaten the social,
political, and economic fabric of American life."
Roberts, supra note 299, at 387 (quoting Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives
on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 Duke .l. 365, 367). In focusing on
Caldwell's response to Rogers, Roberts traces private choice to degeneracy and
domination.
303 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 299, at 374-75, 379-80, 389-99.
304 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing antiviolence reforms).
305 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing role that home pla)s in
identifying worthy victim).
306 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing domestic abuse law reforms
and how advocates justified need for those reforms).
307 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing how antiviolence reforms
of domestic violence law reinforced social hierarchies).
308 See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text (discussing how proponents for re-
form of sexual harassment law avoided providing protection for women used in
prostitution).
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miscuity.30 9 Rather than seriously threatening the structure of ine-
quality, the success of a woman's claim for respectability in the
workplace depended on leaving the degeneracy/respectability dichot-
omy unchanged.
At first glance, rape law reform would seem to have seriously un-
dermined the degeneracy/respectability dichotomy. As we discussed
above, however, although the rape reform initiatives extended the
law's protection to a larger group of women, they reinforced the
boundary between worthy women and women in prostitution through
the rape shield laws and the definition of consent.310 Law reforms
attempted to ensure that worthy women could be found outside the
home; nevertheless, when women are subjected to violence on the
streets, the law still places their virtue in question.
The antiviolence movement's use of strategies that pursue re-
spectability is wholly understandable as part of a late twentieth-cen-
tury culture that reinforces the ideology of respectability through
home and family, and the ideology of degeneracy through
prostitution.311
The recent efforts to "clean up" the Tunes Square area in New
York City demonstrate how our culture continues to police the bound-
aries between respectable middle-class homes and families and the de-
generate streets represented by prostitution and related activities.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, Tunes Square has been a favorite
site for prostitution and sex-oriented businesses, 312 and, as recently as
1992, the block of Forty-second Street between Times Square and
Eighth Avenue was "known mainly for sex, drugs and crime. ' 31 3 But
the arrival of the Disney store and the New Victory Theater, along
with new zoning regulations, have transformed the area into a family-
oriented entertainment district.314
The 42d Street and Times Square that are now taking shape
will be a new kind of urban form, a sort of mall brought to the
309 See supra notes 89-91, 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing how reforms
changed meaning of consent).
310 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing how rape shield laws ex-
clude evidence of complainant's prior sexual history, thereby reinforcing distinction be-
tween worthy and unworthy women); supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text
(discussing how "no means no" standard and "yes means yes" standard exclude women in
prostitution from law's protection).
311 See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text (describing prevailing legal and social
views on prostitution, including its portrayal in arts, literature, and popular media).
312 See N.R. Kleinfield, It's Not Easy to Push Sex into the Shadows, N.Y. Tunes, Mar. 1,
1998, § 1, at 29.
313 Paul Goldberger, The New Times Square: Magic that Surprised the Magicians, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1996, at Cll.
314 See id.
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sidewalks.... It will have stores, theme restaurants, legitimate thea-
ters for live productions, movie theaters, hotels and tourist attrac-
tions like Madame Tussaud's wax museum, all aimed at attracting
the members of the middle class who once gave American cities
their density, but for the last generation have stayed away in droves.
The blocks of Tunes Square just north of 42d Street have al-
ready been filling up with stores and theme restaurants, and they
are thronged with people who seem to crave the notion of urban
energy in a clean, controlled environment-a theme park version of
the city itself.3
15
City planners and commercial enterprises had to remove sex-oriented
entertainment and prostitution from Times Square in order to create a
family-oriented environment reminiscent of suburbia, which is the
contemporary metaphor for orderliness, family, and home.31 6
Within a broader historical context of racial exclusion, it is clear
that the "revitalization" of Tumes Square perpetuates social hierar-
chies. Regina Austin, who expands on David Nasaw's studies of pub-
lic amusements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,317
315 Id.
316 David Nasaw, in his study "of public amusements in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and their decline and fall in the post-World War II decades," connects
Disney with suburbia when he describes the "new species of amusement resort, the subur-
ban or exurban theme parks modeled on Disneyland in Anaheim, California." David
Nasaw, Going Out: The Rise and Fall of Public Amusements 2,254 (1993). Situating the
park far from the center of Los Angeles with no mass transit connections assured a
predominantly white, middle- and upper-class clientele.
Unlike the older amusement parks, Disneyland and the theme parks were
clean, secure, and orderly.... [Tihe theme parks were situated off major high-
ways, "surrounded by buffer zones of vegetation," or as in Anaheim, by a
twenty-foot earthen wall. Their entrances were not simply inconspicuous.
They were ... almost deliberately obscured from public view as if announcing
that the space within did "not wish to be a part of the city."
Id. at 254 (footnote omitted). Judith A. Adams, emphasizing Disneyland's location as an
arrangement designed to "isolate[] it from the unruly and poorer elements of the urban
population," reports that recent statistics about the demographic makeup of visitors to
Disney World reveal that "2 percent [of its visitors] are laborers, 3 percent are black, and 2
percent are Hispanic." Judith A. Adams, The American Amusement Park Industry. A
History of Technology and Thrills 164, 146 (1991). Restrictive zoning rules, recently up-
held by the courts, were designed to make Times Square and other areas of the city family
friendly. See Hickerson v. City of New York, 146 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
where plaintiffs had received full and fair opportunity to litigate constitutionality of zoning
restrictions under New York Constitution, in which underlying issues were identical to
those for First Amendment claim, doctrine of collateral estoppel barred litigation of First
Amendment claim in federal court), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 795 (1999); Buzzetti v. City of
New York, 140 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir.) (finding that city zoning ordinance that regulated
adult entertainment establishments did not violate equal protection clause), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 54 (1998); Stringfellow's of N.Y., Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y.
1998) (upholding amendments to city zoning ordinances against Frst Amendment
challenge).
317 See Nasaw, supra note 316.
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concludes that "the respectability, and thereby the profitability, of
places of commercialized mass entertainment and amusement, be they
movie palaces or world's fair pavilions, have long been based on the
inclusion of white women among their patrons and the exclusion of all
blacks, regardless of gender or class. ' 318 She observes that
[f]rom the mid-1800s to the civil rights era (if not beyond), prohibi-
tions against or on blacks' participation enhanced the status of mass
forms of leisure by countering the moral and material concerns of
the bourgeoisie, which favored leisure consistent with domesticity
and educational enrichment and feared association with persons
who were vulgar and rowdy. The exclusion or restricted inclusion of
blacks, who were assigned the role of indecent, disreputable
"other," made possible the creation of audiences that were hetero-
geneous and democratic as to gender and class, insofar as whites
were concerned. It allowed for the uniting of white Americans-
native-born and immigrant, middle-class and poor-in a common
experience of luxury in leisure venues under an umbrella of white
privilege that generated conduct characterized by decency and
goodwill. 319
The discourse surrounding the Times Square renewal efforts demon-
strates that the "bourgeoisie['s]" fear of "association with persons who
[are] vulgar and rowdy" persists.320 The commercial success for the
area depends on practices that reinforce inequalities by strengthening
the boundary between respectability and degeneracy.
By placing degeneracy and respectability in their historical con-
text and showing the continuing power of this dichotomy in contem-
porary society, we sought to demonstrate how prostitution enforces
and reinforces the boundary between them and how the pursuit of
respectability entrenches social structures of domination. To trace the
interconnectedness of prostitution, respectability, and inequality, how-
ever, is insufficient for the project of transforming prostitution. The
possibility for society to change its understanding of prostitution de-
pends upon political and legal strategies that further the goal of equal-
ity by moving beyond the degeneracy/respectability dichotomy.
318 Regina Austin, "Not Just for the Fun of It!": Governmental Restraints on Black
Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space," 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 667,
695-96 (1998) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
319 Id. at 696 (footnotes omitted).
320 Id.
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IV
PROSTITUTION AND STRATEGIES FOR
ACHIEVING EQUALITY
The degeneracy/respectability dichotomy explains, at least in
part, why the law of prostitution has remained virtually unchanged
during the last three decades while feminist antiviolence law reform
initiatives have enjoyed considerable success.3 21 As we have already
shown, the approaches taken by the reformers in the areas of domes-
tic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape portray the victims of violence
as respectable women.32 This strategy effectively places women in
prostitution beyond the reach of these reform efforts. It may also ex-
plain why advocates for prostitution reform have been unsuccessful,
for the most part, in persuading feminist groups to give reform of
prostitution laws a high priority. Although prostitution reform advo-
cates do not share one view of the value and meaning of prostitution
and have no single shared agenda for reform, they do share the goal of
achieving respectability for women in prostitution.
Prostitution reformers generally fall into two groups: those who
believe that prostitution provides a livelihood for women and seek to
improve the conditions of their work, and those who seek the eventual
elimination of prostitution through antiviolence laws. The first group
approaches prostitution through a rights-based framework that identi-
fies a woman in prostitution as a worker who deserves fair compensa-
tion and safe working conditions.323 They seek to decriminalize
321 See supra notes 72-75, 87-94, 176-80 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of
prostitution from antiviolence law reforms).
322 See supra notes 72-75, 87-94, 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing strategies
used by advocates of antiviolence reforms to show victims of violence as worthy women).
323 See Hobson, supra note 17, at 215-19 (describing European Union movement within
prostitution in 1970s and how it spawned political activist groups and unions in United
States); Holly B. Fechner, Three Stories of Prostitution in the West: Prostitutes' Groups,
Law and Feminist "Truth," 4 Colum. J. Gender & L 26,37-38 (1994) (describing "liberal
feminist" efforts to gain recognition for prostitution as work deserving of equal working
rights).
The published positions of rights-based groups can be found in Good Girls, Bad Girls:
Sex Trade Workers and Feminists Face to Face (Laurie Bell ed., 1987); Sex Work: Writings
by Women in the Sex Industry (Fr~drique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 2d ed.
1998) [hereinafter Sex Work]; A Vindication of the Rights of Whores (Gail Pheterson ed.,
1989); Whores and Other Feminists (Jill Nagle ed., 1997). For other writers who have
embraced their view, see Shannon Bell, Reading, Writing, and Rewriting the Prostitute
Body (1994); Valerie Jenness, Making it Work: The Prostitutes' Rights Movement in Per-
spective (1993); Roberta Perkins, Working Girls: Prostitutes, Their Life and Social Control
(1991); Drucilla Cornell, A Defense of Prostitutes' Self-Organization, 1 Cardozo Women's
LJ. 121 (1993); Joan Nestle, Lesbians and Prostitutes: A Historical Sisterhood, in Sex
Work, supra, 247; Barbara Sullivan, Feminism and Female Prostitution, in Sex Work and
Sex Workers in Australia 253 (Roberta Perkins et al., eds., 1994); see also Mary Joe Frug,
Postmodern Legal Feminism 131-38 (1992) (expressing doubt about legalizing prostitution
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prostitution, to unionize women in prostitution, and to counteract the
stigma of prostitution by portraying it to the public as dignified work
and a sophisticated business.324 This rights-based agenda directly
challenges the taint of degeneracy that is traditionally associated with
prostitution; it is a claim for respectability. 325
The second group of reformers include those advocates with
whom we have collaborated to develop legislative initiatives. 326 They
view prostitution as an intractable form of violence against women
that should therefore be included in the broader antiviolence reform
project that has changed the laws of domestic abuse, sexual harass-
ment, and rape.32 7 They endorse the repeal of all laws criminalizing
persons used in prostitution, but call for the enhancement of criminal
penalties for pimps and johns.328 Like their rights-based counterparts,
they seek to educate the public; their goal, however, is to inform the
public about the harms of prostitution. They also provide educational
groups for women in prostitution.32 9 By locating prostitution along
the continuum of violence against women, and analogizing it to do-
mestic abuse and marital rape, reformers invoke the discourse of the
"worthy victim" that has shaped the antiviolence reform efforts during
in manner that would improve working conditions under which women engage in prostitu-
tion within discussion building on proposition that law constructs women as terrorized,
sexualized, and maternalized); Kate Millett, The Prostitution Papers (1976) (providing sto-
ries and views on prostitution of two women who had been in prostitution and stories and
views of two women who had listened to stories and tried to make sense of them in their
own lives). Many rights-based groups advocate decriminalization of prostitution. See, e.g.,
id. at 10-11 (expressing support for COYOTE (Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics), while
recognizing that decriminalization alone is not enough); id. at 10-11, 30-31 (expressing view
that prostitution is private matter in introduction, but suggesting, in other parts of book,
complexity of meaning and harms caused by prostitution that mere decriminalization
would not address).
324 See Fechner, supra note 323, at 38-42.
325 Laurie Shrage extends the respectability claim further by positing that "if prostitu-
tion were sufficiently transformed to make it completely nonoppressive to women, though
commercial transactions involving sex might still exist, prostitution as we now know it
would not." Laurie Shrage, Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution?, 99 Ethics 347, 359
(1989); see also Laurie Shrage, Moral Dilemmas of Feminism: Prostitution, Adultery, and
Abortion 86, 94-95 (1994). Sheila Jeffreys traces the influence of "queer theory" on the
prostitutes' rights movement, which leads to a construction of prostitution as a liberatory
sexual practice. See Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 92-127.
326 See supra note 9.
327 See Hobson, supra note 17, at 221-22; Fechner, supra note 323, at 48. The published
positions of this group can be found in Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (1979);
Barry, supra note 24; Andrea Dworkin, Right-Wing Women (1983); Giobbe, supra note 37.
For other writers who have embraced their view, see Jeffreys, supra note 3; Pateman, supra
note 3, at 189-218; Carole Pateman, Defending Prostitution: Charges Against Ericsson, 93
Ethics 561 (1983).
328 See Fechner, supra note 323, at 48.
329 See id. at 51-52.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 74:1220
A MA7TER OF PROSTITUTION
the last three decades.330 While we, the authors, have worked to fur-
ther these reform efforts, we appreciate the theoretical problem that
underlies this approach. The problem we identify is that the persua-
siveness of the argument that women in prostitution should be pro-
tected by antiviolence laws relies upon the worthiness/unworthiness
distinction that supports the legal and social construction of the other
forms of violence against women.
In retrospect, we recognize that the civil cause of action, which
allows women coerced into prostitution to sue their pimps and johns,
remains within the degeneracy/respectability dichotomy.3 31 We do not
want to underestimate, however, the impact of the statute as a chal-
lenge to the dichotomy. The statute's recognition of the harms suf-
fered by women in prostitution and its bestowal on them of the
citizenship right to seek redress for those harms undermine the pre-
vailing view of prostitution and the notion of respectability itself.
Nevertheless, the law's reliance on the dualism of consent and coer-
cion potentially reinforces social structures of domination.
Identifying this connection between respectability and dominance
led us to rethink the strategic agenda for transforming prostitution.
Prostitution reform must be made part of a broader liberation move-
ment that is cognizant of all forms of oppression. By shifting the
framework of analysis toward the degeneracy/respectability divide, we
hope to reveal that prostitution functions to perpetuate hierarchical
relations. This insight, that practices of inequality are configured
through an ideology of degeneracy and respectability, establishes a
330 See Giobbe, supra note 35, at 151-59 (drawing parallels between experience of pros-
titution and experiences of marital rape and domestic abuse). See supra notes 72-75,87-94,
171-73 and accompanying text (discussing role of worthy victim in antiviolence reform
efforts).
331 See supra notes 3-23 and accompanying text (describing civil cause of action and
some of its legislative history). For a parallel historical analysis, see Hobson, supra note 17,
at 75, in which Hobson argues that the "passive-victim thesis" found in the popular litera-
ture and in the moral reform journals "channeled the debate on prostitution away from
adverse social and economic structures toward cruel seducers and evil agents." As a conse-
quence, prostitution appeared not "as a social system that flowed from the economic and
social dependence of women," but "as an aberrant or capricious set of circumstances that
drove a woman off course from her natural life patterns." Id. Although Hobson sees the
harm of prostitution exclusively through a gender lens, the central point of her argument-
that reliance on coercion obscures the subordinating structures kept in place by prostitu-
tion-remains pertinent. The analysis of Linda Hirshman and Jane Larson demonstrates
how the statute risks reinforcing the distinction between women who consented and those
who were coerced. The authors support the civil cause of action, but argue that criminaliz-
ing the "fully voluntary choice of an adult woman to work as a prostitute, and the choice of
an adult man to patronize her amounts to a significant restraint on the liberty of both
parties." See Linda R. Hirshman & Jane E. Larson, Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex
288-89 (1998).
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unified theoretical underpinning for many movements that are pursu-
ing social change. Because current social arrangements give
subordinated groups in society a stake in striving for respectability
and not surrendering whatever respectability each of them may have
achieved, efforts to collaborate and build coalitions generally have en-
countered resistance and frequently have failed.332
Regina Austin examines the structural problems of working to-
ward a strategy of collaboration and coalition building. She describes
how conduct deemed deviant by the dominant community interferes
with building strong social connections within subordinate groups.
She explains how the fear of loss of respectability is made manifest in
the "black community's" repudiation of black women in prostitu-
tion.333 The repudiation permits the community to "proclaim[ ] the
distinctiveness and the worthiness of those [women] who do not" en-
gage in such conduct. 334 As she argues, this strategy responds directly
to the racialized and sexualized stereotypes that operate in the domi-
nant society: "[T]he reality [is] that the stereotype of the loose black
woman, or Jezebel, is so pervasive, black women who consider them-
selves respectable are especially likely to be inhibited from identifying
with black prostitutes." 335
332 For example, several theorists address the historical legacy of slavery and sexuality.
Patricia Hill Collins suggests that the historical legacy of white women's complicity in the
sexual exploitation of slave women impacts on the relationship between African American
and white women, which continues to be framed by the web of sexual politics that seduce
white women with an artificial sense of specialness and vest them with the power to sustain
that illusion. See Collins, supra note 26, at 189-92; see also Davis, supra note 229, at 173
(noting that "Black women have been conspicuously absent from the ranks of the contem-
porary anti-rape movement"). But Susan Schechter suggests that
[b]y acknowledging the significance of personal ties and connections to other
movement organizers and time spent building these relationships, activists [in
the battered women's movement] formed coalitions centered in norms of non-
competition that might well serve as models for other political struggles.
The battered women's movement has brought together women of all classes
and races, and in doing so, compels its participants to confront issues of diver-
sity among women.
Schechter, supra note 60, at 319; cf. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 60, at 24,57 (noting that
different types of feminist groups "have sometimes formed coalitions and at other times
created divisions within the movements," but also recognizing that one stated aim of bat-
tered women's movement was coalition building (footnote omitted)).
333 See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Iden-
tification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1773-74, 1793-94 (1992).
334 Id. at 1772.
335 Id. at 1793 (emphasis added). Austin is attempting to develop a theory and practice
that breaks the constraints of the construct of deviancy that leads members of the Black
community to disidentify with each other. See id. at 1772-74, 1815. She suggests ways that
"straight" women could valuably learn from "street" women to produce "a vibrant black
female community." Id. at 1796. A "politics of identification," according to Austin, can
lead to "'the black community"' establishing a "legal agenda" that "would... make the
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Elsewhere, Austin analyzes the case of Clark v. American Broad-
casting Co. ,336 in which Ruby Clark, a Black woman, sued the Ameri-
can Broadcasting Company (ABC) for defamation because, as part of
a news program on street prostitution, she was portrayed in such a
way that could lead viewers to believe that she was a woman in prosti-
tution. 337 While acknowledging the harm experienced by Clark,
Austin examines the implications of her having to distinguish herself
from Black women in prostitution in order to prevail in her suit.338
She observes that all the Black women presented in the program
shared white society's devaluation of black women's sexuality
although it affected them differently. It compelled the black prosti-
tutes to stroll the streets in search of customers, subjected those
who were not prostitutes to unwelcome public overtures, and ren-
dered the portly matron... a neuter object, respectable but out of
the game.339
legal system more sensitive to the social connection that links 'the community' and its
lawbreakers and affects black assessments of black criminality." Id. at 1815. Austin goes
on to conceive of a community that "acknowledges that some, but not all, lawbreakers act
out of a will to survive and an impulse not to be forgotten, and it admires them for this
even though it concludes that their acts ought not to be emulated." Id. Finding this com-
mon ground, the community would, according to Austin, "advocate changes in the criminal
justice system and in other institutions of the dominant society in order to increase the
lawbreakers' chances for redemption," id., meaning not only atonement but also rescue.
Id. at 1815-16.
336 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983).
337 See id. at 1211, 1213.
338 See Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide,
26 New Eng. L. Rev. 877, 884 (1992).
339 Id. at 885 (footnote omitted). Austin further observes:
They all have an interest in opposing the full range of negative categorizations
of black women's sexuality. They all would have gained from an attack on the
attempts of white men (including the cruising johns and ABC) to restrict black
women's sexual expression and to label it in ways dictated by the white men's
purposes.
Id. Austin goes on to argue, however, that a "vibrant and affirmative community" needs to
be based on more than efforts to "unite against a common enemy." Id. at 8S6. As she
states:
[a] genuine sisterhood would be a modem moral community, one in which
political positions and ethical stances are constructed by the sisters as a matter
of "common sense, ordinary emotions, and everyday life." It may be time to
recognize that the only true communities of black females are voluntary as-
sociations of women who are bound by shared economic, political, and social
constraints and find strength, economic support, and moral guidance through
affective, face-to-face engagement with each other.
Id. at 887 (quoting Alan Wolfe, Whose Keeper?: Social Science and Moral Obligation 211
(1989)). Austin is urging "black women... to challenge the appraisals of black female
deviants, whether they are based on the standards of the dominant society or those prevail-
ing in the black community." Id.'at 879. Although she recognizes the risks, she suggests
that "[i]n the name of a 'black sisterhood,' a 'community' within 'the community,' we might
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As Austin reveals, coalition and collaboration have a greater like-
lihood of success when undertaken with the insight that where one
person claims respectability, he or she becomes complicit in another
person's subordination. In other words, any claim for respectability
reinforces systemic inequality. This framework for discussion, in
which a claim for respectability is understood as a claim for domi-
nance, allows for collaboration with groups working to reconstruct
economic, social, and political arrangements. Coalition building on
these terms may have more potential than legal reform alone to trans-
form the meaning of prostitution and to benefit the lives of women in
prostitution.340 Within a collaborative effort based on the degeneracy/
respectability framework, both the argument that prostitution is symp-
tomatic of other economic and social inequalities3 41 and the argument
that prostitution causes or contributes to other economic and social
inequalities3 42 lose force. Causal analysis gives way to an appreciation
of the complexity of discursive arrangements holding interrelated hi-
erarchies in place.
While the goal of collaborating with diverse groups dedicated to
achieving social justice is of utmost importance, it is also essential to
consider how the law should treat prostitution. Our approach to re-
forming the law of prostitution is to redefine it as a social practice
perpetuating inequality. This reform involves changing the criminal
law and treating prostitution as a discriminatory practice. First, state
statutes should be amended so as no longer to penalize persons used
in prostitution. Criminal penalties, however, should continue for
those who purchase sex, procure others for use in prostitution, or
knowingly derive financial benefit from the proceeds of a person used
in prostitution. States' civil rights laws should define as acts of illegal
discrimination the purchase of sex for money, the procurement of
others to engage in a market exchange of sex for money, and the prac-
tice of knowingly benefiting financially from the earnings or proceeds
of a person used in prostitution.343 This kind of legal reform provides
respond to female deviance with understanding, support, or praise based on the distinctive
social, material, and political interests of black women." Id.
340 Cf. Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory
221-49 (1998) (arguing that contemporary legal studies cannot achieve ethical ideals it sets
out for itself without more robust interaction with other discourses).
341 See supra notes 111, 136 and accompanying text (discussing treating prostitution as
symptom of other inequalities).
342 See supra notes 333-39 and accompanying text (discussing treating prostitution as
cause of other inequalities).
343 Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 Mich. J. Gender & L.
13, 29 (1993) (proposing use of federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994), for
women in prostitution to sue for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights). For
criticism of the use of a rights analysis to achieve equality goals, see Elizabeth Kingdom,
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a woman in prostitution the right to file a complaint with a state civil
rights agency. The agency would be required by law to treat this dis-
crimination complaint on the same footing as it would treat any other
complaint. Additionally, the complainant would have the right to pur-
sue a private cause of action in civil court.
There is precedence for this approach in the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA),344 which makes a crime of violence that is moti-
vated by gender discrimination a civil rights violation.345 The reform
we propose, however, differs from VAWA in three important ways.
First, VAWA creates only a private cause of action and thereby ob-
scures the important governmental interest in furthering equality.346
Second, it focuses exclusively on gender discrimination a47 and there-
fore, contrary to our proposal, fails to recognize that practices of ine-
quality implicate and support all forms of discrimination. Third,
unlike our proposal that equates prostitution with discrimination, it
does not recognize domestic abuse and rape as perpetuating gender
domination, but rather requires further evidence that the perpetrator
was motivated by gender animus.348 The reason for the differences is
that our proposal grows out of the broader strategy of undermining
the degeneracy/respectability dichotomy and the inequalities it holds
in place.
By treating prostitution as a civil rights violation, our proposal
transforms the buying of sex from a transgressive act that reinforces
the dichotomy to a discriminatory act that undermines it. It makes
real the theoretical connection between respectability and inequality.
It also takes seriously the interconnectedness of systems of inequality
by recognizing that prostitution is supported by, and in turn supports,
other forms of discrimination: Prostitution is not a separate category
of subordination so much as it is a practice that embodies all social
hierarchies.
The civil rights proposal also provides a legal framework for tran-
scending the constraints of the consent/coercion and private/public di-
chotomies that currently dominate legal discourse and sustain the
What's Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law 1-6, 79, 130-31 (1991);
Smart, supra note 31, at 138-59. But see John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie
Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World,
65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2129,2212-19 (1992) (recognizing power as well as limits of rights analy-
sis and advocating "a strategy of rights [that] can enhance African-American life in the
quest for resource mobilization and collective identity").
344 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,931-14,040 (1994).
345 See id. § 13,981.
346 See id. § 13,981(c).
347 See id. § 13,981(a)-(d)(1).
348 See id. § 13,981(e)(1).
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degeneracy/respectability divide. The antidiscrimination law does not
recognize as a defense the plaintiff's "consent" to a discriminatory
practice. For example, when a plaintiff seeks employment with an em-
ployer who is known to engage in discriminatory hiring practices, or
applies to an educational institution that is known to discriminate in
its admissions criteria, it is highly unlikely that a court would uphold
the legitimacy of the discriminatory practices based on the plaintiff's
initiation of the discriminatory act by applying for employment or ad-
mission. In the same way, the fact that a woman initiated the "dis-
criminatory act" of prostitution does not negate the harm, nor should
it be taken as proof of equality between the parties.3 49
The benefits of this proposed legal reform do not come without
potential costs. For example, it is difficult to predict whether creating
the new category of prostitution as discrimination will reinforce,
rather than dismantle, the subject status of "prostitute." The status
exists now, however, in the absence of a civil rights claim. To argue
that providing a woman in prostitution a remedy for a harm reinforces
that harm suggests that her interests reside in maintaining the status
quo-an entirely suspect proposition. More importantly, the proposal
reduces the risk of reinforcing the status of "prostitute," and enhances
the possibility of dismantling it, by defining discrimination as the act
of purchasing sex for money, rather than by defining it in terms of the
status of the woman.
A second concern that the proposal raises is its reliance on the
state to develop the civil rights claim. There is the risk that the state
349 A study of men who buy sex reports that the men "repeatedly stress[ ] the attraction
of a woman whom one could ask to do anything." McKeganey & Barnard, supra note 24,
at 53. The researchers concluded that for most of the men they interviewed, "the prosti-
tute seemed to be no more than the sex she sold." Id. A quote from one of the men
interviewed is typical: "[Y]ou've got a bit more dominance, you've got the money in your
pocket, then you've got the dominance over them." Id. This ruthless admission of a pur-
chaser of sex is tangible evidence in support of the civil rights proposal, as well as the need
for the law to recognize that consent is more likely to obscure inequality rather than cor-
rect it. Other statements showing the typicality of the respondents' views about what they
thought they were buying, include:
It's easier to ask a prostitute to do things because she's there to service you,
you know you're paying her for the service. It's like going to have your car
done, you tell them what you want done, they don't ask, you tell them you
want so and so done and if they don't do it, fair enough, you go down the road
to someone else.
Id.
It was just the fact that here were women who would do anything, you know
that was required, no bones about it plus the fact that there was no commit-
ment at all. You know, it was for a specific purpose that you became involved,
then it was over and you could go back to work. If you wanted another one it
was just a matter of going along making your choice and so on.
Id. at 52.
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will distort the purposes of the proposal and pursue limited, and per-
haps even detrimental, ends.350 That risk is heightened by the
continuing vitality of the degeneracy/respectability dichotomy. In rec-
ognition of the potential for the law to be misused and distorted, the
civil rights proposal relies on women in prostitution to decide when
they are harmed and whether they want to turn to the state to pursue
their claims. An additional benefit is that the proposed reform en-
ables a woman with few resources to pursue her claim through the
existing state civil rights administrative process.
A third question that the proposal must address to be viable is
whether well-established civil fights jurisprudence can address ade-
quately the harms of prostitution. The problem here is that existing
statutes and court decisions seldom recognize the interrelationship
among different forms of discrimination and require, instead, that
claimants choose one form of discrimination or another.3 51 The de-
generacy/respectability framework shows that prostitution is not, ex-
clusively, based upon sex discrimination, but implicates discrimination
based on class, race, and sexuality as well. For the law to provide a
remedy for the harm caused by the purchase of sex for money, it must
take into account how prostitution perpetuates all forms of discrimi-
nation. In light of this, the civil rights proposal does not depend on
the claimant's membership in any specific protected class, or on hav-
ing any particular status. Thus the risk that the law will fail to redress
all the harms of prostitution is reduced because the claim is based on
an act-purchasing sex for money-that crosses socially subordinated
categories.
350 Cf. Lacey, supra note 340, at 91-95 (discussing range of problems created by femi-
nists relying on "the state as the main source of political/regulatory power"); MacKinnon,
supra note 343, at 29-30 (discussing disadvantages for women of having to rely on state
under criminal justice system and advantages for women being able to pursue on their own
their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994), which creates cause of action allowing
persons to sue alleging conspiracy to deprive them of civil rights).
351 See Martha Chamallas, Jean Jew's Case: Resisting Sexual Harassment in the Acad-
emy, 6 Yale J.L. & Feminism 71, 85 n.83 (1994) (noting that "traditional structure of Title
VII cases may have obscured racial issues" in sexual harassment claim brought by Chinese
woman because plaintiff is "forced to choose whether to litigate the case as a case of racial
or sexual harassment" and "there is no distinctive cause of action under Title VII designed
for women of color... who are subjected to racist and sexist behavior" (citation omitted));
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 19S9 U.
ChLi. Legal F. 139,149-50 (arguing that many discriminating employment experiences Black
women face are not recognized by traditional definitions of race and gender
discrimination).
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A final concern is whether by using civil rights laws that provide
an individualized, as opposed to a group-based remedy, 52 the propo-
sal fails to address the harms of prostitution experienced by
subordinated groups.3 53 Although a jurisprudence based on group
mindedness might offer important opportunities to disrupt the degen-
eracy/respectability dichotomy, it would be a mistake to think that an
individually based claim has no far-reaching social effects. The antivi-
olence reforms that we discussed earlier led to the recognition of legal
rights and remedies for individuals who, because of their group mem-
bership, were previously silenced by the law.354 The reforms' effects
went well beyond securing the safety of women in their homes, the
workplace, or on the street; they challenged existing discursive ar-
rangements and have significantly influenced contemporary economic,
political, and social relations. While it is difficult to predict the far-
reaching effects of civil rights claims based on prostitution, it is clear
that the law's current posture on prostitution is untenable because it
leaves existing hierarchical relationships intact.
Prostitution, as currently configured within the criminal justice
system, is viewed as a threat to family life and the home.3 55 To
decriminalize the activities of a woman engaged in prostitution, and to
accord her the fights of citizenship through a civil rights remedy, is to
remove the woman's conduct from the realm of moral opprobrium.
The purpose of these changes is to reconfigure the crime from one in
which all parties to the market exchange of sex for money are trans-
gressing the norms of family and home, to one in which those persons
who support and perpetuate the purchase of another person for sex
are undermining society's commitment to equality.
The effect of these reforms will be to immunize women in prosti-
tution from criminal liability and provide them with the opportunity
to pursue legal remedies. There is no doubt that our proposals will
meet with objections from those advocates for women in prostitution
who will argue that, by treating the purchase of sex as a crime and an
352 United States law generally resists recognizing group harms or remedies. See Austin,
supra note 338, at 885 n.40 (explaining that "[g]roup defamation claims brought on behalf
of large groups are disfavored in part because they essentially attack political points of
view and opinions" (citation omitted)); Roberts, supra note 299, at 396, 403 (arguing that
preference for individual liberty separated from social power leads to preference for pri-
vate remedies over collective solutions and advocating for "an understanding of liberty and
equality that accounts for group oppression" (footnote omitted)).
353 Cf. Lacey, supra note 340, at 91 (critiquing proposals to provide individualized, as
opposed to group-based, remedy for women harmed by pornography).
354 See supra Part II (discussing law reforms to domestic violence, sexual harassment,
and rape laws).
355 See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text (discussing sterilization of urban
space).
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act of discrimination, these legal reforms interfere with a woman's
right to make a living in prostitution.3 56 Others are likely to disagree
with our approach because it rejects the view that prostitution is an
expression of sexual autonomy.357 Their arguments are particularly
attractive because they seem to be reflecting and respecting women's
choices. They can only advocate for a woman's right to engage in
prostitution, however, by denying her the right to claim that prostitu-
tion is an act of inequality that harmed her. They cannot claim they
are expanding and not limiting women choices and neither can we.
Arguing about which approach expands or limits choices, however,
reflects a misunderstanding of the respectability analysis. The signifi-
cance of the analysis is that it moves beyond the rhetoric of choice and
coercion. What the analysis of the degeneracy/respectability dichot-
omy demonstrates is that a discourse based on choices, which is noth-
ing more than a restating of the consent/coercion and private/public
divides, reinforces existing hierarchical relations.358 Until we recog-
nize the harm of pursuing respectability, what reformers may intend
as a strategy to respect women's choices may do little more than per-
petuate subordination.
CONCLUSION
Currently, the prevailing legal and social view of prostitution is
that it is a victimless crime of immoral conduct 359 that can be tolerated
356 See supra notes 9, 25 and accompanying text (describing position of some groups
advocating on behalf of women in prostitution).
357 See Bell, supra note 323, at 108-09, 135 (describing prostitutes' rights discourse as
linking sex knowledge and power so that "positioning of sex workers as 'sex experts' moves
prostitutes... to being the owners and producers of sexual knowledge" and prostitutes'
rights movement as constructing "prostitution as an active expression of women's sexual-
ity"); Lars 0. Ericsson, Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical As-
sessment, in Sex, Morality, and the Law 87, 101 (Lori Gren & George E. Panichas eds.,
1997) (arguing that "we must liberate ourselves from those mental fossils which prevent us
from looking upon sex and sexuality with the same naturalness as upon our cravings for
food and drink [and that] ... we may have something to learn from prostitution in this
respect"); International Committee for Prostitutes' Rights World Charter and World
Whores' Congress Statements, in Sex Work, supra note 323, at 305, 310 (affirming "the
right of all women to determine their own sexual behavior, including commercial ex-
change, without stigmatization or punishment" (emphasis omitted)); Veronica Monet, Se-
dition, in Whores and Other Feminists, supra note 323, at 217,221 ("Sex in general and sex
for money really is something that a fully feminist woman can choose to engage in. And
that choice can liberate, empower, and raise her self-esteem."); Rosemarie Tong, Prostitu-
tion, in Sex, Morality, and the Law, supra, at 107, 118 (describing various analyses of pros-
titution, including "existentialist feminists" who view prostitute as "an exceptional woman
who dares to challenge the sexual mores of her society").
358 See supra Part I (discussing relationship among consent, privacy, and inequalities).
359 See, e.g., Donna Laframboise, Our Laws Won't Stop Prostitution, Toronto Star, Dec.
18, 1995, at A17, available in 1995 WL 6031168 (describing prostitution as victimless
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as long as it does not disrupt business districts or quiet neighbor-
hoods.360 Our society, in its literature, science, performing arts, adver-
tising, and media, simultaneously romanticizes and demonizes a
woman who is engaged in prostitution.361 Society constructs her as a
powerful entrepreneur in the marketplace exercising her autonomy, as
well as an immoral repository for disease and corruption. Both these
constructions immunize the purchaser of sex from serious legal scru-
tiny.362 It is this popular conception of prostitution that makes it both
a potent marker of the boundary between degeneracy and respectabil-
ity and a practice of inequality.
We began this Article with excerpts from the legislative history of
a Minnesota statute creating a civil cause of action giving persons in
crime); Clarence Page, Hugh Grant's Saga Ripe with Intrigue, Entertainment Value,
Fresno Bee, July 13, 1995, at B5, available in Lexis, News Library, FRESNO file (same);
Tom Puleo, Runner-Up Won't Quit Field Just Yet, Hartford Courant, Oct. 2, 1998, at B1,
available in 1998 WL 20772662 (same); Bill Wallace et al., Hallinan Takes Slim Lead in
District Attorney Race, S.F. Chron., Dec. 13, 1995, at Al (same); Arthur Drache, Revenue
Poised to Broaden Its Definition of Couple, Fr. Post, Sept. 8, 1998, at 23 (describing pros-
titution as immoral); Fred Reed, No Easy Answers Except One: Sex Sells, Wash. 1Times,
July 6, 1998, at C2 (same). But see Deborah L. Rhode, Who Is the Criminal?, Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 25, 1995, at A21 (arguing that prostitution is "falsely portrayed" as victimless crime).
360 See, e.g., Debra Franco, Police Aid in Reclaiming East Platte Avenue: Patrols Target
"Unwanted Element" on 1-Mile Strip, Colo. Springs Gazette, Jan. 10, 1999, available in
1999 WL 6186108 (describing business owners' and area residents' organizing to reclaim
neighborhood "from prostitutes and drug dealers"); Deborah Holton, Neighbors Prepare
to Battle Sex Superstore in SW Portland, Portland Oregonian, Jan. 12, 1999, at B5 (report-
ing residents are expressing concern about neighborhood decline by presence of prostitu-
tion activity and sexually oriented businesses); Reed, supra note 359, at C2 (observing that
"[d]ecent people in the region are sick of the girls" and that "they cause actual traffic
jams"); Paul Shukovsky, Neighbors Uniting to Fight Aurora Prostitution Drug, Sex Activi-
ties on Streets Described, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 12, 1999, at Bi, available in 1997
WL 6579666 (reporting of neighbors complaining to city officials and police "of vice per-
meating their neighborhood").
361 See Hobson, supra note 17, at 235; see also Brock & Thistlethwaite, supra note 3, at
9, 30, 178-79. Brock & Thistlethwaite note that "the romanticization of prostitutes in
Christian cultures is magnified in most Hollywood versions of prostitution." Id. at 9. They
further observe that these sexist stereotypes are compounded by racism that finds its legacy
in such cultural and media stereotypes of the prostitute as Suzy Wong and Miss Saigon and
portrayals in the mainstream media of African American women as always available for
sex. See id. at 9, 30, 178-79. A third image of a woman in prostitution built on the coer-
cion/consent framework is that of the "innocent" victim who is tricked or coerced into the
life of prostitution. See Rosen, supra note 253, at 46-47 (reporting that Progressive Era
reformers presented woman engaged in prostitution "as one of two polarized images: the
innocent victim or the sinister polluter"). The influence of psychoanalytic theory on the
images and construction of prostitution in the twentieth century cannot be underestimated.
See generally Hobson, supra note 17, at 184-89 (describing how psychoanalysis reinforces
gender and class distinctions and places prostitution outside of discourse of social justice).
362 See Jeffreys, supra note 3, at 214-19 (explaining how assumptions about "natural"
male sexual urges places john beyond social, including academic, scrutiny).
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prostitution the right to sue for damages.3 63 The legislators assumed
that prostitution was an exclusively gendered issue and demonstrated
their commitment to protecting gender equality by honoring a
woman's consent in recognition of her sexual autonomy.3 "6 Their
views of prostitution and their analysis of gender equality, however,
can be understood as part of the practices that maintain inequality
when seen through the lens of degeneracy and respectability. The
civil cause of action, as well as other antiviolence reforms, reinforces
social hierarchies by pursuing strategies of respectability. Nonethe-
less, they have the potential to transform our understanding of prosti-
tution and to undermine the degeneracy/respectability dichotomy that
prostitution embodies. The dichotomy not only explains the inade-
quacies of antiviolence law reforms, it also explains why those inade-
quacies seem inevitable. The identification of the home, cleanliness,
and health with respectability, and of the streets, filth, and disease
with degeneracy, establishes a value system in which only some per-
sons are deemed worthy. In this system, to relinquish a claim to re-
spectability is to relinquish the fights of full citizenship that deem
women to be worthy of protection from harm. Until we can develop
equality strategies and a theory of citizenship that do not depend on a
concept of worthiness, prostitution as a paradigmatic model of unwor-
thiness and as a practice of inequality will continue to mark the degen-
eracy/respectability divide and reinforce social hierarchies. The
analysis of degeneracy and respectability transforms the meaning of
prostitution and demands that each of us attend to the words of W.H.
Auden, who wrote, "All we are not stares back at what we are."3
363 See supra notes 3-21 and accompanying text (describing statute and some of its legis-
lative history).
364 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing some of statute's legislative
history).
365 W.-. Auden, The Sea and the Mirror ch.1 (Prospero to Ariel), in Collected Poems
311, 313 (Edward Mendelson ed., 1976).
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